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Abstract 
This dissertation develops a pedagogy of professional communication for online education 
that provides a degree of feedback higher than that of a classroom setting.  In order to 
construct such pedagogy, I examine professional communication from three perspectives: 
cognitive, technological, and rhetorical.  Cognition and technology are becoming, in many 
senses, indistinguishable.   Technology is extending and augmenting cognitive processes 
such as memory through databases, spatial awareness through various global positioning 
technologies, and especially the greater cognitive attention system via the sheer magnitude of 
media channels.  Much of this extension and augmentation is happening beneath, or at least 
outside of consciousness; in most cases, we are not consciously aware of the cognitive effects 
of technologies such as SIM cards or databases.  They are ubiquitous, deeply embedded, and 
routine. Katherine Hayles and Nigel Thrift designate this effect of technology on cognition as 
the “technological unconscious”. I term this increasingly unconscious relationship of 
cognition and technology as technogenetic.  
Following Niklas Luhmann, I argue that the autopoietic operationally closed nature of the 
human biological system forecloses purity; as Luhmann expresses it, “only communication 
communicates,” not communicators.  While machines experience the pure communication of 
digital code, human beings must rely on cognitive processes, constrained and afforded by 
mental affinities.  This dissertation explores research in a number of disciplines from the 
work of Sperber and Mercier in cognitive psychology on the argumentative nature of human 
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reasoning to the work of Jeanne Fahnestock, Randy Allen Harris, and others on cognitive 
rhetoric and figural logic to conclude that argumentation in its many facets is the key 
rhetorical skill necessary to navigate a technogenetic world.     
A technogenetic rhetoric engages writing as argumentation within the extra-discursive factors 
created by the technological unconscious.  Technogenetic rhetoric also assumes the 
visuospatial aspects of technologically enframed communication.  As a pedagogy, 
technogenetic rhetoric follows a constructivist model; in this dissertation, realized by a 
contextually authentic online simulation game that I call Ametros: A Professional 
Communication Simulation Game.  Ametros is a Greek word that means “without measure” 
that I use to represent the complexity of contemporary technogenetic systems of 
communication.  
Ametros organizes and deploys the elements of discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial 
rhetoric in a ludic environment that provides a combination of human and artificial 
intelligence driven feedback superior to both existing online solutions and most large 
classroom settings.  The artificial intelligence, in turn, develops recursively through the 
creation and of corpora of student communication using an annotation interface based on 
ontologies of argumentation and figuration.  These annotations will engage natural language 
processing algorithms that will, over time, allow the machine to provide real-time feedback 
on communication skills of the student.  Ametros provides an experiential and ludic 
environment that moves pedagogy of composition, in all of its forms from one of delimited 
process to a procedural logic of iteration better able to navigate complex systems where 
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audiences as assemblages of human and technological actors determine and are determined 
by, interactions of cognition and technology.    
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Introduction 
The genesis of my dissertation can be traced back to a student survey on an online course 
that I had developed for the University of Waterloo Department of English in 2009.  I was 
given the opportunity to redesign an early version of the wholly online Genres of Business 
Communication course.  The original version contained excellent content, but was limited in 
delivery.  Content was presented in text-based slides with little or no student interaction.  
Over six months, I recorded lectures, created multimedia presentations to accompany the 
audio, and developed case-study-based workshops to serve as practical exercises of genre 
theory.  I eagerly opened the student survey of the first offering of the new course expecting 
to find high praise and wonderment for my highly interactive course.  While the number of 
angry and disappointed comments was greatly reduced from the previous version, I was 
shocked as I read through comment after comment lamenting the lack of feedback on work; 
the lack of connection with the Instructor and Teaching Assistants; the inconsistent grading; 
finally, and most devastating, it was dull.  A dramatic improvement in the digital delivery of 
content had not led to a level of student satisfaction remotely close to the levels achieved in a 
classroom environment.   
The simple answer is that an online environment cannot compete with a teacher in a 
classroom.  And in many respects this is true, but there had to be more to the dissatisfaction.  
Professional communication, by its very nature a praxis where theory must be engaged with 
practice in order to be mastered, would seem to be perfectly suited to the online environment 
where students are able to work through the content of the theory and apply it to workshops 
and case studies without time constraints.  The problem, as I see it, with professional online 
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pedagogy is the direct modal transfer of classroom teaching methods to a digital 
environment.  A recorded lecture is a lecture and automated PowerPoint slides are 
PowerPoint slides; workshops in a classroom are workshops online; instructor response to 
writing in an online setting is still response; and cases are case whether discussed in person 
or read online.  What is different is the degree of interaction.  In a classroom, the student is 
able to discuss and question the material and while this is available online through discussion 
boards and email, the asynchronous nature of the interaction, often considered the greatest 
positive of an online environment, actually has a negative impact on student perception of 
feedback.  Comments on the length of time a question takes to be answered are common, as a 
student often needs support at the moment they are engaged in the work.  When we mirror 
face-to-face lecture and slide methods in a digital environment, cognitive dissonance can 
easily arise, where student’s expectations, geared to classroom structures, cannot match the 
off-synch reality of online feedback. 
A less obvious reason than dissonant delivery methods for student dissatisfaction with an 
online environment is that of misplaced pedagogical strategies.  Most professional 
communication pedagogies focus on a process method where students are exposed to a step-
by-step, albeit recursive, model of audience, purpose, and scope analysis.  The primary focus 
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of such pedagogies is textual composition with a limited focus on visual communication.1 
Deploying process pedagogy in a digital environment creates another cognitive dissonance in 
the student.  The environment does not align with the method; digital online environments 
require pedagogy capable of teaching the composition and delivery of routine, negative, and 
persuasive communications in an amalgamation of textual and the visual modalities.  In other 
words, technologies in the form of online course delivery, as well as modes of 
communication from email to Twitter demand a new set of pedagogical methods.     
The basis of a new set of pedagogical methods can be found in the scholarship of 
technogenesis and epigenetic change.  A number of theorists including Katherine Hayles 
(2012), Bernard Stiegler (1998, 2009), and Gilbert Simondon (2006) have explored a theory 
of technogenesis where human beings have evolved in concert with technological 
development (Hayles 2012 p. 10).  Such evolution can be found in the biological and 
psychological changes resulting from environmental factors defined as “epigenetic” changes 
(11).  Hayles (2012) and Stiegler (2010) describe changes to cognitive patterns of human 
attention related to the volume and accessibility of contemporary digital media.  Hayles 
relates a predilection of the native digital generation for hyper-attention over deep attention 
                                                
 
 
1	  A	  number	  of	  business	  and	  technical	  communication	  texts	  such	  as	  Carolyn	  Meyer’s	  
Communicating	  for	  Results	  are	  moving	  towards	  contemporary	  digital	  composition	  with	  
chapters	  on	  social	  media	  and	  infographics,	  but	  the	  overall	  focus	  remains	  on	  text	  
composition.	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that results in neuroplastic alterations to cognitive behavior.  Stiegler presents evidence of 
increases in diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder that parallel the 
development of digital media technologies.  Technogenesis is also related to work in what is 
termed “extended cognition” by Andy Clark (2009) where cognitive activities such as 
memory and reasoning, once thought to reside solely in the mind/brain, leak out into the 
world in the form of technologies such as databases and processors.  While such extended 
cognition existed before digital media (Clark 2009, xxv), for instance, relates physicist 
Richard Feynman’s claim that his “work” was done “on” paper and not in his mind), but 
digital media has extended cognitive capabilities exponentially.  The sheer volume of 
information available in a couple of finger swipes or mouse clicks is unfathomable and 
presents challenges to both composition and reception.  Hayles (2012) refers to a 
“contemporary technogenesis” that finds that 
as digital media, including networked and programmable desktop stations, mobile 
devices, and other computational media embedded in the environment, become more 
pervasive, they push us in the direction of faster communication, more intense and 
varied information streams, more integration of humans and intelligent machines, and 
more interactions of language and code (11). 
In such an environment, agents of communication include both human beings and 
technology.  In fact, Bruno Latour (1987) places technological objects as actors in network 
interactions on the same ontological level as human actors.  Humans and technology 
coevolve as complex systems.   
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Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, in The Techno-Human Condition (2011) describe 
three systemic levels of human and technology interaction. Level I is technology in and of 
itself, for example, Skype as a code-based computer application. Level II is technological 
integration into greater systems of human/technology interaction.  Keeping with the Skype 
example, Level II consists of the application in use on the greater Internet-based 
communication network.  Level III involves the integration of technology and human in the 
world; for example, Skype and human as participants in systems of communication.  The 
complexity of each Level builds exponentially; making the teaching process primarily aimed 
at Level I interactions problematic.  Technogenesis makes process pedagogy problematic.  
Digital media expands the volume of communication, but also its form; visual 
communication is at least as prevalent as text.  Professional communication pedagogy, 
whether delivered online or in person, requires a methodology that takes technogenesis and 
the epigenetic changes to cognitive faculties such as attention and memory into account. 
The goal of my project is to develop a pedagogy of professional communication for an 
online environment that provides a sound foundation in a triangulation of three key areas of 
study—cognition, technology, and rhetoric—that I am defining as technogenetic rhetoric.  
Cognition, technology, and rhetoric are entwined in the communication of everyday life; my 
project entwines them in the pedagogy of communication.    Technology affects and extends 
cognitive processes such as attention and memory while our rhetorical use of language and 
image reveals a confluence of cognitive affinities.  There is a relationship of dependence and 
construction between the elements of technogenetic rhetoric; each element depends on the 
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other two in order to construct its object (see Figure 1). Digital applications such as Twitter, 
for instance, at once demand and construct attention through their various technological 
platforms, through their cognitive appeals, and through their rhetorical dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Technogenetic Rhetoric 
Figure 2 is a graphical depiction of technogenetic rhetoric of professional communication.  
Context, pedagogy, delivery and objectives serve as the key components of my project.   
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Figure 2: Technogenetic Rhetoric of Professional Communication 
The autopoietic complex systems theory of Nicklas Luhmann in relation Jurgen Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action are placed in a frame of Kenneth Burke’s concepts of 
identification and consubstantiation to establish the context of professional communication in 
this pedagogy, while the cognitivist frameworks of Piaget and Vygotsky provide a theory of 
digitally situated learning.  Technogenetic rhetoric of professional communication is defined 
through cognitive rhetorical theories of argumentation and figural logic in terms of discursive 
(text), extra-discursive (technological effects), and visuospatial (image) communication.   In 
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terms of delivery and objectives, technogenetic rhetoric requires a pedagogical environment 
that includes applications and tools suited to feedback, response, and assessment in a digital 
setting.  One promising delivery method, explored in this dissertation, is a simulation game 
based on the digital games and learning scholarship of Schaffer and Resnick (1999), Gee 
(2003, 2005), and Bogost (2007) that moves past the extrinsic nature of cases and workshops 
towards an immersive experience of professional communication.   
We teach methods of professional communication to a world no longer recognizable to 
pedagogical processes of composition.  Digital technology has made step-by-step process-
based pedagogies if not obsolete, then at least less effective; reports are increasingly being 
augmented by infographics, memos, emails, even micro-blogging and IM messaging. Bullet 
points are overtaking paragraphs in routine professional communication, and communication 
is frequently truncated into one hundred and forty-four character messages.  The design of a 
document is more important than ever with infographic synthesizing of image and text.  The 
sheer number of communications has exploded, with the number of genres not far behind.  
Professionals receive hundreds of messages per day.  People are texting and tweeting while 
listening to presentations, and presenters have their eye on Twitter as they speak.  I am not 
arguing that the iterative process of writing does not have a place in pedagogy designed for 
such a proliferation of media genres; iteration is a foundational, but incomplete aspect of 
digital composition.  I am arguing for pedagogy that subsumes current models of response 
and process into pedagogy capable of addressing technogenetic effects.    
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Problematically for composition pedagogy, technology wreaks havoc on the cognitive 
attention system by extending our ability to perform cognitive tasks related to memory.  
Katherine Hayles (2012) and Bernard Stiegler (2010) describe a state of “hyper-attention” 
where individuals move rapidly from one object of focus to the next without ever attending 
deeply to any. Hayles (2012) and Thrift (2005) view the effect of digital multitasking as 
forming a technological unconscious where the role of digital media technology has fallen 
below our conscious awareness.  Heidegger (1977) called this effect, where technology 
becomes a part of our way of being, “enframing.”  Digital media technologies demand 
attention to the point that their hailing is no longer viewed as such.  The effects and affects of 
technology slip beneath conscious recognition in an almost ideological fashion.  We live in a 
state of hyper-attention without recognizing that we do or, when we do, without 
acknowledging the cause.  The environment in which we teach is changing at an ever faster 
clip.  We teach in a technogenetic world. 
What has not changed is the need for rhetoric, particularly argumentation structure and 
schemes, as well as figural logic, a specialized project of argumentation theory developed by 
Jeanne Fahnestock (1999, 2005), to engage a technogenetic world.  Rhetoric as 
argumentation and figuration is a cognitive activity.  Cognitive rhetoric reveals the symmetry 
between how we form our communications and our cognitive activities.  There is currently a 
divide in the scholarship of cognitive rhetoric.  Cognitive rhetoric has taken two, so-far 
unconnected paths. On the one hand, in the work associated with Flower and Hayes (1981), it 
has strong connections with process theories of composition and situational cognition. This 
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approach emphasizes the dynamics of discourse, and therefore lends itself to cognitive side 
of a technogenetic theory rather naturally, but it ignores technology. On the other hand, the 
work of Mark Turner (1997), as influenced by the seminal book by George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson (1980), Metaphors we live by, cognitive rhetoric has strong connections to 
developments in poetics and linguistics, and studies very closely the relationships between 
rhetorical forms and cognitive processes.  In the same vein, Jeanne Fahnestock (1999) is 
developing a theory of figural logic that investigates rhetorical figures as epitomes of 
reasoning.  Additional support for cognitive rhetoric is also found in cognitive psychology 
where Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier (2011) propose a theory that human reasoning is 
fundamentally argumentative.  These approaches emphasize the cognitive affinities our 
minds have to certain forms and configurations of language.  But they do not explore the 
technological aspects of communication. They say nothing about technology at all.  While 
scholars in the various streams of cognitive rhetoric seem only vaguely aware of each other, 
and rarely cite each other’s work, the two strains together relate cognitive affinities of form 
to the dynamic processes of creativity vital to a technogenetic rhetoric.  Technogenetic 
rhetoric is a synthesis of cognitive rhetorical theory with theories of digital media, extended 
cognition, and the technological unconscious.  The purpose of technogenetic rhetoric is the 
development of pedagogy capable of preparing students of professional communication with 
the skills and insights necessary to communicate in a world of technologically driven hyper-
attention. 
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The technologically driven hyper-attentive world is also the cause of the negative reviews 
of my online course.  We cannot paste old teaching methods onto an online course and 
consider ourselves to have created digital pedagogy.  Digital pedagogy has to mirror its 
environment.  Lectures, no matter how well designed the slides, are ineffective online if the 
context remains confused.  In other words, we cannot lecture online as if in a classroom.  In 
order to deeply understand theories of argumentation, figural logic, design, and visual images 
crucial to communicating in a hyper-attentive digital environment, students need to 
experience the material in a manner that aligns with that environment.  My solution is based 
on the work of James Paul Gee (2003) in video games and learning, and Schaffer and 
Resnick (1999) in epistemic simulations, and Ian Bogost’s theory of procedural rhetoric and 
literacy.2  I propose Ametros, a professional communication simulation game that places the 
student in the role of professional communicator tasked with solving problems using theory 
and techniques learned in the context of a professional genre such as finance, marketing, 
operations, supply-chain, or technical.  The Greek word Ametros means “without measure”, 
which I take to aptly represent the complexity of technogenetic communication systems.  The 
context of the simulated organization is guided by the work of Niklas Luhmann on complex 
social systems.  For Luhmann, both human beings and social formations such as the 
                                                
 
 
2	  Bogost	  provides	  a	  very	  wide	  definition	  for	  the	  term	  “procedure”.	  	  He	  views	  a	  procedure	  as	  
culturally	  and	  socially	  defined	  interactions	  between	  agents	  both	  human	  and	  technological.	  	  
Procedure	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  rote,	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  measures.	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professional organization are autopoietic, operationally closed complex systems whose 
properties emerge out of the operations of their existence.  A human being is a combination 
of biological and mental systems closed off from the world and other human systems.  Being 
operationally closed systems, human beings cannot communicate; “only communication 
communicates,” as Luhmann puts it.  In other words once we initiate communication, it is no 
longer in our control. Human systems can only receive communication without access to the 
mental processes of the sender that went into its formation.  Communication between human 
systems is always incomplete.   A “double contingency” is formed where both the production 
and reception of communication is subject to hermeneutics (Luhmann 1984).    
Organizations for Luhmann are defined by communication.  The genres and structures and 
flow-paths of communication are what make an organization an organization, and what 
makes a particular kind of organization (government, NGO, manufacturing plant, service 
industry) the particular kind of organization it is.  Luhmann’s conception of human beings 
and organizations as systems aligns with the enactive theory of cognition which views 
cognition as an interrelationship between mind/brain and world that cuts a middle path 
between cognitivism and connectionism.  The term enactive refers to the perceptually guided 
action of the perceiver in her own local situation. The embodiment of the perceiver, not the 
internal or external representation of a preexisting world, drives cognition.  Cognition is the 
interdependent coupling of the world and the systems of perception.  Digital technologies 
mediate these couplings to two effects: (1) mediation drops below cognitive perception as it 
becomes ontologically entwined with the content where it is impossible to see the medium is 
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the message.  And (2) this unconscious mediation through aspects of immediacy, ubiquity, 
and clarity, gives the illusion of communication no longer bound by Luhamn’s double 
contingency.  This illusion leads to the question of human agency; if communication between 
human beings and between organizations is doubly contingent and reliant on enactive 
“coupling” that is masked by digital technology, how is human agency and motivation 
possible in a world of technologically unconcious operationally closed systems?  Luhmann’s 
enactive view of complex systems poses some problems for rhetoric in the areas of agency 
and motivation that Kenneth Burke’s conceptions of identification and consubstantiation help 
to alleviate.  Rhetoric as argumentation and form creates couplings that are more effective at 
managing the movement of communication from one system to another. 
Technogenetic rhetoric applies to communication, either produced or received via a 
technological medium, as it exists in a world of complex human, social, and organizational 
systems.  Ametros creates such an environment of technology, complexity, and 
communication through pedagogical authenticity and experience developed with the 
cognitivist learning theories of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky.  Piaget offers a theory of 
experiential learning that aligns with relational theories of cognitive rhetoric where elements 
such as argument and form integrate with cognitive mechanisms and affinities.  Piaget, 
through his stages of cognitive development, presents a basis for the simulation-as-learning 
pedagogy of Ametros.  Vygotsky’s “zone of proximal development” (1978) offers a 
theoretical basis for the design of Ametros where human and artificial intelligence agents 
move students into higher levels of development than possible in a traditional online teaching 
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environment.  Ametros deploys the cognitivist theories of Piaget and Vygotsky by increasing 
the interaction of instructor, both human and machine, in an experiential setting.  And 
increased interaction leads directly to more detailed and timely feedback, the problem 
Ametros is designed to alleviate.  Students in the game environment engage their own and 
others’ work from a number of perspectives, including composition, reception, and most 
importantly, annotation.  Students experience doubly contingent complex systems through 
project-specific production and reception of communication; they respond and are responded 
to, producing or not producing actions that move their progress through the course and the 
game.  On a deeper level, students engage communications through annotation; students 
annotate their texts (and in the future, visual images) for elements of argumentation including 
structure, form (figural logic), and scheme.  These annotations are checked by human 
Teaching Assistants, but as the database of Ametros grows, the artificial intelligence agent 
will be able to help students in real time.  The corpus of argument elements will allow the 
student to engage a number of analytic tools that inherently provide feedback; visualization 
tools such as Araucaria, dialogue applications such as Arvina, and custom-designed 
applications (e.g., that provide analysis of argumentation schemes through an artificial 
dialogue based on Douglas Walton’s critical questions) are a few.  Ametros, as an ongoing 
research project, will produce a large and valuable corpus of professional communication 
specific argumentation that can be sub-divided into genres such as marketing, technical, 
supply-chain, legal, technical, and so on; into modes, such as bulletins, email, blogs, 
microblogs, and so on; into discursive frames such as addressivity, reflexivity, referentiality, 
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and so on; into rhetorical-figure clusters, such as repetitions, symmetries, contrasts, and so 
on; the pie can be sliced in as many ways, or as few, as the researchers choose.  The growing 
general Ametros corpus, and its more specific corpora, will allow and encourage further 
research into a wide variety of professional communication areas.  The ultimate goal of 
Ametros is the development of an online environment that provides a higher degree of 
feedback not by automating all existing functions of the Teaching Assistant and Instructor, 
but through the creation of a more effective division of labour between human and machine.  
The artificial intelligence engines suggested in the following dissertation will be capable of 
providing structural feedback in terms of argument construction through schemes and 
figures, providing more time for the Teaching Assistant to respond to the discursive, non-
discursive, and visuospatial compositions of the students following the response models of 
Nancy Sommers (1982), Richard Haswell (2006), and modified version of Jeff Sommers’ 
Response 2.0 architecture of audio response (2013).  The goal is not only increased instances 
of feedback, but also a higher degree of compositional response. 
1.1 Chapter outline 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters, each representing a key element of the 
project.  Each chapter is headed by its appropriate section of the overall graphic depiction of 
technogenetic pedagogy.  The figures serve as a visual abstract of the chapter contents. 
Chapter 2 establishes a foundation for a technogenetic rhetoric of professional 
communication.  In section 2.1, the effects of technology on professional communications 
  16 
are examined, particularly in light of Heidegger’s theory of enframing where technology 
slips below conscious awareness to form the essence of communicative action.  Section 2.2 
of the chapter defines and describes the Greater Attention System in terms of Nigel Thrift’s 
concept of the “technological unconscious” where the ubiquity of technology causes it to 
sink below recognition as it expands our cognitive abilities.  In section 2.3, the systemic 
context of professional communication is explored in light of Luhmann’s theory of 
autopoietic human and social systems. Section 2.4 examines the contextual space of 
organizations as systems.  Section 2.5 concludes the chapter by bringing Jurgen Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action into contact with Luhmann’s work by way of Kenneth Burke 
and Actor Network Theory.  Defining the complex systemic nature of professional 
communication in terms of human agency is critical to the development of technogenetic 
rhetoric. 
Chapter 3 introduces the discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial nature of 
technogenetic rhetoric.  Discursive refers to the written and spoken aspects of 
communication; extra-discursive refers to elements of communication that fall outside of 
discourse and visual image; while visuospatial refers to the visual aspects of communication 
from typeface to digital image. In section 3.1 on discursive argumentation, I follow a review 
of argumentation in light of the Luhmann and Habermas debate on communicative agency 
with a discussion of Sperber and Mercier’s (2011) work on argumentative reasoning. I 
conclude the section with a review of Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentative logic as the 
structural basis on my pedagogy.   In section 3.2 on form, I explore the cognitive and 
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argumentative aspects of rhetorical figuration and figural logic focusing primarily on the 
work of Kenneth Burke, Richard Gregg, Randy Allen Harris, and Jeanne Fahnestock.  In 
section 3.3, I discuss the strategic argumentation strategies of Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as the argumentation schemes of Douglas Walton.  Section 3.4 
details the extra-discursive and visuospatial elements of technogenetic rhetoric. 
Chapter 4 develops a complex, digitally situated pedagogical basis for technogenetic 
rhetoric.  Section 4.1 describes technogenetic pedagogy in relation to the cognitive 
composition work of Linda Flower and John Hayes.  Section 4.2 defines shared and situated 
knowledge in terms of the constructivist pedagogy of Piaget and Vygotsky as a prelude to the 
introduction of a digital simulation game that aligns learning and experience.  Section 4.3 
further develops technogenetic pedagogy by introducing Gee’s theory of semiotic domain as 
a strategy to deal with the complications of organizational space created by Luhmann’s 
system theory.  Section 4.4 reviews selected examples of current professional communication 
pedagogy in comparison to technogenetic pedagogy.  Section 4.5 calls primarily on the work 
of Byron Hawk to establish a post-process pedagogy capable of dealing with the conception 
of audience as assemblage of technological and human systems.  Finally, section 4.6 
repurposes the work of Margaret Syverson on composition and complex systems, as well as 
actor-network theory to develop two analytical methods focused on the dimensions and 
attributes of communicative assemblages.  These methods serve as the pedagogical 
underpinnings of the professional communication simulation game.       
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Chapter 5 introduces the Professional Communication Simulation Game (Ametros) as a 
delivery medium for technogenetic pedagogy.  The chapter opens with a discussion of three 
key scholars of gaming and pedagogy: James Paul Gee, David Schaffer, and Ian Bogust.  
Gee’s work on semiotic domains and content is discussed in relation to Schaffer’s theory of 
“thick authenticity”, while Bogust offers a conception of procedural literacy important to the 
PCGS pedagogy.  Section 5.1 reviews current research into digital gaming and pedagogy 
while section 5.2 investigates the relationship between content and learning in a digital world 
with special emphasis on the work of Sealy and Brown.  Sections 5.3 and 5.4 introduce the 
game world and play of Ametros.  The elements of play, games, content, and authentic 
situated learning are applied to the design of Ametros.   
Chapter 6 outlines a series of Ametros objectives for online pedagogy that focus on 
feedback, a research program and protocol inherent to the PCGS involving corpora building 
and natural language processing, assessment, and finally, a brief outline of further research.  
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 develop pedagogical and natural language processing protocols that 
provide feedback superior to classroom-based courses by developing corpora of professional 
communication suitable for natural language processing.  Section 6.3 describes assessment 
protocols that align the needs of the institution with the reality of the professional 
organization.  Finally, section 6.4 suggests a research protocol and on-going program to 
study communication immersed in digital media through the construction of corpora and 
natural language processing applications. 
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Chapter 2 
Technology, Attention, and the Organization as System 
Professional Communication involves the production and reception of audio, speech, text, 
and visuals, in spatial and temporal media.  For the most part, traditional pedagogy is based 
on teaching process strategies to each element; students are taught the pre-writing process for 
textual production: purpose determination, audience analysis, and scope; students are taught 
the basics of presentation software: how many bullet points per page, where an image is 
placed and so on; students are taught the importance of volume, inflection, flow in an oral 
presentation; students are taught the angles, framing, composition, and so on, of visual 
semiotics; in some quarters, students are taught production concerns for video and other 
temporal media, such as juxtaposition, pace, camera movement, and so on.  But, while there 
Context
AttentionTechnology Systems Space Agency
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is some cross over in processes, the technics of professional communication are proliferating 
at a rate that far outstrips our ability to teach to the medium or the mode.  While text remains 
the basis of routine email communications, multimedia presentation software is fast 
becoming the medium of choice for all persuasive communication as a stand-alone document 
or accompanied by an oral presentation.  Blogs, wikis, and social media are increasingly the 
space of technical information.  Multimedia software applications that bring text, image, 
video, and speech into one communication event problematize pedagogy focused on media 
specific processes.  The answer to such pedagogical problems is often an instrumental 
approach aimed at extending process learning; how can text messaging be incorporated into 
the writing process and so on.  The instrumentalist view of technology is fixated on 
technological instances: this software application or that smartphone, examples of Allenby 
and Sarewitz’s (2011) Level I technology interaction.  I contend that the better pedagogical 
path lies in an understanding of what Heidegger would call the “essence” of technology.  
Heidegger (1977) eschews an instrumentalist view for a deeper relationship between human 
beings and technology; “[e]verywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether 
we passionately affirm or deny it,” he observed. “But we are delivered over to it in the worst 
possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which 
today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology” 
(311).  Technology “enframes” or reveals truth; enframing is the essence of technology 
where techne is a “bringing forth” that is more than a tool used as an end-to-a-means (320-
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25).  In other words, technology in professional communication has an ontological function 
beyond its instrumental use as tool.   
Enframing is on display in the modern meeting where presenters are communicating with 
speech, visual images, video, and text to an audience, some of whom are in the room while 
others are a continent away watching on a screen.  The presenters speak and click while the 
audience listens and watches while simultaneously reading and producing other 
communications to other audiences who in turn are sitting in their own meetings listening, 
watching, reading, and typing.  More is going on here than an instrumental example of the 
effect of video-conferencing, PowerPoint, streaming video, Blackberry use and so on.  
Communication is serving an exponentially constitutive role.  
Following the work of Niklas Luhmann, organizations are presented as networked systems 
that autopoietically establish their form through communicative acts.  While organizations 
are collections of individual subjects, the boundaries that separate and define their existence 
are created by communication.  A collection of lawyers is only a law firm if they produce and 
receive communications relating to their operations.  The firm is distinguished from the 
environments it inhabits by the communications it produces specific to its cases and 
administration.  Physical presence or even its members do not define the organization; it is 
the networked system of communications produced that establishes its ontology.  These 
networked systems of communication are complex in that boundaries formed by 
communication also prevent communication.  To put this idea in a less postmodern way, 
organizations can only imperfectly communicate with other organizations.  For example, a 
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lawyer member of a law firm (organization as networked system) produces communication 
in the form of a summation for a judge, a member of a number of nested systems (the overall 
legal system, the local jurisdiction and so on).  The summation is a communicative instance 
that defines the boundaries between the various organizational systems in play – but as soon 
as the communication leaves the lawyer’s mouth, it is out of her control. How the judge 
interprets and engages the communication are now constitutive elements of the 
organizational systems in which the judge resides.  In this sense the organizations are 
operationally closed systems.  Even though Luhmann believes only communication 
communicates, organizations do not (2013, 78-9).  The transactional communication model 
at the organizational level is complex.  Encoding and decoding not only define the 
transaction, they define the organization, with neither sender nor receiver in control.  In 
sections 2.3 and 2.4, I discuss in detail the autopoietic nature of organizations as social 
systems. 
To further complicate the make-up of the organization as system, human beings within 
such systems are themselves operationally closed autopoietic systems.  One mind cannot 
know the contents of another.  We can hope and predict and calculate, but we cannot know; 
we can only produce communication that is at the mercy of interpretation.  The enframing 
nature of technology combined with Luhmann’s autopoietic theory of human and 
organizational (social) systems create a challenge for professional communication pedagogy: 
if human beings and organizations are systems defined by their own biological and 
communicative actions bombarded from all directions by technologically driven 
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communication, how do we develop a rhetoric capable of working with complex and closed 
systems while navigating multiple streams of arrangement and delivery in the form of text, 
image, and voice?  Kenneth Burke’s (1950) concept of rhetoric as identification, with the 
goal of consubstantiation, serves as a guiding theory.  Rhetoric fulfills the need of the 
individual to feel connected in the face of what Burke describes as “division”.  Actor network 
theory developed by Latour, Law, and Callon provides a perspective of technology suitable 
for such a rhetoric.    
I suggest a “technogenetic rhetoric” that builds on the pioneering work in composition 
studies of Linda Flower and John Hayes while incorporating scholarship in the cognitive 
nature of argumentation, linguistic and image-based figuration, visual rhetoric, information 
design, as well as educational simulation and game studies.  A technogenetic rhetoric of 
professional communication maintains a focus on technologically situated invention while 
attempting to establish more effective links with audience as operationally closed system.  
The remainder of this chapter establishes a foundation for a technogenetic rhetoric of 
professional communication. Section 2.1, Technology, explores of the effects of technology 
on professional communications, particularly in light of enframing.  Section 2.2, The Greater 
Attention System, introduces Nigel Thrift’s concept of the “technological unconscious” 
where the ubiquity of technology causes it to sink below recognition as it expands our 
cognitive abilities.  Section 2.3, Organizations and Human Beings as Systems, explicates 
Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic human and social systems. Section 2.4, The Space of 
Organizations, briefly articulates the importance of conceptual space to such systems, and 
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section 2.5, Communicative Agency and Social Systems Theory, completes the chapter by 
bringing Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action into the fold and bridges it to 
Luhmann’s work by way of Kenneth Burke and Actor Network Theory.  Defining the 
complex systemic nature of professional communication in terms of human agency is critical 
to the development of technogenetic rhetoric. 
2.1 Technology 
Heidegger’s concept of enframing, a calling of attention to the underlying truth or form of 
things as the essence of technology, ironically aligns with the most pressing question society 
has concerning technology: is it good or bad for us?  Technology pundits such as Nicholas 
Carr (2012) believe hypermedia available over the Internet is degrading our ability to focus 
on complex tasks while others such as Stephen Johnson (2005) see only positive changes in 
the brain as we adapt through neural plasticity.  The debate rages on with one side looking 
backwards at our pre-Internet practices of linear task completion, our ability to focus on the 
solution of complex problems with unwavering concentration, while the other looks forward 
to an increased ability to multitask forming lateral connections of ideas that lead to greater 
innovation.  Theorists such as Clay Shirky (2010) believe digital communication media 
create psychologically and socially beneficial uses of our cognitive surplus, while 
Philosopher Bernard Stiegler (2010) feels we are letting down the younger generation by 
allowing digital media to appropriate the role of caregiver creating a “battle for intelligence” 
(16).  One side believes we are getting smarter and the other that we are losing our cognitive 
ability to engage in deep attention.  The debate itself, however, as Cathy Davidson (2011) 
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feels, is moot; the Internet is here to stay, whether it is good or bad for us is not the question 
we, as teachers of professional communication, need to be asking.  As technology enframes 
the underlying core of our professional practices, we need to be asking how and what do we 
teach that will help a person succeed in a system of hyper-communication.3 
Organizations are constituted by communication and operate as autopoietic operationally 
closed systems in an environment of human beings, themselves autopoietic operationally 
closed systems of consciousness.  Individual members of an organization are incapable of 
pure communication. Thought is not directly transferable into language; nor language into 
thought. Communication exists as the non-material, although not formless, substance of an 
organization (Luhmann 1996).  Communication technologies have changed the density of 
organizations through ever faster modes and ever more prolific media.  Communications--as 
a letter delivered by messenger on horseback, carried as telegraph sent through a pneumatic 
tube in the nineteenth century, as a telex in the mid-twentieth century, or as an email in the 
early twenty-first century--constitute social systems and organizations.  As technology has 
evolved, the quantity and speed of such transmissions has increased organizational density.  
The professional of the mid-twentieth century, opening the dozen or so letters delivered by 
                                                
 
 
3	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  debate	  over	  technology	  and	  intelligence	  is	  moot	  in	  an	  ethical	  
sense,	  the	  debate	  is	  important	  and	  vital.	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that,	  in	  a	  pragmatic	  sense,	  
teachers	  of	  professional	  communication	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  function	  in	  an	  technogentic	  
and	  epigenetic	  world.	  
  26 
the mail carrier, could work through the hermeneutic activities of production and reception of 
language as text in a linear manner, dealing with situations or problems one after another as 
ingrained by the predominant, Fredrick Taylor influenced, management theories of the day, 
where work was subdivided into tasks and processes (see Taylor, 1911).  On the other hand, 
the professional in the twenty-first century struggles to maintain a linear path in her work 
while being deluged by hundreds of communications per day.  This observation seems so 
banal and obvious that it is hardly worth discussing, but by taking a Heideggarian approach 
to the problem of the twenty-first century professional, technology brings forth the truth of 
the situation.  Technological shifts uncover the manner in which we work.  As Catherine 
Davidson states in Now You See It: “we had to be trained to inhabit the twentieth century 
comfortably and productively.  Everything about school and work in the twentieth century 
was designed to create and reinforce separate subjects, separate cultures, separate grades, 
separate functions, separate spaces for personal life, work, private life, and all the other 
divisions” (13).  Taylorism dominated workplace practices of the twentieth century. Tasks 
were identified and separated and then completed in a linear and orderly fashion.  In 
professional management settings, theories such as management-by-objective, where agreed 
upon goals are linearly pursued, dominated the field.  Technologies in the instrumental form 
of notebook computers, iPads, BlackBerrys, and Skype, have made such practices 
problematic.  It is not that management-by-objective (MBO) strategies are now obsolete. 
Technology, however, has revealed the direction in which we worked, from goal back to 
plan, looking for a linear path that the sheer volume of communication makes difficult to 
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follow. In Permanence and Change (1935), Kenneth Burke invokes Veblen’s (1914) theory 
of “trained incapacity” as “that state of affairs whereby one’s very own abilities can function 
as blindness” (7); technology has in essence, revealed a degree of trained incapacity where 
operational schemas such as MBO lose their inherent logic.  In The Philosophy of Literary 
Form (1974) expands his use of Veblin’s concept to serve as a marker of opportunity where a 
change in perspective (as through the lens of technogenetic rhetoric) reveal the “paradoxes”, 
or what I define as communicative complexity, are in fact opportunities to escape trained 
incapacity (247).    
The non-linearity of communication is made more complex by the existence of both 
discursive and visuospatial rhetoric.  Discursive rhetoric is familiar—the structure, form, and 
strategy of arguments and appeals.  Visuospatial rhetoric applies to the non-discursive 
rhetoric of image and space; how we take in a visual scene; are moved by cognitive 
perceptions of colour, movement, expectations, relationships, and so on.  Visuospatial and 
discursive rhetoric are combined in the rhetoric of the Nigel Thrift’s “technological 
unconscious” (2005), the unconscious extension of cognition into the world through 
technology.  The technological unconscious is the rhetoric of word and image in their myriad 
forms, both visual and linguistic.  Burke alludes to the discursive and non-discursive nature 
of rhetoric by allowing for the addition of “attitudes” to the more traditional “propositions” 
of rhetoric.  Burke describes attitude in terms of the coming together of the symbolic and 
non-symbolic: 
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[a] personal mediation between the realms of nonsymbolic 
motion and symbolic action.  Its ‘how’ refers to the role of the 
human individual as a physiological organism, with the 
corresponding centrality of the nervous system, 
ATTITUDINIZING in the light of experience as marked by the 
power of symbolicity (1937, 394). 
Technology as technological unconscious is both symbolic and non-symbolic by definition 
and, in the case of visuospatial rhetoric; technology serves as a mediator in the formation of 
Burke’s “attitudes”.  Visuospatial rhetoric allows me to argue that every aspect of 
professional communication is rhetorical in a non-discursive sense—the layout of an email, 
the use of colour, space, graphics, as well as digital media such as streaming video.  
Professional communication pedagogy must include strategies and methods for deploying 
both discursive and visuospatial rhetoric.  Modern communication technologies call for a 
discursive and visouspatial rhetoric that moves beyond traditional and visual rhetoric to 
become a key element in digital literacy (Murray 2009). A technogenetic rhetoric is called 
for.  The simultaneously discursive and visouspatial technological unconscious plays havoc 
with the greater cognitive attention system, problematizing and making more complex both 
the teaching and execution of professional communication.  The following section details the 
cognitive attention system and further develops and defines the technological unconscious. 
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2.2 The Greater Attention System 
Modern communication technologies simplify and speed production and reception, a 
simplicity that seduces through interruption; email, Linkedin, Twitter, the blinking 
BlackBerry Messenger light on my smartphone, and the ring of a Skype call, beckon while I 
write.  The twenty-first century professional is seduced into what some deplore as 
superficiality and others champion as multitasking.  As Davidson observes, we have always 
multitasked. If we did not we could not drive a car (signal, steer, brake, and follow a sports 
talk show on the radio), cook dinner for our family (dice for one dish as another simmers and 
a third sautés, all the while talking about geometry with a teen-ager doing homework), and so 
on.  Whether or not multitasking is good or bad is less important than what it reveals about 
our professional activities.  What technologically induced multitasking brings forth is the 
absolute necessity of accounting for the cognitive faculty of attention in the study and 
teaching of professional communications.  The old adage that perception is everything needs 
to be amended to attention is everything.  Todd Oakley (2009) summarizes the relationship 
between attention, perception, memory, and learning: “when we attend, we perceive.  When 
we attend and perceive, we remember.  When we attend, perceive, and remember, we learn” 
(25).   The importance of attention may have been less evident when professionals answered 
letters and phone calls—linear, serial activities that rarely competed against each other for 
our attention. Even the classic mid-twentieth century businessman with twenty phone lines 
going attended to one call at a time.  What attend to and how we attend to it define the 
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essence of the organization, making attention paramount to a technogenetic rhetoric of 
professional communication.     
Catherine Davidson begins her book Now You See It with her experience of the now 
famous Harvard “attention blindness experiment”.  In 1999, psychologists Christopher 
Chabris and Daniel Simons devised an experiment that would highlight attention blindness.  
Subjects were asked to view a video of six basketball players passing balls back and forth.  
Three were wearing white shirts and three black.  Subjects were asked to count the number of 
passes between white shirted players.  While the players were passing basketballs, a person 
in a gorilla suit entered the shot and began thumping her chest.  The vast majority of subjects 
do not see the gorilla (2011, 1-3).  We become attentive to the task at hand and develop an 
attention blindness that prevents us from seeing significant events even when they are in our 
immediate perception.  Davidson asks: “is it possible for a whole society to have attention 
blindness? We’re so busy attending to multitasking, information overload, privacy, our 
children’s security online, or just learning a new software program…that we haven’t 
rethought the institutions that should be preparing us for more changes ahead” (12).  The 
danger is that as teachers of professional communication we have developed attention 
blindness to the true essence of the technological developments that have increased the 
communicative density of organizations.  It is not the hardware and software of 
communication technologies themselves, it is not a matter of the pervasive Internet sucking 
up all our attention and scattering it in tiny pieces to the point we accomplish nothing; nor is 
it particular modes or products such as social networking, text messaging, Wikipedia, and so 
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on.  Communication technologies make undivided attention a challenge, but that does not 
mean that we should strive to return to a more linear, task oriented way of functioning.  Even 
if it were possible, and for most of the digital generation, it is not, we would lose what 
technology is opening up for us, more efficient opportunities to establish identification and 
consubstantiality with other human beings in the form of communicative action towards 
common professional causes. What we need to establish are rhetorical strategies capable of 
engaging communication and hypermedia. 
In his book From Attention to Meaning, Todd Oakley develops a model of what he terms, 
“The Greater Attention System” that consists of three individual systems: signal, selection, 
and interpersonal (26).4  The signal system is composed of the alerting and orienting 
attributes of attention; the selection system is composed of the attributes of detecting, 
                                                
 
 
4	  I	  should	  note	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  signal	  attention	  system	  operates	  in	  the	  mind	  is	  
controversial.	  	  In	  her	  book,	  How	  We	  Think:	  Digital	  Media	  and	  Contemporary	  Technogenisis	  
(2012),	  Katherine	  Hayles	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  thought	  occurs	  in	  
the	  unconscious	  mind.	  	  Hayles,	  is	  supported	  by	  social	  psychologists	  Ap	  Dijksterhuis,	  Henk	  
Aarts,	  and	  Pamela	  K.	  Smith	  (2005)	  who	  believe	  that	  “strictly	  speaking,	  conscious	  thought	  
does	  not	  exist.	  	  Thought,	  when	  defined	  as	  producing	  meaningful	  associative	  constructions,	  
happens	  unconsciously.	  	  One	  may	  be	  aware	  of	  some	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  thought	  process	  
or	  one	  may	  be	  aware	  of	  a	  product	  of	  a	  thought	  process,	  but	  one	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  thought	  
itself”	  (81).	  	  They	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  composition	  of	  a	  text:	  	  “Thinking	  about	  the	  article	  we	  
want	  to	  write	  is	  an	  unconscious	  affair.	  	  We	  read	  and	  talk,	  but	  only	  to	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  
materials	  for	  our	  unconscious	  mechanisms	  to	  chew	  on.	  	  We	  are	  consciously	  aware	  of	  some	  
of	  the	  products	  of	  the	  thought	  that	  sometimes	  intrude	  into	  consciousness…but	  not	  of	  the	  
thinking	  -­‐	  the	  chewing	  –	  itself”	  (quoted	  in	  Hayles,	  2012,	  95).	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sustaining, and directing, while the interpersonal system is comprised of the sharing, 
harmonizing, and directing attributes (26).  The three systems of attention “operate on a 
continuum such that targets within the field of attention can occupy a place on a scale from 
inactive to active to salient” (26).  Salient items or situations are present in conscious thought 
and require little cognitive effort, while active items are also in consciousness but require 
more effort, and finally, inactive items require the greatest effort.  Objects and situations 
move towards the salient end of the continuum through the senses or from long-term 
memory.  The signal system represents our ability to distinguish signal from noise. Signals 
may be situational, such as a car coming at you as you cross the street; the car is a visually 
perceived signal from the visual noise of the scene in a figure/ground gestaltist manner.  
Signals may also be cultural; Oakley gives the example of language; oral speech can serve as 
a signal to which human beings are predisposed to attend, standing out from the other 
acoustic phenomena in the environment, the noise.  Oakley presents two axioms of the signal 
system relevant to professional communication: 
1. not all information is equally important and  
2. different organisms are alerted to different items (27).   
The first axiom is self-evident in terms of professional communication. The second, 
however, requires modification; different professionals (as operationally closed mental 
systems), as individuals and also as classes (chemical engineers, product managers, technical 
writers) are alerted to different items and situations.  The signal attention system “alerts” by 
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recognizing information in the form of objects, situations, and language, while it also 
“orients” information by placing the source and cultural context; in other words, the 
cognitive attribute of orientation decides what information is important.  The subject line of 
an email sent to a sales manager that reads “URGENT: CUSTOMER WANTS TO CANCEL 
SALE” will alert and orient a signal that will quickly move along the attention continuum to 
salient.  The rhetorical features of this line trigger that signal responsiveness—the 
visuospatial “shouting” of all-caps, the placement of URGENT as the first word in our 
conventional left-to-write literate attention sweep, labeling and framing the following 
sentence and the propositional semantics contained in both the label and the following 
sentence alert and orient the reader.     
The selection system “detects” objects, situations, and language, moving towards or away 
from a signal on the basis of salience. The selection system deploys our cognitive ability to 
detect; “detecting is the process that initiates conscious execution of a task or set of tasks” 
(30).  The selection system is put under duress by digital communication technology.  The 
professional who receives two hundred plus emails on their smartphone, tablet, and desktop 
computer in addition to dozens of voice calls, voicemail messages, Skype calls, and text 
messages is putting her selection system into hyper drive.  As Oakley states, “detecting 
facilitates mental processing of one task while inhibiting the completion of other tasks” (30).  
The professional must decide which messages to read and respond to at the expense of the 
others.  The detection function of the selection system is crucial to a cognitive rhetoric of 
professional communication as it serves as a foundational process in the treatment of 
  34 
audience in my theory of cognitive rhetoric.  The next cognitive attribute of the selection 
system is sustaining of attention.  Sustaining attention is the reduction in scope achieved 
through focused concentration on an object, situation, or language and is challenged by 
omnipresent digital communication. In fact it is the inability to sustain attention that Carr, 
Stiegler, and others hold to be the greatest negative impact of digital media.  In terms of 
professional communication, sustaining focused attention is difficult in the presence of 
smartphones and computers. The pressure to respond to emails and text messages 
immediately makes it difficult to concentrate on the message of a live or online presentation.  
Oakley presents two sub-categories of sustaining: “vigilance” and “search.” Vigilance is the 
continuous focus of attention on a situation; the example he provides is the constant attention 
of a museum guard on patrons.  Search is the continuous scanning for signals of a certain 
type.  Search differs from detecting in how cognitive effort is directed; in detection, attention 
reacts to an exigence while in search mode, attention is dedicated to the observance of 
signals.  The search attribute plays a role in professional communication as digital media 
produces constant signals to be scanned; the inbox, the flashing light on the smart phone, the 
twitter feed, and so on.  The final cognitive attribute of the selection system is “controlling” 
of attention.  There are two types of control, “switching” and “oscillating”.  Switching is the 
conscious directing of attention from one exigence to another, while oscillating directs 
attention from one exigence to another and back again; oscillating attention is the primary 
mode of multitasking where, for example, the professional listens to a presentation while 
reading and responding to emails while keeping an eye on the organization’s Twitter feed.  
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Attention engages the search and controlling attributes to oscillate between information.  The 
sustaining function is held in reserve or engaged for short time periods as for example, when 
our professional reads an email and types a response; sustained attention is completely 
removed from the signal information coming from the presenter.  The selection system is key 
to teaching professional communication strategies with both the producer and receiver of 
communication being taken into account.  The selection system Oakley invokes is also 
closely related to a complex social systems view of organizations and human beings.  The 
fact that we detect, sustain, and control signals demonstrates Luhmann’s insight that only 
communication communicates.  We perceptually attach ourselves to communication using 
attributes of the selection system; communication may be directed at us, but that does not 
mean we receive it.  Reception is determined by the degree of structural coupling engaged by 
the mode in question, be it language, text, or visual.  Cognitive rhetoric of professional 
communication should develop strategies of identification that increase the likelihood of 
reception. 
The third system in Oakley’s model of attention is the “interpersonal”.  The interpersonal 
attributes deal with the linking of minds in common action.  The attention system must 
account for the operational closure of mental systems; how do we use attention to achieve 
common goals?  The three cognitive attributes of the interpersonal system are “sharing”, 
“harmonizing”, and “directing”.  Shared attention is “the peripheral awareness of another” 
(34).  Shared attention can be as innocuous as watching a movie in a crowded theatre, but it 
is also a requirement for identification and consubstantiation.  In order for a communicative 
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event to be successful, both producer and receiver need to have dedicated sufficient attention 
to the information.  Shared attention occurs during a conversation and also, to certain extent 
in the composition and reading of text.  The writer dedicates attention to the production of 
the message while the reader to the reception; simultaneity is not necessary for sharing.  
Writer and reader are sharing attention to the information, but how the information is 
understood cannot be shared as a result of Luhmann’s double contingency where 
communication is contingent upon both production and reception (discussed in detail below).  
Shared attention, while shaping and facilitating meaning, does not lead to meaning in a 
deterministic manner.  Meaning requires the second cognitive attribute, harmonization or 
joint attention.  Oakley (with help from Tomasello, 1999) argues that “children do not 
develop language and symbolization without being able to (1) know that others are subjects 
of experience, (2), maintain an interest in them as subjects, and (3) track the attention that 
others pay to objects or subjects in the environment.  Human attention requires the 
harmonization of minds onto a focal item of attention” (34).  Oakley uses the word harmony 
as the metaphor for meaning or what Luhmann terms understanding.  The professional in our 
example will not generate understanding of the presenter if she does not share common 
background knowledge, values, terminology, and so on.  In order to gain shared and 
harmonized attention, one must be able to deploy the third attribute, the directing of 
attention.  The presenter in my example attempts to direct the attention of the listener/viewer 
through non-discursive elements of vocal tone, pace, volume, as well as through the use of 
visual images in the form of a PowerPoint display.  The interpersonal system conceived by 
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Oakley aligns with my use of Luhmann’s complex social systems theory and Burke’s 
conceptions of identification and consubstantiality in developing cognitive rhetoric of 
professional communication.  Oakley’s model accounts for the division that exists between 
human beings as operationally closed mental systems; the signal, selection, and interpersonal 
attention systems presuppose minds incapable of pure communication and that 
communication must engage the three systems of attention in order to be effective.   
For example, let’s look at how attention and mental systems engage in the production and 
reception of an email message.  The producer of the email coalesces thought into language 
through thought signals that alert and are oriented by the signal attention system of the 
conscious mind. The selection system detects the relevant signals and sustains attention 
towards a coherent textual message while the controlling attribute avoids moving to other 
foci of attention.  The interpersonal system engages rhetoric to imagine strategies of delivery, 
argument, and figuration.  The communication is developed through an enactive engagement 
of perception; the touch of fingers to keyboard and vision that scans and corrects the text 
being digitally produced.  Once composed the communication exists in digital bits that are no 
longer a part of the mind of the mental system that produced it.  The communication as bits 
are sent via the Internet to the inbox of the intended recipient who, alerted to the information, 
orients the signal of the computer’s ping, engages the selection system to detect the message 
among others in the inbox, and sustains attention long enough to determine whether she 
needs to control her attention by blocking out other signals.  Finally, she reads the message.  
If the communication is rhetorically effective, harmonization will occur leading to 
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identification and consubstantiation between the two individuals in terms of the information 
put forward.  Harmonization that leads to identification can no longer be controlled by the 
sender (as opposed to harmonization achieved through a conversation that is still subject to 
the three systems of attention, as a dialogue of rapidly produced communications) and is 
subject to the operation of the receiver’s systems of attention.  The key cognitive attribute is 
the directing function of the interpersonal system where the producer attempts to engage the 
attention systems of the receiver with the goal of harmonized identification.  
Language is a structural coupling medium between operationally closed mental systems; 
an attention system such as Oakley’s model of signal, selection, and interpersonal is required 
to bring thought into consciousness as language.  The greater attention system is the key to 
communication both in production and reception.  Digital communication technologies 
frequently serve to make the directing of attention more difficult.  Somehow the professional 
communicator, attempting to acquire funding for a project she believes crucial to the success 
of the organization, must rely on her own greater attention system to bring unconscious 
thought into conscious language and then attempt to direct the attention of another towards 
taking language from consciousness to unconscious thought.  When viewed from a 
perspective of complex systems and attention, the task can seem impossible.  Rhetoric—
discursive rhetoric as argumentation and figuration, and non-discursive rhetoric as 
information design—shapes the way such a communicative exchange takes place.  This is 
hardly an earth shattering idea. Organizing language, devising strategic arguments, and 
presenting visual images with rhetoric has been accepted as a method of persuasion for 
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thousands of years.  I believe rhetorical argument as strategy and form have a cognitive 
function similar to Oakley’s attributes of attention.  Before presenting rhetoric in its 
relationship to cognition, I need to clarify the relationship between consciousness, 
unconscious thought, and technology. 
Nigel Thrift (2005) conceived of a relationship between technology and mind that presents 
a starting point for my discussion.  Thrift examines the notion of “position and juxtaposition” 
of human activity—in other words, the space in which we exist and take action.  This space 
makes up what Thrift terms the “technological unconscious,” where technology has 
pervasively entered our lives to the extent that it is out of direct conscious cognition. 
“Whereas ‘computing’ used to consist of centers of calculation located at different sites,” he 
says, “now, through the medium of wireless, it is changing its shape...computing is moving 
out to inhabit all parts of the environment...” (3712).  Sim cards in cell phones, global 
positioning software, and mobile wireless hotspots expand the space of work and by doing 
so, change its temporality.  The workday is no longer eight hours long; communication 
technology makes one available 24/7. Even if the computer is shut down and the smartphone 
silenced, the attention system unconsciously, and at times consciously, fires up the cognitive 
attributes of vigilance and search of the selection system.  The technological unconscious is 
created by unseen or unnoticed technologies, which function largely outside of 
consciousness, but are a part of our cognitive activity.  The technological unconscious serves 
working memory through databases such as the smartphone address book and calendar, but it 
also stresses the attention system.  When communication is ever-present and continuous the 
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attention system does not truly shut down.  Before BlackBerrys, Twitter, and tablet 
computers, the majority of professional communication occurred in the physical workplace, 
the office.  The physical space of work was defined and the actual space of the organization 
formed through communication, now, the physical space of work is largely superfluous and 
the actual communicative space has extended to everywhere the professional and her 
technology reside.  The technological unconscious aligns with theories of enacted and 
extended cognition.  Our cognitive attributes are distributed creating cognitive action that 
occurs interactively with technology, an interaction that is altering the manner in which our 
greater attention system is engaged.  As both Hayles (2011) and Swift (2005) point out, the 
technological unconscious has always existed and it has always placed a strain on our 
cognitive abilities.   Both authors give the example of the strain placed on an individual as 
they rode the first passenger trains in the nineteenth century; a person accustomed to the pace 
of a carriage could not cognitively deal with the speed at which the landscape passed through 
the visual system.  Catherine Davidson (2012) gives the example of the fears some had for 
the operation of the automobile requiring the driver to steer, shift, watch the road, watch the 
fuel gauge and so on.  We can project very similar scenarios back to the domestication of the 
horse, the harnessing of fire, and so on. The technological intervention in the ‘natural’ world 
brings with it cognitive demands that go beyond what our minds evolved, in nature, to 
encounter.  The technological unconscious also develops cognitive ability as Stephen 
Johnson (2005) points out in his example of the increase in narrative and plot complexity in 
television shows.  Cognitive abilities adapt and shift as a result of the technological 
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unconscious. It is yet to be seen whether the ubiquity of communication in our professional 
lives will have peripheral effects on social relationships and identity. 
In addition to the greater attention system and technological unconsciousness, another 
important element of professional communication pedagogy is what Katherine Hayles (2007) 
terms “cognitive style”.  Hayles sees a generational shift in the manner in which we engage 
the greater attention system; networked media has lead to a predominantly hyper versus deep 
attention style in the first generation exposed to digital media for most of their life, 
individuals born after 1987 or “Generation M” (187).  Deep attention is the ability to 
concentrate on an item or situation for an extended period of time.  Hayles gives the example 
of reading a Dickens novel.  Hyper attention, on the other hand “is characterized by 
switching focus rapidly among different tasks, preferring multiple information streams, 
seeking a high level of stimulation, and having a low tolerance for boredom” (187).  Deep 
attention is required for the solving of complex problems, developing strategies, and 
internalizing complicated material.  Hyper attention “excels at negotiating rapidly changing 
environments in which multiple foci compete for attention” (188).  Hayles highlights the 
problems that develop when an education system built around activities of deep attention is 
attended, or more to the point, not attended by a generation that prefers hyper attention to the 
degree that they are almost incapable of deep attention.  Both deep and hyper attention 
involves the controlling attribute of the selection system of the greater attention system.  
Hyper attention engages the switching component of the control system, the individual 
engaged in hyper attention is able to switch focus from one item or media to another in a 
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seamless fashion, sustaining attention sufficiently to acquire the thread of meaning before 
switching to another item and focus. The inability to sustain attention on one medium, 
however, reduces how much information enters working memory to be used in more 
complex cognitive activities such as association and synthesis.   
The conference call may be producing information crucially important to a strategy of 
product development, but the hyper attentive style has caused the professional to not 
internalize information into working memory that could have led to a breakthrough idea.  
Deep attention also involves the control element of the selection system, but relies on the 
cognitive attribute of oscillation.   Oscillation is similar to switching, as it moves focus from 
one item to another, but differs in that the movement occurs within one domain.  In our 
conference call example, the professional maintains sustained attention on the information in 
the call, but moves attentive focus from one element to another.  For example, the 
professional attends to a suggestion by the speaker for a price reduction program allowing it 
to enter working memory; attention then oscillates to a report on the negative effects of a 
price reduction on customer loyalty produced by an internal department.  With both related 
items in working memory, long-term memory is accessed to recall a previous meeting with 
the vice-president of sales in which she voiced disdain for a price drop.  The professional 
synthesizes the information into a recommendation against the price reduction.  Oscillating 
attention, within the control component of the selection system, lead to the solving of a 
problem.   I am not arguing that one style is better than the other (for good-versus-bad 
arguments, see Carr, 2010, Stiegler, 2011, Johnson, 2005, Shirky 2010); both styles have 
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their advantages and disadvantages.  The key is being able to move from one to the other as 
required by the exigence of the situation.  The pedagogical challenge, as Hayles presents, is 
in teaching a generation seemingly incapable of deep attention.  There is also a challenge in 
what and how to teach rhetorical strategies that engage deep or hyper attention.        
A greater attention system enactively engaged with a technical unconscious, drawn to a 
hyper attentive style presents a number of pedagogical challenges.  What manner of rhetoric 
will provide the basis of effective communication in an environment and organizations, 
constituted by communication, and members incapable of accessing the thought and minds of 
one another?  Communication, a product of unconscious thought coupled with language and 
a technological unconscious, exists apart from rational exchange.  In other words, once a 
communicative object is crafted it is at the mercy of the receiving mind in terms of 
understanding.  The rhetoric suitable to such an environment must be linked to the cognitive 
attributes and affinities of both producer and receiver. It is not enough to consider purpose 
and what an audience will be amenable to (although this is still important). The professional 
requires knowledge of the forms of language and image that provide the best opportunity for 
mutual understanding between producer and receiver in this new environment.  It is 
indisputable that rhetoric as argumentation and form are inherently cognitive in nature. We 
are more attracted to messages that have been rhetorically constructed to leverage the 
cognitive dispositions of the human mind.   
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Communication and attention take place in an environment of human and social systems.  
The next section outlines Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems and its relationship to 
rhetoric, specifically Kenneth Burke’s conceptions of identification and consubstantiality.     
2.3 Organizations and Human Beings as Systems 
Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory holds that individual members do not define 
societies.  Social systems theory does not view society, and by reduction organizations, by 
their members but by their events, or what actually happens (Moeller 2006).  These events 
manifest through communication.  Communication can be linguistic, but also more generally 
symbolic; paying for a sandwich at the cafeteria is a form of economic communication that is 
constitutive of the economic system.  Human beings are required for communication to take 
place, but they sit outside of communication itself. “[H]umans cannot communicate; not even 
their brains can communicate; not even their conscious minds can communicate,” according 
to Luhmann. “Only communication communicates” (1994, 371).  For example, in 
Luhmann’s framework, this dissertation is not a direct transcript of my conscious thoughts.  I 
am incapable of transferring my consciousness directly onto the page or through speaking.  
You only have access to the content on the page as a communication.  Your reactions to my 
thesis, written or verbal, are not direct transcripts of your conscious thought.  Eva M. Knodt, 
in her forward to Luhmann’s Social Systems, describes the inability to access the mind of 
another as the “hermeneutic despair”, common sense tells us we understand another person 
only in an incomplete and partial sense.  Luhmann scholar Hans-Georg Moeller adds that 
“we can, in communication, only connect to the communication of others, but never to their 
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minds or brains, much less to the ‘human being’ as such in any given case.  While 
communication cannot take place without human beings, human beings are, paradoxically 
enough, still totally inaccessible within communication” (2006, 9).   
Kenneth Burke observes the same paradox in A Rhetoric of Motives when he writes of the 
individual’s desire to identify with others as way of bridging the division of individual minds 
(1950, 19).  In a sense, Burke’s belief in rhetoric as the architectonics of symbol use that 
leads to consubstantiality where two or more people identify with each other’s interests and 
are in substance both together and separate is an answer to the hermeneutic despair Luhmann 
offers.  In fact, as a program, cognitive rhetoric has as an objective the establishment of 
rhetoric as an architectonic and a framework for harmonization.  As we explore Luhmann’s 
conception of the individual, organization, and communication, we will find that Burke’s 
conception of rhetoric serves a cognitive function that eases this dilemma.     
 Luhmann establishes three types of systems: psychic (or mental), biological, and social 
(organizational).  Each of the three systems serves as environment for the other two.  They 
exist as a trinity with no system sitting hierarchically above or below the other. Physical, 
mental and social systems require each other for existence.  Mental systems consist of 
consciousness; biological systems are made up of cells, organs, etc.; social systems as 
organizations consist of communication.  The contents of the first two systems are self-
evident, but communication as the content of a social system seems counterintuitive.  In 
order to grasp the system-as-communication argument Luhmann puts forward, we have to 
look at the self-organizing autopoietic nature of the three system types.  Autopoiesis is a 
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concept developed by biologist Humberto Maturana that explains how living organisms are 
products of their own activities.  His research partner Francisco Varela describes autopoiesis: 
A living system is an organization that preserves itself as a 
result of its organization.  How does it do this?  It produces 
components that produce components that produce 
components.  This is no mystery: enzymes produce enzymes.  
The boundary of the cell is its membrane.  The membrane 
again is a process that limits the diffusion and thus preserves 
the internal network of production that produces the 
membrane.  Everywhere you see systems that exist due to a 
kind of Munchhausen-effect:  they manage to grab themselves 
by the hair and pull themselves out of the swamp...This is the 
case in many areas.  [Biological] autopoiesis is only one 
example.  Other examples are language, and, possibly, 
families, firms, etc. (1997, 148-49)  
The concept of autopoiesis applies to all self-organizing systems.  There is a large body of 
research on the autopoietic nature of organizations (Magalhaes and Sanchez, 2009, Zelney, 
2005).  Organizations exist and are preserved as products of their components.  Where 
autopoietic theory of organizations differs from traditional organizational theory is in the 
make up of these components.  Traditional theory takes either a humanistic or scientific 
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approach, both of which place the subject as the key component (Weber, 1978, Taylor, 1911, 
Mayo, 1949).  Max Weber places the individual subject in a bureaucratic hierarchy that 
presupposes rational action and division of labour.  Fredrick Taylor studied the processes 
engaged by individuals in a scientific, and reductive manner, while Elton Mayo studied the 
psychological foundations of human behavior in a group setting.  Autopoietic organizational 
theory diverges from this tradition most dramatically by removing the individual from the 
equation.  Organizations are not collectives of individuals, in this view, although individuals 
are necessary for organizations to form. Organizations are self-organizing entities that arise 
and reconfigure as a result of their own activities.  Magalhaes and Sanchez define the 
autopoietic perspective on organizational structure in these terms: “organization means 
necessary relationships or network of rules that govern relations between system components 
and that thereby define the system conceptually.  Structure means the actual relations 
between components that integrate the system in practice and that satisfy the constraints 
placed by the organization” (5).  The system, as constituted by communication replaces 
human beings as the key self-organizing components in an organization.  In his classic essay 
“The Autopoiesis of Social Systems” (1986), Luhmann describes how the system is defined 
by communication: 
Social systems use communication as their particular mode of 
autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communications 
which are recursively produced and reproduced by a network 
of communications and which cannot exist outside of such a 
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network. Communications are not ‘living' units, they are not 
‘conscious' units, they are not ‘actions'. Their unity requires a 
synthesis of three selections: namely, information, utterance, 
and understanding (including misunderstanding). This 
synthesis is produced by the network of communication, not by 
some kind of inherent power of consciousness, or by the 
inherent quality of the information. Also - and this goes against 
all kinds of ‘structuralism' - communication is not produced by 
language. Structuralists have never been able to show how a 
structure can produce an event. At this point, the theory of 
autopoiesis offers a decisive advance. It is the network of 
events which reproduces itself and structures are required for 
the reproduction of events by events (174). 
When Luhmann says that communication is not “produced” by language, he is referring to 
the genesis of thought into language, or in other words, how communication actually comes 
about.  Most linguists do not view language as thought; language serves a scaffolding role 
that is never a complete reproduction or translation of thought (Pinker, 2007, 77-83).  For 
Luhmann, communication cannot be “preprogrammed” by thought.  Communication depends 
on situation and previous communications; communication requires “self-reference” (1986, 
174).  Viewing communication as the constituting elements of, and not the products of, an 
organization has serious ramifications for the process theory of professional communication.  
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Some may even find these ramifications alarming: if communication is not produced by 
language, is it possible to teach the process of professional communication/composition?  
Perhaps not. But I contend that an understanding of autopoiesis opens a number of other, 
richer, pedagogical possibilities which move away from composition process towards (or 
back to) a pedagogy based on rhetorical argumentation, figuration, and information design 
that aligns with the enframing nature of technology that serves as medium for organization 
constituting communication.  Such a view of communication opens the door to new 
pedagogical structures, structures that move away from lecture/workshop constructions 
towards networked simulation “games” that embrace the contingent nature of 
communication.  Chapter four develops such a pedagogical structure in detail.  
In addition to being self-organizing systems of communication, organizations are also 
operationally closed; the operations of an organization are what distinguish it from its 
environment (Luhmann, 2013, 63).  Without operational closure the organization does not 
exist.  Operational closure allows the internal components or structures (processes and 
procedures as communication) that interact to create and maintain the organization to evolve 
in a recursive fashion; processes and procedures can change, be discarded, and invented new 
without altering the substance of the organization (Magalhaes and Anchez 6).  The processes 
and procedures that form the operating components of the organization are, in substance, 
forms of communication.  Every request for a meeting, presentation of new product features, 
legal brief, and scientific report is part of the substance of the organizing components of the 
organization.   
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Systems construct their own reality through the self-organizing autopoietitc activities 
described above.  Reality is not a representation of an existing external world, but a 
construction created by operational closure of the system.  In other words, in creating and 
maintaining its own existence, a system creates its environment.  For example, an 
organization, as social system creates its own existence everyday through its activities; the 
products or services it produces, the communications created by its member human systems; 
and its structural coupling with other systems (such as the functional economic system) bring 
the organization into existence and in doing so create its environment of other systems 
(customers, stakeholders, employees and so on). Autopoietic theory follows the enactive 
model of cognition that mediates between modular information-processing views of the mind 
and connectionist views of globally distributed states in the mind.  Francisco Varela, who 
developed this approach with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, describes enactive 
cognition as negotiating the “middle path between the Scylla of cognition as the recovery of 
a pregiven outer world (realism) and the Charybdis of cognition as the projection of a 
pregiven inner world (idealism)” (172).  The term enactive refers to the perceptually guided 
action of the perceiver in her own local situation.   The term enactive refers to the 
perceptually guided action of the perceiver in her own local situation.  For example, in terms 
of a person viewing a rose, a cognitivist (realist) would find sensory input being computed by 
the brain/mind to represent the rose as it objectively exists in the world (see Newell & 
Simon, 1976).  An idealist would follow a methodological solipsism that finds the 
representation formed in the brain/mind of the viewer has nothing to do with the rose in the 
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objective world.  The rose in the world and the rose in the mind cannot be connected; one is a 
plant and the other a mental state.  An enactive approach entails a meeting of perceptual 
stimuli and a history of structural coupling, in other words the rose in the world is 
represented in the mind through the intersection of perception and context.     It is the 
embodied engagement of the perceiver with the material world, and not the internal or 
external representation of a preexisting world that drives cognition.  Cognition is the 
coupling of the world with human systems of perception; perception and the world are 
interdependent.  The enactive cognition created by operational closure is key to 
understanding that communication is the coupling medium between mental systems, and by 
default social systems as organizations, and not a direct connection of one mind to another. 
Niklas Luhmann names the linking of system to system and system to environment 
“structural coupling”.  Organizations as communication systems are structurally coupled to 
mental systems of consciousness that in turn are structurally coupled to biological systems 
(Moeller, 2006, 18).  Moeller defines structural coupling as “a state in which two systems 
shape the environment of the other in such a way that both depend on the other for 
continuing their autopoiesis and increasing their structural complexity” (2006, 19).  
According to Luhmann, mental systems structurally couple via language: 
One cannot imagine that a consciousness could have evolved 
without communication.  Similarly, one cannot imagine that 
there would be meaningful communication without 
consciousness.  There must have been a kind of coordination, 
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that, because it relates to different forms of autopoiesis, lead, 
on the one hand, to an increase of complexity within the realm 
of possible mental contents and, on the other hand, within the 
realm of social communication.  It seems to me that this 
mechanism of coupling is language. (Quoted in Moeller, 2006, 
19; Moeller’s translation).   
The coupling of language and consciousness is not a coupling of one mind to the other; one 
mental system heuristically distills its own thought into language while the other interprets 
perceived sounds or marks to form meaning in an effort to ward off hermeneutic despair.  
Kenneth Burke had a similar insight when he found terminology to be a “reflection of reality, 
[and] by its very nature a selection of reality; and to this extent a deflection of reality” (1966, 
45).  Burke’s reflection, selection, and deflection of reality bundled together represent 
enaction.  
Social systems theory—with autopoietic operationally closed mental systems serving as 
the environment for autopoietic operationally closed social systems of communication—
presents a challenge to technogenetic rhetoric of professional communication; human beings 
as mental systems formulate communicative acts and objects that do not mirror thought. Just 
as the narrator in Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie says of language, “how true it is that 
words are but vague shadows of the volumes we mean” (5), Luhmann finds that language as 
“...structural coupling, excludes a lot in order to include very little...” (2013, 87).  Human 
beings perceive communications that are but vague shadows of the speaker’s thought by 
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formulating thoughts that in turn can never be directly relayed in a return communication 
creating an endless, or at least as long as the communication continues, chain of self-
referential communications.  Similar to Derrida’s notion of a word dragging a chain of 
signifiers behind it, language faces an unending contingency.   To add to the uncertainty, this 
coupling via language runs along a very narrow plane; only certain specific sounds serve as 
aural language and very specific marks serve as written language.  Communication is 
contingent in terms of understanding; the meaning intended by a speaker or writer is 
contingent on the mental hermeneutics of the listener/reader.  Luhmann’s version of speech 
act theory attempts to account for contingency by including “understanding” in a triad with 
“information” and “utterance” (2013, 215).  The elements of the triad can be defined 
individually, but in practice they operate as a unity.  Information is the content of the 
utterance and as such is a selection of thought while understanding or misunderstanding is 
the outcome of the linguistic structural coupling.  Teaching the art of converting thought into 
information and then formulating an utterance that creates understanding through the poiesis 
of technology is the pedagogical challenge.  The autopoietic operationally closed system 
perspective of individuals and organizations where communication is not a direct 
transmission and is contingent on heuristics of closed mental and social systems presents an 
even greater challenge in an omnipresent environment of attention-splintering and memory-
blunting digital media.  This challenge, however, is also liberating.  Developing new 
pedagogical strategies based on networked simulation mirror the contingent nature of 
communication while reopening avenues of instruction obstructed by technology.  The 
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lecture is not suited to teaching professional communication that is contingent and distorted 
by technology and the technological unconscious; the connection between theory and 
practice is difficult to express in a lecture context.  Creating a context that aligns theory and 
practice in a networked simulation game creates far more effective teaching moments.  The 
next section explores the space of organizations. 
2.4 The Space of Organizations 
Social systems, autopoiesis, operational closure, and structural coupling provide a 
theoretical basis for the space of professional communication.  Communication, as the 
product of the network of a system, opens spaces that fill with recursive formations of 
information, utterances and (mis)understandings.  These spaces form, expand, entrench, or 
disappear.  Sidney Dobrin in his book Postcomposition, seeks to move the study of writing 
(utterances in Luhmann’s triad) away from a subject-centred pedagogy towards a focus on 
writing itself.  He employs the metaphor “occupation” to describe how writing forms and 
occupies space.  For Dobrin, writing “saturates” the “cultural, historical, and political space it 
occupies” (56).  Writing alters space, but also limits what can be written in terms of content; 
a personal message written by a lawyer to her husband does not occupy the space of a firm 
functioning in the legal social system.   It is in the conflation of content and space that 
Dobrin sees as the root of a focus on the subject in composition studies: 
Content is subject matter, the matter of the subject, denoting 
both power of the subject over the matter/the content and the 
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makeup of the subject.  The matter of the subject, the subject’s 
matter, is that which composes the subject, and too often in 
composition studies, writing is understood in this way, as 
matter of subjects, as materials or substances of subjects (57). 
Dobrin makes the case in Postcomposition for writing as an object separate and distinct 
from the subject.  Without ever directly referring to Luhamnn and social systems theory, he 
establishes much the same argument that writing/communication manifests outside of the 
individual.  Language that forms in the mental system of the individual is not thought itself, 
just as language as sound or marks on a screen/page is not a direct conduit to the thought of 
the speaker/writer.  Language becomes communication that serves a social 
system/organization’s mode of autopoietic reproduction.  The essence and space of a social 
system is produced through communication.  
An organization is the formation and deformation of these spaces by professional 
communication.  For example, what is a law firm? Is it the three floors in the office tower on 
Bay Street?  Or is the firm the individual lawyers that occupy the offices on those floors?  
Let’s say there are two hundred lawyers in the firm. Common sense says that this group of 
people practicing law together is the firm.  The key words in that definition, however, are 
“practicing” and “together.” Without either one, the two hundred people are simply lawyers.  
The lawyers are participating in, what Luhmann defines as the functional social system of the 
law, as well as the economic social system, but what makes them a firm is the 
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communication that must take place in order to “practice” law “together”.  The firm is the 
ongoing formation of communicative space in the form of written briefs, spoken arguments, 
meetings, presentations, customer bills, and hallway hellos.  The quality of the firm is the 
quality of its communication and here the dilemma for teachers of professional 
communication becomes clear; information is uttered and understood or misunderstood in a 
space and manner that is completely outside the direct control of the utterer and the uttered-
to.  None of this is really new information to the student of rhetoric; rhetoric exists, as I.A. 
Richards believed, to “be a study of misunderstanding and its remedy” (1965, 3).  Whether 
one employs the metaphor of scaffolding or structural coupling, rhetoric is the art or method 
of forming intricate but accessible scaffolds or seamless and easy fitting couplings.  The 
metaphors of scaffold and coupling are insufficient, however, to describe the interpersonal 
effects of communication as the substance of systems and formulator of understanding within 
the enframing essence of technology.  The more suitable pair of terms is Burke’s 
“identification” and “consubstantiality”.  Identification is a better term than the biological 
“structural coupling” for the motivated linking of mental systems achieved through 
communication.  Identification presupposes action; a missing element in Luhmann’s theory, 
while consubstantial describes the formation of a system’s mode of autopoietic reproduction 
and structural coupling of separate systems.  Before describing the incorporation of these 
terms further, we need to discuss Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action to 
bridge the problem of motivation in Luhmann’s general systems theory. 
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2.5 Communicative Agency and Social Systems Theory 
Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann debated the constitution of society throughout the 
1970’s, 80’s and 90’s.  Luhmann, as discussed above, views society as a collection of mental, 
biological, and social systems constituted by consciousness, life, and communication 
respectively.  The individual subject resides outside of society itself; subjects as operationally 
closed mental systems serve as the environment for social systems of communication.  
Systems theory focuses on the communicative events that form society (Moeller, 2006, 6).  
Habermas, on the other hand, views society as constituted by the actions of its subject 
members.  Individual subjects establish social relations through communicative actions.  
Communication is front and centre of both models of society; for Luhmann, communication 
drives human action, while Habermas believes human action drives communication.  For 
Habermas, it is “through this communicative practice [subjects] assure themselves at the 
same time of their common life-relations, of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld” (1981, 6).  
The concept of lifeworld partially aligns with what Luhmann terms “environment,” but 
unlike the notion of environments consisting of other systems, it serves a communicative 
function; “[the] lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the 
members as background knowledge” (13).  The lifeworld serves as the environment of 
subjects and consists of commonly held beliefs that enable communication.  Luhmann did 
not disagree with the idea of lifeworld as a space of common ground, but he found a paradox 
in Habermas’ conception; how could lifeworld be both ground (context) and also the horizon 
(world)?  Luhmann reconceived lifeworld into familiar (ground) and unfamiliar (horizon) as 
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a way of retaining the space of context with the ever-moving future contingencies of the 
world (Kjaer, 2008, 70).  Even though his theory is named “Communicative Action”, 
Habermas (1981) does not equate action with communication, “language is the medium of 
communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding 
with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims” (101).  In 
other words, to restate Habermas somewhat reductively, subjects are “motivated” by personal 
self-interest to rationally cooperate with other subjects to form a society.  The enlightenment 
concept of rationality is foundational to Habermas’ theory.  Individual subjects take action by 
“[mobilizing] the rationality potential” to form “validity claims” where statements are true or 
at least rationally proposed through argument, align with the appropriate context, and 
represent the true intentions of the speaker/writer (99).  Individual subjects actively form 
society through rational, self-serving communicative actions;  
actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations, and 
also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts 
in constituting a communicative practice which, against the 
backdrop of a lifeworld, is oriented to achieving, sustaining, 
and renewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that rests on 
the intersubjective recognition of validity claims (17).   
For Habermas, communications, as validity claims, can only continue through the practice of 
argumentation where “participants thematize contested validity claims” (18).  The individual 
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subject is responsible for the success or failure of the communication.  Luhmann places the 
production of meaning by communication above action.  Once the communication is uttered 
the subject no longer controls the outcome;  
one introduces items of evidence first and sees whether anyone 
doubts them.  If someone has doubts and good arguments for 
these doubts, one must assess what needs to be corrected in 
one’s own theoretical edifice to take this other view into 
account (2013, 168).   
In terms of rhetorical motivation, the opposition between action and meaning have important 
repercussions for cognitive rhetoric of professional communication.   The two positions align 
with the two perspectives on the rhetorical situation.  Luhmann, with his reflexive concept of 
communication, would be in agreement with Lloyd Bitzer who conceived of the rhetorical 
situation as an objective occurrence that provided three key elements that resulted in a 
rhetorical discourse:  an “exigence”, “an imperfection marked by urgency” (1968. 6), an 
“audience”, and “constraints” made up of people, events, and objects that “have the power to 
constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (8).  For Bitzer, the situation is 
external to the mind and must provide all three elements to the rhetor before a rhetorical 
discourse can come into effect.  In 1980, Bitzer simplified his definition of exigency to “a 
factual condition plus a relation of some interest”, remaining external in nature (28).  
Habermas’ action theory aligns with Richard Vatz’s conception of the rhetorical situation 
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where a dependence on an external communicative event is not required.  Vatz argues that 
exigency is created by the rhetor; the rhetor’s choice of language characterizes the situation 
so that any “real” situation can only be a “translation” (157).   The rhetorical situation from 
the position of the subject becomes even more complex in a technologically unconscious 
world. 
Luhmann and Habermas are at once close and far apart in their theories of society; both 
view communication as foundational, both theorize a distinction between 
environment/lifeworld and system/subject; and both envision a form of argumentation as 
critical in communicative acts.  The major distinction between the two is the place of the 
subject; for Luhmann it is defined by the social system and for Habermas it is society.  Both 
theories have weaknesses, at least in terms of applying them to a cognitive rhetoric of 
professional communication; Habermas’s conception of subject-driven action through 
communication in a lifeworld does not effectively define the space of professional 
communication in a digital world. While Luhmann’s operationally closed, autopoietic social 
systems provide a workable definition of space, it is weak in describing how subjects as 
mental systems are motivated to engage in communication.  Habermas deemed Luhmann’s 
systems theory as metabiology, based on concepts unrelatable to sociology while Luhmann 
found Habermas’s positioning of the subject as the constituting component of society an 
outdated humanistic old European viewpoint (Leydesdorff, 2000).  Thomas McCarthy, in his 
essay, “Systems Theory: Complexity and Democracy”, finds that if systems theory “is not 
connected with action theory, [it] becomes empirically questionable, a play of cybernetic 
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words that only serves to produce reformulations of problems that it does not really help to 
resolve” (1991, 123).  Fortunately, Kenneth Burke’s concepts of “identification” and 
“consubstantiality”, in the locus of human motivation, bridge the constructivist Luhmann and 
the humanist Habermas. Burke’s ideas allow for an autopoietic space for professional 
communication while retaining the agency of the subject in terms of composition. 
Burke’s identification implies both action and reflexivity in that the human subject may 
persuade another to identify with her, or be persuaded by that other to identify with her; one 
acts and is acted upon.  The very notion of identification implies division, as Burke writes; 
“one need not scrutinize the concept of “identification” very sharply to see, implied in it at 
every turn, its ironic counterpart: division” (1950, 23).  Human beings are divided, 
operationally closed mental systems; “identification is compensatory to division.  If men 
were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to claim their 
unity” (22).  Burke identifies action in rhetoric, but also alludes to what Luhmann termed 
“double contingency”, the limiting factor in terms of communicative action where a 
contingency exists in the linguistic scaffolding of thought into language on the part of the 
sender while a contingency also exists in the scaffolding of language into thought on the part 
of the receiver (1984, 104).  In describing persuasion, Burke (1950) writes: “You persuade a 
man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (55).  There is a double contingency here in 
terms of selection on the parts of the persuader and persuadee; being divided, neither has 
access to Burke’s list of requirements for identification.  Burke deals with the contingency 
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problem by identifying the consubstantiality created by the attempt to achieve identification: 
“A is not identical with his colleague, B.  But insofar as their interests are joined, A is 
identified with B.  Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, 
if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (20).  One can become 
“substantially one” or consubstantial with another through rhetorical communication (21).  It 
is Burke’s concept of consubstantiality that bridges the gap between Habermas’ 
communicative action and Luhmann’s doubly contingent meaning.  Substance, for Burke is a 
“way of acting-together” where subjects “have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, 
attitudes that make them consubstantial” (21).  The substance of these relations is 
communication that is at once acted and contingent.  Even though these relations have 
substance, they manifest as substance-less communicative events, not actions taking place in 
a static lifeworld; communicative events constitute both the organization as system and the 
lifeworld of context and common knowledge.  Relations between human beings are 
consubstantial, but they exist only in the operationally closed mind, although once expressed, 
they are the constitutive events of society and by default an organization.  Burke helps 
answer how human agency operates in self-organizing, autopoietic, and operationally closed 
mental and social systems.  Individual human subjects seek identification in order to obtain a 
sense of consubstantiality that in turn provides, to return to the biological metaphor, a 
structural coupling with inaccessible mental and social systems. 
Burke provides a way of dealing with the problem of doubly contingent communication 
and agency, but offers limited aid in reconciling the role of technology and attention in 
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communication developed through a technogenetic rhetoric.  On a cognitive level, 
communication creates a sense consubstantiality that gestures at agency.  I formulate and 
release an utterance as an act of agency while you receive, interpret and reply, also an act of 
agency.  Hermeneutically accomplishing a sense of understanding leads to consubstantiation 
that affirms an agency that does not objectively exist.  We are, in essence “actors” playing 
out a reality that is in fact a fiction.  A fiction in the sense that we believe that we 
communicate with one another, while in reality it is only communication manifested in 
sound, sight, and touch that is capable of communicating.  I cannot will your understanding.  
While perhaps not his intention, Burke provides a theory for our fictional feeling of agency in 
communication.  Burke could not, however, have foreseen the role technology would come 
to play in twenty-first century communication.  How does social media, web 2.0, or 
videoconferencing affect consubstantiality?  Is the fiction of agency more or less visible?  
Michel Callon (1986), Bruno Latour (1987), and John Law’s (1994), actor-network theory 
provides a perspective from which to begin to join technology, cognition, and rhetoric. 
Actor-network theory (ANT) is notoriously difficult to define and for my purposes a 
comprehensive review of the theory is not required.  There are, however, some key facets of 
the theory that help bridge the gap between consubstantiality and the technological 
unconscious.   The term “actor” does not refer to a human communicative agent in the 
Habermasian sense.  Actors include all social and mental systems, as well as the objects or 
things that participate in networks of activities.  ANT treats human and non-human equally 
because “without the non-human, the humans would not stand a chance” (Latour, 2004, 91; 
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quoted in Fenwick and Edwards, 2010, 3).  ANT investigates all points of engagement 
between human beings and technology.  Latour (1987) uses the term “translation” to refer to 
the change that occurs in both human being and technological object when the two engage.   
A presenter on Skype or Go-To Meeting is fundamentally different than a presenter on a 
landline conference call or even a face-to-face meeting.  We accept technology as an actor in 
a network when we attribute agency through personification.  Skype is software, but when 
deployed it is more.  It resides in the technological unconscious as a part of the whole that is 
communication.  Skype acts as if it has agency; human beings and technology structurally 
couple and as the “personificationalist” cognition of the human mind couples with the object, 
Skype is “felt” to act.  We launch the program and follow its direction without consciously 
acknowledging its intrinsic inertia.  Skype without us is a string of zeros and ones on a piece 
of silicon, but we treat Skype as a “black box”, something that has internal qualities too 
complex to consider while having an external relationship that allows for objectification 
(Latour 1987).  The presenter on Skype is a translation of the individual and the technology; 
one is nothing, if not different without the other.  According to Gunther Teubner (2007), 
personifying technology is a strategy for coping with uncertainty.  Treating technology as a 
black box allows for a doubly contingent relationship.  One does not know what is going on 
inside the technology, but understands the translation of technology and themselves.  
Personification of technology is most apparent through interactions with software agents.  
For example, Amazon, in the manner of a sales clerk, suggests books and tells you what 
others who purchased a certain book have also purchased. It is easier to personify the 
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software agent, which is done unconsciously and manifested in not considering the fact we 
are communicating with computer code, than it is to reconcile the fact we are passing 
personal information to a machine.   
ANT offers an entry point into interactions of systems, technology and human beings that 
reveals consubstantiality between communicators formed through technogenetic rhetoric that 
engages cognitive attributes and mechanisms of communication production and reception.  A 
detailed engagement with ANT is found in chapter three.  
2.6 Summary 
A networked world is neither good nor bad, but a reality all teachers of professional 
communication must take into account.  We live with a technological unconscious that 
covertly extends our cognitive abilities while seducing us with speed, accessibility, and 
quantity.  We believe we are communicating more effectively because we are 
communicating more.  But as Luhmann points out, operationally closed human systems 
cannot truly communicate; one cannot know the contents of another’s mind, in fact we 
cannot know the content of our own mind until we move thought into language; only 
communication communicates.  Communications are signals attended to, or not attended to 
by our greater attention system.  I argue that a technogenetic rhetoric that engages 
technology, discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric with cognitive mechanisms such as attention 
is required to teach professional communication in such an environment.   Also, how, as a 
professional communicator does one have agency in such an environment and how do we 
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teach communicative action?  The answer to this question, I have argued, is found in the 
work of in his conceptions of identification and consubstantiality.    Finally, Actor-network 
theory provides a bridge between technology and human and social systems.  The next 
chapter presents the rhetorical basis for a technogenetic rhetorical pedagogy of professional 
communication.    
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Chapter 3 
The Discursive, Extra-Discursive, and Visuospatial Basis of 
Technogenetic Rhetoric 
The foundation of professional communication pedagogy consists of a cognitive and social 
approach to discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric.  Discursive rhetoric is the 
  68 
composition we all understand as teachers—the words, spoken and written, of 
communication.  Extra-discursive refers to aspects of techno-cognitive rhetoric that exist 
outside of discourse and visuospatial rhetoric.5  Visuospaitial rhetoric encompasses the non-
linguistic, unspoken and unwritten conventions and appeals of visual communication.  
Discursive rhetoric, for my pedagogy, consists of argumentation and figuration as the 
primary drivers of identification based on evidence and logic.  Visuospatial rhetoric serves as 
a primary driver of emotion, and attention.  Discursive rhetoric entails meaning on a content 
level—words, spoken or written—but also on a formal level including figuration, genre, and 
format.  Visuospatial rhetoric is not only limited to aspects such as typeface, colour design, 
tone, but also the use of tables, charts and graphs.  Both discursive and visuospatial rhetoric 
involve the formation of mental images and appeals to various cognitive mechanisms.  Extra-
discursive rhetoric attempts to get at the effects technology on genres and formats.  What I 
suggest in this chapter is not new; argumentation and figuration pre-date rhetoric as a field of 
study, and scholars have been studying the rhetorical effects of images for centuries.  What I 
will suggest is a deployment geared to the multitasking, hyper-flow of information 
environment of twenty-first century organizations.  Both discursive and visuospatial rhetoric 
                                                
 
 
5	  Nick	  Hardy	  (2011)	  uses	  this	  term	  for	  Foucault’s	  description	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  power	  that	  are	  
neither	  discursive	  nor	  ontological,	  effects	  that	  remain	  outside	  of	  language	  and	  objects	  of	  
power.	  	  My	  use	  is	  both	  more	  general	  (not	  tied	  to	  issues	  of	  power)	  and	  more	  local	  (to	  the	  
domain	  of	  rhetoric).	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are applied to a triadic model of structure, form, and strategy.  Structure serves as a scaffold 
for elements of form and strategy.  Structure includes Stephen Toulmin’s field-dependent 
theory of micro-argument as strategy for engaging dense fields of communication in a multi-
tasking environment.  Theories of figuration and figural logic will also be discussed as form 
and strategy for the engagement of attention and the reduction of attention blindness.  
Aspects of ethos, kairos, tone, leadership, trust, and especially affect are examined as extra-
discursive, and finally, a theory of visuospatial rhetoric will be introduced that brings 
elements of technology, design, and sensory engagement to the production and reception of 
professional communication.  All rhetorical theories are investigated in their relation to 
cognition, with a special emphasis on attention.   
My conception of techno-cognitive rhetoric differs from the cognitive process work done by 
Linda Flower and John Hayes.  Rather than focus on the processes writers engage in the 
production of a text, I engage the cognitive psychology scholarship of Dan Sperber and Hugo 
Mercier (2011) on argumentative reasoning to focus on the engagement of cognitive 
attributes, technology, and communication in an attempt to answer the technogenetic and 
ontological questions posed in the previous chapter  As teachers of professional 
communication, we need to help our students align rhetorical strategies with cognitive 
mechanisms for argument, appeal to cognitive affinities such as association, repetition, and 
symmetry through form (figuration), and put conscious effort into the formation and 
reception of mental and visual images. In section 3.1 on discursive argumentation, I follow a 
review of argumentation in light of the Luhmann and Habermas debate on communicative 
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agency with a discussion of Sperber and Mercier’s (2011) work on argumentative reasoning. 
I conclude the section with a review of Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentative logic as 
the structural basis on my pedagogy.   In section 3.2 on form, I explore the cognitive and 
argumentative aspects of rhetorical figuration and figural logic focusing primarily on the 
work of Kenneth Burke, Richard Gregg, Randy Allen Harris, and Jeanne Fahnestock.  In 
section 3.3, I discuss the strategic argumentation strategies of Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as the argumentation schemes of Douglas Walton.  Section 3.4 
details the extra-discursive and visuospatial elements of technogenetic rhetoric. 
3.1 Discursive Argumentation 
In Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke wrote that “wherever there is persuasion, there is 
rhetoric.  And wherever there is ‘meaning’ there is persuasion” (172).  Every professional 
communication is rhetorical in the sense that it contains meaning that influences an audience.   
Some professional communications are overtly rhetorical: a proposal for a new program, a 
statement that a proposed strategy will be ineffective, and so on.  Other communications are 
not so obviously rhetorical—a meeting request, for instance, or an ‘objective’ marketing 
report, even a forwarded or cc-ed email. But rhetoric, the moves of influence, is just below 
the surface.  Every communication is an argument on some level.  When one gives an 
opinion on the skills of a coworker or relays information on the coworker’s personal life to 
another person, the speaker is being rhetorical; the speaker is making an argument.  
Professional communication textbooks tend to separate rhetoric and argument from routine 
messages and research reports.  I claim that even a routine message is rhetorical and, by 
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default, an argument. When a professional makes a meeting request, it always carries reasons 
(minimally, an implicit ‘I want your presence in room x at time y’); when she composes a 
marketing report, she is making an argument based on the appeal of her expertise; when she 
ccs a person on an email, she is claiming that this person adds value to the communication.  
In order for such a broad application of rhetoric and argumentation to be accepted, I take as a 
given that arguments are not solely the result of conscious planning.  For instance, genres 
argue; the scientific article format (IMRAD – introduction, methods, results, and discussion) 
argues inductively while parables argue analogically.  Ideologies argue below the conscious 
level as they hail the subject. Digital media such as YouTube videos argue through a kind of 
“witnessing”.   Many arguments are consciously formulated, but thought originates in the 
unconscious; communication is the incomplete and imperfect product of the movement of 
unconscious thought to conscious language.  The strategic dimensions of the meeting request 
genre are not often considered, but more times than not, they are interpreted by the recipient 
as an argument.  The receiver consciously or unconsciously evaluates the stated or implied 
reasons, or in the absence of reasons, the credibility and character of the sender; is the sender 
reliable, do they habitually call useless meetings?  Many unintended discursive and extra-
discursive evaluations of logos, pathos, and ethos occur with every communication.  In order 
to develop pedagogy that accommodates the evaluation of all professional communications, I 
will begin with a discussion of the philosophy and types of argumentation followed by an 
examination of the cognitive elements and effects and finally concluding with a description 
of an argumentation theory that incorporates the structure offered by Stephen Toulmin with 
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the substance of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric to serve as a foundation for 
my professional communication pedagogy.     
Before discussing the philosophy of argumentation, it is important to revisit the 
constitution of the organization.  In the previous chapter, I presented the debate between 
Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas over the constitution of society.  In terms of 
pedagogical application, I follow Luhmann’s conception of the organization as complex, 
autopoietic operationally closed system, where communication is the constitutive element.  
Habermas contends that organizations are made up of subjects rationally cooperating in 
communicative action towards common goals.  The technological unconscious, where 
communication technologies have proliferated to such an extent that the processes they 
provide have dropped below conscious awareness while remaining part of our everyday 
cognitive activities, has made Habermas’ theory untenable.  Technologically driven 
complexity has demonstrated Luhmann’s conception to be more applicable for the teaching 
of professional communication.  Individuals formulate communication that, once uttered, is 
the technological substrate subject to double contingency; contingency exists at the point of 
formulation, the movement of thought into language, and also at the point of reception, 
where language is interpreted into thought.  Individuals as mental systems, subject to doubly 
contingent communication, are not what make an organization an organization; 
communication is.  It is not communication per se, of course that makes an organization; all 
sorts of systems implicate communication. But the genres and structures and flow-paths of 
communication are what make an organization an organization, and what makes a particular 
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kind of organization (government, NGO, manufacturing plant, service industry) the particular 
kind of organization it is.  
It is possible for an individual to control communication to the extent that Habermas’ 
rational communicative action is probable.  In some manner we do manage to achieve 
common goals despite the impossibility of direct communication with each other and as I 
suggest above, we do so through what Burke describes as identification that leads to 
consubstantiality, a sharing of substance where we are apart, but also together.  Identification 
and consubstantiality are accomplished through communication as rhetoric where we craft 
language distilled from thought using strategies of argument and form.  Burkean 
Identification is the missing bridge between Luhmann and Habermas in their conception of 
society, because it reduces double contingency.  Rhetoric effects the movement of thought 
into language and language into thought by providing catalysts to cognitive attributes and 
affinities such as the affinity for repetition engaged in this sentence (thought into language 
and language into thought).  Rhetoric as argumentation and form (form is also an element of 
argumentation as will be discussed below) creates identification across double contingency.   
Despite disagreeing with a system model of the organization, Jürgen Habermas (1984) 
agrees that argumentation is the key to rational communicative action where individuals rely 
on “validity claims” that allow for consensus through rational argument.  Gesturing at 
Wenzel’s taxonomy of argumentation (1978), Habermas identifies three types of 
argumentation theory: “process” where the form of the argument takes precedence; 
“procedure” where the interaction between participants is the defining factor; and finally, 
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what Habermas defines as “producing cogent arguments” which translates to product, the 
transformation of opinion into knowledge (25).  For Habermas, rhetoric is concerned with 
process, dialectic with procedure, and logic with product:  
The fundamental intuition connected with argumentation can 
best be characterized from the process perspective, by the 
intention of convincing a universal audience and gaining 
general assent for an utterance; from the procedural 
perspective, by the intention of ending a dispute about 
hypothetical validity claims with a rationally motivated 
agreement; and from the product perspective by the intention 
of grounding or redeeming a validity claim with arguments 
(26).   
Habermas finds each perspective incomplete; “At no single one of these analytical levels can 
the very idea intrinsic to argumentative speech be adequately developed” (26).  Rhetoric as 
process is concerned only with the efficacy of an argument regardless of validity; dialectic as 
procedure transforms validity into acceptability (Tindale 1999, 5); the products of formal 
logic are not applicable to the majority of everyday arguments, as they do not account for 
context and circumstance.  While I do not believe that Habermas’ conception of an 
organization holds in a world with an ever-expanding technological unconscious, I do agree 
with Habermas’ views on argumentation.  He contends that  
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it turns out that in the attempt to analyze the corresponding 
basic concepts in the theory of argumentation – such as ‘the 
assent of a universal audience’ or ‘the attainment of a rationally 
motivated agreement’ or ‘the discursive redemption of a 
validity claim’  - the separation of the three analytical levels 
cannot be maintained (26).   
Argumentation involves the process of form, the interaction of procedure, and the logic of 
product.  Chirstopher Tindale (1999) proposes that a rhetorical model of argumentation 
provides the most comprehensive theory.  Tindale describes attempts to synthesize process, 
procedure, and product, focusing on pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 
1992) where process and product are combined.  Pragma-dialectics is rooted in the work of 
John Searle and J. L. Austin on speech act theory and views arguments as a series of speech 
acts defined by dispute where a proposition is expressed by a speaker and subsequent doubt 
is expressed by a listener.  The theory turns the speech acts of arguments into products 
identified as speech acts while also defining a series of rules (that is, procedures) for speech 
interactions involving disputes and arguments (Tindale 45).  Douglas Walton (1989) also 
offers a synthesis of procedure (dialectical) and product theories in his conception of 
dialectical argumentation where “at least ten types of argumentative dialogue” are identified.  
Pragma-dialectic theories provide a number of analytical advantages outside of the scope of 
my development of pedagogy; pragma-dialectics presents a persuasion dialogue where both 
parties attempt to present a thesis. Both are trying to persuade.  Such a scenario does occur 
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often in a professional setting, but the implicature basis of the theory highlights the 
advantage of a rhetorical approach to argumentation.  Mutually acceptable rules are required 
for pragma-dialectics that are subject to inter-subjective acceptability (62).  In other words, 
dialectical and product theories separate or synthesized as pragma-dialectics require an 
unattainable connection of minds.  They violate the rule of double contingency.  A rhetorical 
theory, on the other hand, does not require conversational implicatures and are not subject to 
mutually agreed upon acceptability.  In addition to dealing with audience, context, and 
situation, a rhetorical theory of argumentation assumes procedure and dialectic; it is, after all, 
the counterpart to dialectic.  Rhetoric redeems validity claims through what Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca termed quasi-logical arguments.  Rhetoric reduces contingency by 
providing form and strategy that form affinities for cognitive pathways to identification.  
Rhetoric is therefore ideally suited to professional communication pedagogy where the work 
of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca needs to be combined with developments in systematic 
informal logic that include Stephen Toulmin’s structural model and Walton’s presumptive 
reasoning.   
In order to develop a technogenetic pedagogy of professional communication, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of audience and strategy for establishing grounds needs to be 
revisited in relation to Toulmin’s field dependency theory and model of micro-argument and 
Walton’s schemes of presumptive reasoning.  However, before moving into philosophical 
and rhetorical discussions of argumentation, an analysis of research from cognitive 
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psychology on the nature of reasoning and argumentation will help provide a cognitive 
ground.   
 In their 2011 paper “Why do Humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative 
Theory”, Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier develop a hypothesis that links reasoning and 
argumentation.  Sperber and Mercier find reasoning to be best understood as a function of 
human communication, and argumentation produces communication that is more reliable in 
terms of epistemic development.  Sperber and Mercier support Habermas’ claim for the 
preeminence of argumentation in reasoned communicative action.  The difference between 
the two approaches is in the relationship between reasoning and argument; for Habermas, 
argumentation is the manner in which we use language to express reasoning (in other words, 
reasoning is a mental activity separate from and prior to communication); for Sperber and 
Mercier, reasoning is manifested in argumentation enabling communication to take place. 
“We want,” they say,  
to explore the idea that the emergence of reasoning is best 
understood within the framework of the evolution of human 
communication.  Reasoning enables people to exchange 
arguments that, on the whole, make communication more 
reliable and hence more advantageous.  The main function of 
reasoning is argumentation (60).   
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Sperber and Mercier’s theory is based on the dual process model of thought where thinking 
operates in two cognitive systems; System 1 on an unconscious level and System 2 on a 
conscious level (Evans 2007; Johnson-Laird 2006; Kahneman 2003).  Sperber and Mercier 
offer their own version of the dual process model that contends, “…that the arguments used 
in reasoning are the output of a mechanism of intuitive inference” (58).  Inference, as a 
cognitive mechanism, serves to “augment and correct information available to the cognitive 
system” (58).  Inference mechanisms are distributed between a number of different cognitive 
domains and are unconsciously engaged; “People may be aware of having reached a certain 
conclusion – be aware, that is, of the output of an inferential process – but we claim that they 
are never aware of the process itself” (58).  Intuitive beliefs form and move into 
consciousness as “reflective beliefs” where reasons are examined.  This is what Sperber and 
Mercier define as “reasoning proper”.  They provide an example from rhetoric where we 
might look to the reason for accepting a belief to the ethos of the source (in their example, a 
professor).  Reasoning proper is defined by a conclusion arrived at through the examination 
of reasons, or in other words, argumentation.  As opposed to Habermas’ conception of 
argumentation as the communicative method of deploying reason, Sperber and Mercier find 
reason to be communication as argumentation:  
The mental action of working out a convincing argument, the 
public action of verbally producing this argument so that others 
will be convinced by it, and the mental action of evaluating and 
accepting the conclusion of an argument produced by others 
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correspond to what is commonly and traditionally meant by 
reasoning (59).   
Taking the model one step further, communication, whether mental or social, is essentially a 
form of reasoning as argumentation.  There are speech acts that do not serve as 
argumentation--asking the time, commenting on the weather and so on--but all of the 
communication we deem professional in nature, from requesting a meeting as discussed 
above, to a marketing plan, is in essence argument. 
Sperber and Mercier’s model takes into account Habermas’ foundational concept of 
validity claims with their theory of “epistemic vigilance”; the cognitive mechanisms of “trust 
calibration” (with their correspondence to theories of ethos) and “coherence checking” (with 
their correspondence to logos), developed in early childhood, serve to gauge the truth and 
validity of arguments (60).  We are wired to evaluate arguments as a function of reasoning.  
These mechanisms are self-evident in the case of a dialogic exchange where the argument is 
overt, but are less engaged when communication is asynchronous and one-way 
(prototypically, in writing).  In experiments, reasoning based on written information 
improves when the subject is made aware that the writing is meant to be an argument (Evans 
et al 1993).  In some respects this work explains why the modality of text in print is so high 
while supporting Sperber and Mercier’s claim that reasoning is in essence argumentation; 
reasoning improves when argumentation skills are engaged.  Further experimentation in 
cognitive psychology (Perkins 1985; Kuhn 1991) has demonstrated that people are in fact 
naturally good at argumentation.  Experimenters provided subjects a premise such as “Would 
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restoring the military draft significantly increase America’s ability to influence world 
events?”  Results were initially poor in terms of quality of reasoning; more explanatory than 
reasons or evidence based), but as participants were provided more information and became 
more knowledgeable on the issue, arguments based on evidence were formed and reasoning 
scores improved.  When subjects were educated in argumentation strategies, scores improved 
even further.  The conclusion of the studies is that people are cognitively predisposed to be 
strong arguers as reasoning improved as subjects were able to knowledgably create premises 
and strategies such as analogy, exemplification, and so on.  Research has also demonstrated 
that groups that engage in argumentative debate are more adept at solving problems.  Even 
seemingly contradictory concepts such as the “confirmation bias” defined in Sperber and 
Mercier as the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (63), support the relationship between reason and 
argument.6  Cognitive bias is thought to be a result of a deficiency in cognitive resources, 
specifically working memory (Johnson-Laird 2006).  Sperber and Mercier, however, find the 
explanation difficult to reconcile with the fact people do not lack the cognitive resources to 
dispute the claims of others.  Cognitive bias comes into effect in group reasoning settings; 
                                                
 
 
6	  In	  his	  Elements	  of	  Rhetoric	  (1841),	  Richard	  Whately	  presents	  a	  theoretical	  precursor	  to	  the	  
notion	  of	  confirmation	  bias	  in	  his	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  “presumption”	  and	  “burden	  of	  proof”	  as	  
a	  “preoccupation	  of	  the	  ground,	  as	  implies	  that	  it	  must	  stand	  good	  till	  some	  sufficient	  
reason	  adduced	  against	  it…”(120).	  	  Presumptions,	  as	  confirmation	  bias,	  reverse	  the	  force	  of	  
argument.	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reasons and evidence are tested by members of the group by engaging confirmation biases 
that help to sort out good reasons from bad.  Confirmation bias plays an important role in 
evaluating the arguments of others and not solely in the production of our own beliefs.   
In the open-peer comment section of Sperber and Mercier’s paper, the authors receive 
support for their theory from the majority of reviewers. Darcia Narvez, however, comments 
that  
the authors describe reasoning as a process more akin to 
rhetoric, completely leaving out practical reasoning.  They 
claim that human reasoning evolved to competitively persuade 
others of one’s viewpoint rather than for making the best 
decision (84).   
Narvez means this as a bad thing, of course. Rhetoric is still viewed by some cognitive 
scientists, along with many other scholars, as irrational and decorative, not as a link between 
language and cognitive mechanisms, affinities, and attributes.  Sperber and Mercier present 
the case that reasoning, as argumentation, is rhetorical.  Argumentation as product and/or 
process is rhetoric in action and the primary formulator of practical reason. What should I 
do? What do I believe?  Argumentation is rhetorical; it is the primary manner of 
identification that forms consubstantiality between divided human beings as mental systems 
in an environment of society as communication.  Sperber and Mercier along with other 
proponents of their argumentative theory of reasoning, support my claim that rhetoric is an 
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inherently cognitive aspect of communication, or more succinctly, more than dressed up 
language or strategies of language deployment.  Rhetoric as argumentative strategy, 
figuration, and grammar plays a key role in communication that should be studied from a 
cognitive perspective.  In terms of professional communication pedagogy, rhetoric, as 
argumentation, figuration, and grammar deployed as speech, text, and visual media, serves as 
foundational content. 
The triad of structure, form and strategy anchor the argumentation theory taught in 
technogenetic pedagogy.  In Figure 3, the triad is placed in relationship to discursive, extra-
discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric.  The structure, form, and strategy triad serve as the 
foundation of technogenetic rhetoric and complex digitally situated learning (to be discussed 
in chapter 4).  
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Figure 3: Structure, Form, Strategy of Technogenetic Rhetoric 
To use an architectural analogy, structure is the inside of a building, the foundation, walls, 
transoms and so on.  Form, on the other hand, is the outside of a building, the public facing 
aspects.  Strategy maps onto the decisions made by the architect in designing the building.  
These three elements can be analyzed as separate domains, but cannot be separated in 
practice.  Structure cannot exist without form, nor form without structure, and neither come 
into existence without strategy.  All three elements are rhetorical in nature, forming degrees 
of identification and consubstantiality in their effectiveness.  Rhetorical elements such as 
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audience analysis, purpose determination, appeals, and commonplaces (loci) are examined in 
light of structure, form and strategy.  My aim is to move theory into a praxis that provides 
students with an understanding of the pragmatic effects of argumentation along with skill in 
the execution of technique.  My argumentation praxis is based on the cognitive effects of the 
structures, forms and strategies deployed with an eye to the relationship between cognition 
and technology. The following section introduces praxis of argumentation for professional 
communication pedagogy. 
3.1.1 The praxis of argumentation for professional communication pedagogy  
The first part of the triad I will discuss is that of structure.  The structure of an argument 
includes the basic elements of its construction, but also serves as a heuristic for production 
and analysis.  Argumentation structure provides a discursive space for the invention of form 
and strategy.  And to be clear, structure, form, and strategy are not material entities that can 
stand on their own. All three are required in the formation of an argument and elements of 
each overlap and serve as the foundation for the others; there is structure in form, form in 
strategy, and structure cannot exist without both form and strategy.  As teachers, we abstract 
the three elements for the sake of pedagogy, but it is vital that students understand the triad 
has a relationship similar to Saussure’s signified and signifier as two sides of a piece of 
paper.  
In his 1958 classic text, The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin describes arguments as 
having an anatomy and a physiology.  The gross anatomy of an argument is the completed 
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text or speech with the parts and paragraphs serving as organs.  Toulmin is interested in the 
deeper physiological aspects of argument; what he defines as “micro-arguments” (87).  
Micro-arguments occur, mostly unnoticed, in everyday professional communication.  They 
are embedded in the conversations, meeting requests, presentations, and correspondences that 
occur during the average twenty-four hour workday.  What Toulmin provides is a structure 
for micro-arguments that aids in the production and evaluation of arguments.  I believe 
Toulmin’s structure of micro-arguments serves a similar purpose as Heidegger’s concept of 
enframing does for our relationship with technology.  Just as enframing divulges an essence 
of technology that serves to define our mode of being in extended cognition, Toulmin’s 
model provides a basis through which we can understand our capacity for argumentative 
reasoning.  Claims are derived through either or both System 1 and System 2 reasoning while 
warrants are the products of argumentative reasoning based on grounds (data).  Using 
Toulmin’s example argument, a person may access grounds (data) through intuitive 
inference, move the grounds into language as a mental or oral statement; “Harry was born in 
Bermuda”; engage System 2 reasoning to evaluate the grounds and make the claim “Harry is 
a British subject”; and by evaluating the grounds and claim, determine the warrant that “a 
man born in Bermuda will be a British subject” (92).  The model provides a structure through 
which we can track conscious and, what Daniel Dennett refers to as sub-personal aspects of 
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argumentative reasoning.  In terms of praxis, the model allows for a glimpse into the 
cognitive processes we engage in forming knowledge though argumentative reasoning7. I 
offer a reinterpretation of Toulmin’s model in terms of his concepts of field-invariance, the 
aspects of argument that apply to all arguments, and field-dependence, the belief that the 
backing of an argument may only be evaluated by the field in which it is applied.  I am also 
offering a broader space for the element of claim that is grounded in Burke’s conception of 
                                                
 
 
7 Toulmin’s model has been used extensively in composition textbooks and pedagogy.  Karen 
Lunsford’s 2002 article in Written Communication “Contextualizing Toulmin’s Model in the 
Writing Classroom: A Case Study” offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis of 
applications of the model.  Although Toulmin’s model has received its share of criticism, 
Lunsford finds specific critiques to be “moot” as the teachers in her case study reinterpreted 
the model many times over as they applied it to various pedagogical goals (160).  Joseph 
Bizup (2009) finds the “history of the Toulmin model in composition studies [to be] largely a 
story of alterations and hybridizations” (15).  The model has been cited extensively in a 
number of divergent fields (Bizup 2009).  In fact, Toulmin’s model is also being used in 
artificial intelligence as a tool in the development of algorithm based knowledge 
representation and reasoning (see Potter 2008).   
	  
  87 
persuasion as identification.  Before presenting these reinterpretations, a brief description of 
the Toulmin model with examples from professional communication is called for. 
As I briefly sketched out above, Toulmin’s model of micro-argument involves the 
cognitive processing of intuitive inference into language that serves as Grounds (originally 
called data by Toulmin, I maintain the reference to data in parenthesis as the term is used in 
other applications such as artificial intelligence research).  Grounds (data) serve as the basis 
for a claim.  Grounds (data) are the idea, the flash of intuitive inspiration, while the claim is 
the expression of the idea through speech, text, or multimedia.  There is a third element that 
connects grounds (data) and claim, termed the warrant.  Toulmin describes the warrant as 
the answer to the question, “How did you get there?” If the interlocutor were to have asked, 
“What have you got to go on?” grounds (data) might have sufficed as a response, but in the 
first instance a warrant is required.  A warrant provides a basis for the linking of grounds 
(data) to a claim (90).  Imagine Glenda, a fictional marketing manager for an adventure-
based vacation agency, reads a series of reports on the demographics of her customers. Later 
in the day, she comes across an article on a local radio station describing the listener base as 
belonging to the same demographic.  Using System 1 and System 2 reasoning mechanisms, 
she intuits a relationship forming grounds (data).  She decides to express a claim in a 
meeting request via email to her vice-president and team (see Figure 4): 
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Figure 4: Routine Email as Argument 
 
Glenda’s memo makes a claim that her agency should advertise on radio with Adrenaline FM 
based on the grounds (data) that the radio station listener aligns demographically with their 
clients.  The warrant is not directly stated in the text. Glenda uses an Aristotelian enthymeme 
where she states the two premises of grounds (data) and claim while leaving out the 
conclusion; the radio station listener will be receptive to our product offering. In this 
particular professional setting, there are more claims being made beyond the radio-
advertising claim; there is a claim that Glenda is capable of calling such a meeting.  The 
rhetorical appeal of ethos frames a claim of credibility in terms of ideas and inspirations.  If 
To: [list]  
c.c. [admin list]
Subject: Meeting request: Radio advertising
Ms. Smith and team,
I believe we should designate a significant section of our budget to a radio advertising campaign on Adrenaline FM 
106.7.  The latest adventure travel demographic report published by Gartner presents a customer profile that matches the 
listener of Adrenaline FM.  
The Adrenaline listener is predominantly male, age 25-34, earns over $70K annually, and participates in a number of 
outdoor sports.  Our primary client demographic aligns in gender, age, and income almost exactly.  
I have not worked out the customer acquisition cost associated with a radio campaign, but will do so before we meet.
I am setting up a meeting for Tuesday, September 23 @ 2:pm in the Leader’s Room and via conference call 1466934.  
Please send notification of attendance.
Thanks,
Glenda Rickards
Senior Marketing Manager
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Glenda is prone to making claims based on weak grounds that do not support a suitable 
warrant, her meeting request may be ignored.  In essence, Glenda, by sending the email, is 
making a claim that she has the ethos to call a meeting based on the grounds (data) that she 
habitually has good ideas based on strong evidence analysis with a warrant that her idea is a 
good one.  Another claim based on ethos is made by Glenda in her use of research.  She is 
claiming that Gartner and the source for the radio station demographics are able to support 
their claims and grounds.  Glenda’s email is a micro-argument before she receives any 
feedback or debate.  Also, by putting her title after her name, Glenda is making an ethotic 
micro-argument.  Other elements of argumentation include the salutation of “Ms. Smith and 
team” rather than “Dear Ms. Smith and team” or “Mary, Bill, and Alice”.  The salutation 
makes a demand on attention rather than a request.  Finally, the action is placed at the end of 
the communication after the reasons have been laid out demonstrating an appeal to the 
rationality of her audience (more on argument strategy later in this chapter).  The Toulmin 
model provides a heuristic for engaging the attention system of the communications student 
in a deep and important analysis of a seemingly simple communication.   
There are three more elements to Toulmin’s model: backing, qualifier, and rebuttal.  
Backing involves field-dependent evidence that further support the warrant.  In our example, 
Glenda provides specific demographic language that aligns with her grounds (data); gender, 
age, and income level.  The backing she provides does not directly back the grounds, they 
serve to expand rather than back.  The field-dependent language does, however, back the 
claim that Gartner and the radio station demographic supplier have the right to make their 
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claim.  If Glenda had been able to provide evidence that other adventure-travel firms 
acquired more customers via radio advertising, she would have provided backing directly to 
her grounds (data), claim, and warrant.  A rebuttal consists of statements that, if true, would 
make the claim invalid.  In our example, Glenda brings up a rebuttal based on customer 
acquisition cost.  The rebuttal informs the reader that she has thought through potential 
reasons that her claim would have to be set aside.  Rebuttals also provide backing to claims 
of ethos; the fact that Glenda states a potential reason for the invalidity of her claim 
strengthens her claim that she should be heard on her idea or grounds.  Qualifiers refer to the 
modal strength of the claim and grounds.  Toulmin provides two modal distinctions; force 
and criteria.  Force refers to the “practical implications” of the modal term.  In our example, 
Glenda uses the strong modal term “believe” which in practical terms, represents her high 
level of commitment to the claim.  Criteria refer to the context of the modal; Toulmin 
explains criteria to refer to  
[the] reference to which we decide in any context that the use 
of a particular modal term is appropriate.  We are entitled to 
say that some possibility has to be ruled out only if we can 
produce grounds or reasons to justify this claim, and under the 
term ‘criteria’ can be included many sorts of things…[for 
example] something can be mathematically impossible (28-29).   
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Force modals are in essence field-invariant while the criteria of modals are most often field-
dependent.  The modal in our example does not have criteria; had Glenda made the statement 
that the campaign would be economically impossible if the customer acquisition cost proves 
to be too high, she would have employed a modal based on a criteria.  Qualifiers play an 
important role in the overall force of the claim and grounds (data).   
The areas of Toulmin’s model I repurpose for professional communication pedagogy are 
the concepts of field-invariant and field-dependent.  Toulmin believes the microstructures of 
everyday arguments are field-invariant; every argument contains a claim, warrant, and 
grounds.  Backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals, on the other hand are field-dependent; what 
constitutes modal criteria, backing, and rebuttal depend upon the intrinsic nature of the field.  
Toulmin’s concept of field has been interpreted in a number of ways, but primarily as subject 
matter, sociological entities, and discourse communities (Bermejo-Luque 2006).  For the 
purposes of professional communication pedagogy, I combine aspects of these various 
conceptions to define a field as a communication system. With Luhmann’s social system 
theory in mind, a field is a system/organization constituted by communication; the 
environment of a field consists of biological systems (life) and mental systems 
(consciousness). Bermejo-Luque (2006) offers a similar definition of fields as “subject 
matter, intellectual disciplines, or, in general, systems of propositions” (81).  She proposes 
that fields serve two rhetorical roles in argumentation; as a determiner of truth value; a field, 
as a system of propositions determines modality; and a field serves as a heuristic for the 
evaluation of arguments by providing the appropriate context (82-3).  I agree that a field 
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constituted by communication serves as a system of propositions that help determine the 
truth-value and efficacy of arguments, but I also believe the environment in which a field as a 
system resides plays a crucial rhetorical role in argumentation.  An environment consisting of 
biological and mental systems—otherwise known as human beings—serves as audience for 
the communication that constitutes a field.  Fields, as sub-species of social systems, serve to 
coalesce organizations, human beings, and functional systems into cohesive entities.  An 
example relevant to professional communications would be the field of retail clothing that 
would include organizations (as systems of communication) such as The Gap, American 
Apparel, Bluenotes, Harry Rosen, and so on; the professionals employed by these 
organizations (as mental systems); all within the economic functional social system.  The 
field is composed of all of the communication conducted by the member systems from the 
individual emails to trade magazines.  This description is getting very close to that of speech 
and discourse communities.  Speech and discourse communities, based on agreed-upon 
lexical, stylistic, and topical conventions, are primarily voluntary cooperative entities (Borg 
2003).  Discourse and speech communities would map onto industry organizations such as 
Retail Association of Canada, and be contained within the field.  Fields are communication 
systems made up of discourse communities with the environment for both consisting of 
mental (human) and social (organization) systems.   
Perceiving fields as a function of systemic interaction brings rhetoric into Toulmin’s 
model.  Individuals as mental systems both populate and serve as the environment for 
communication based fields, in other words as audience.  Field-invariant audiences map onto 
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Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) conception of the “universal audience,” defined as 
“a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker” (31).   
The universal audience is not a collection of “real” people; it is a mental construction based 
on the field in which the argument is taking place.  The field-dependent audience is the 
collection of “real” people receiving and judging the argument.  When a professional writes 
and designs a presentation arguing for a specific marketing direction for a given product, she 
conceives an audience that is at once field-invariant and field-dependent.  It is not a case of 
two groups; the audience is at once field-invariant as a conception of the writer/speaker and 
field-dependent as real people sitting in the room and universally field-invariant.  I am not 
arguing that the universal audience is exclusively field-invariant while a particular audience 
is exclusively field-dependent; a universal audience exists within each field.  For example, 
the audience for a legal argument is at once field-invariant, as the mentally conceived 
universal audience of the lawyer, and field-dependent, responding to the specific forensic 
appeals of the field (and sub-field, such as civil, corporate, or criminal law), both of which 
are represented for the speaker/writer in the particular audience listening or reading the 
argument. The field-invariant universal audience I am referring to consists of mental systems 
as defined by their cognitive mechanisms and affinities.  Randy Allen Harris (2008) 
conceived of the universal audience in terms of the cognitive similarities shared by human 
beings.  Universally, we all cognitively respond to certain structures of language use such as 
argumentation and figuration in a similar fashion.  I discuss the relationship of rhetoric and 
cognition in detail in subsequent sections.   The field invariant/dependent division is a result 
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of the operationally closed nature of mental systems.  As the professional moves from 
thought to language, no degree of structural coupling or identification has occurred; the 
audience is only a mental construction, a universal audience of the field and the speaker 
aligns writing/speech with her intuited conception of their desires.  Once communication 
takes place, engaging the organization as system, the speaker is able to interact with a field-
dependent particular audience.  This is not to say that the professional does not use the 
knowledge of the particular audience in designing her argument, but only imagined, universal 
aspects can be accessed.  There is no way for the professional to have particular field-
dependent knowledge until communication is engaged (communication that could be 
linguistic, the form of questions and comments, as well as kinesthetic, as body language and 
eye contact).  It is important to define field-invariant and dependence further.  A field-
dependent audience consists of real people while a field-invariant consists of intuitively 
inferred imaginary people.  The field-invariant audience remains a sub-set of all potentially 
inferred people, in other words, in professional communication, the marketing presenter in 
our example intuitively infers members of concentric systemic fields – as members of the 
functional economic system, marketing specialists, retail specialists, and members of the 
particular segment of the organization.  The field-invariant audience can judge the claim, 
grounds, and warrant in terms of logical coherence and organization.  The field-dependent 
audience consists of the real people who belong to same sub-set of fields as the field-
invariant universal audience, with the ability to not only judge the claim, grounds, and 
warrant, but also challenge the aspects of backing, rebuttal, and qualifiers with specific and 
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relevant knowledge.  The key delineator is the ability to challenge. A field-invariant 
universal audience as mental construct cannot challenge as it is defined by unconscious 
cognitive mechanisms and affinities such as argumentative reasoning and conceptual 
blending (more on these below).  A field-dependent universal audience as mental construct, 
on the other hand, can challenge through the use of the figure prolepsis by the rhetor.  To 
accomplish this challenge, the rhetor imagines a challenge to her argument and brings it 
forward in order to demonstrate its weakness.  So the universal audience is both field-
invariant in terms of cognition, and field-dependent in terms of strategy.8  
Toulmin’s conception of field gestures back to Aristotle’s common and special topics.  
Just as field metaphorically invokes space, Topos designates the metaphorical place a speaker 
can go to find her argument.  Common topics such as definition and analogy are universal in 
nature in that they apply to all fields.  The definition of an argument may be invoked in any 
argument, while the figure analogy may be applied to any argument of comparison.  Special 
topics apply only to the field in question.  Constitutionality arguments apply to the particular 
                                                
 
 
8	  This	  conception	  of	  field-­‐dependence	  and	  invariance	  stretches	  Toulmin’s	  definition.	  	  By	  
incorporating	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca’s	  conception	  of	  universal	  and	  particular	  
audiences,	  a	  field	  becomes	  a	  rhetorical	  domain	  where	  the	  multiple	  arguments	  of	  ethos	  
presented	  in	  the	  radio	  advertising	  argument	  presented	  above	  are	  discernable.	  	  
Incorporating	  the	  notion	  of	  audience	  to	  the	  Toulmin	  field	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  core	  of	  his	  
argument	  that	  certain	  elements	  of	  argumentation	  are	  field-­‐invariant	  and	  apply	  to	  all	  
communicating	  human	  beings	  while	  only	  experts	  within	  specific	  fields	  are	  capable	  of	  
judging	  the	  application	  of	  backing,	  qualifiers,	  and	  rebuttals	  to	  specific	  warrants.	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fields of law and politics.  All common topics appeal to logic and reasoning and are therefore 
also appeal to the universal cognitive audience described above.       
Bringing audience into the model also allows for the inclusion of rhetorical situations.  In 
conceiving a field-invariant universal audience, the professional must place them in a 
situation.  Whether the situation presents itself through communication (Bitzer’s objective 
exigence in systemic terms) or is inferred through System 1 reasoning into System 2 
argumentation by the professional(s) (as Vatz would argue) is moot.  Without a situation an 
audience is not imagined/assembled and an argument is not formulated.  Rhetorical situation 
in light of field invariance and dependence brings us back to attention and technology.  
Communication technology has extended our cognitive ability.  Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers in their 1998 essay “The Extended Mind” theorize a relationship between 
technologies and the mind where:  
the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-
way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a 
cognitive system in its own right. All the components in the 
system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If 
we remove the external component the system's behavioral 
competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its 
brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts 
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equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly 
in the head (222). 
When a professional accesses a database of contact information or marketing information, for 
instance, or when a software program helps to organize thought into language and images, 
cognition is extended.  They use what they have defined as the “parity principle” to serve as a 
gauge:  
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process, which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then 
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive 
process (222).   
Cognition has always been extended to some extent from ancient man using a stick to outline 
a hunting plan of attack in the sand to Richard Feynman’s often quoted statement to a 
biographer that his notes were not a record of his thinking, they were his thinking; in other 
words, the paper was an integral part of his cognitive activity (Clark 2011 xxv).  Computer 
software of all kinds has become an active part of our cognitive activity; to a professional, 
the loss of a BlackBerry is not unlike a stroke: they lose both some of their memory and a 
significant part of their ability to communicate, and they need a kind of cognitive-techno 
therapy to regain what they’ve lost.  Argumentative reasoning is a function of extended 
cognition in professional communication settings.  The ability to infer an idea, reason it into 
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language, and communicate it to others, is as much a product of the extended cognitive 
relationship with the BlackBerry as it is purely mental activity.  Taking Clark’s conception of 
extended cognition even further are the extensions provided by socio-cognitive technologies 
such as figuration.  Figures allow an extension of one mind into another, as all language 
does, but in a manner that extends the ability to store and recall the information in question.  
They provide a distributed cognition among social affiliates, who seed one another’s minds 
with information and heuristics and cues for further sharing and retrieval. For example, a 
metaphor, as will be discussed below, forms a conceptual blend of mental spaces in the 
receivers mind that is more easily stored and recalled from memory.  The effect of metaphor 
and other figures is not the key aspect of extended cognition; figures serve as technology in a 
similar way to the database or the search engine except the retrieval is not outside but inside 
of the mind. That is why, for instance, so many mnemonics and proverbs are figured. They 
have a linguistic configuration that ‘docks’ easily in the minds of group members.  
The other side of this relationship of mind and technology is its effect on the greater 
attention system.  As discussed above, the selection system is engaged on a constant basis 
sending System 1 reasoning and argumentative System 2 reasoning into overdrive.  James 
Crosswhite (2011) correctly asserts that Toulmin’s model lacks a method of invention: 
“There are no exigencies, no rhetorical situation.  Further, there are no procedures for 
generating arguments” (2562).  The model itself is not meant as heuristic for invention; it 
assumes invention.  Toulmin, coming from a philosophical and logic perspective, develops a 
model that is analytic, allowing for the recognition of the structural components of 
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argumentation.  The inclusion of audience and situation into the theoretical foundation of 
field invariance and dependence, however, improves the model’s ability to aid invention.  
Technologically extended cognition and a highly engaged selection system of attention lead 
to argumentative reasoning.  Arguments are developed with field-invariant universal and 
field-dependent particular audiences in mind.  The notion of audience serves to bridge the 
gap between argumentative reasoning and the engagement of Toulmin’s model.  Returning to 
Glenda, our marketing manager, technologically extended cognition led to the engagement of 
Glenda’s attention system and her ability to reason argumentatively.  It is her conception of 
the field-invariant universal and field-dependent audience that led her to construct her email 
argument and it is the same factors that either support or detract from the arguments of ethos 
described above.  Glenda details her claim, grounds, and warrant by intuitively inferring the 
knowledge and skills of a universal audience of marketing professionals and structures her 
backing, rebuttals, and qualifiers to appeal to the particular audience.  Glenda’s cognition is 
extended via the technology of email in the sense that the string of responses maintains the 
original message and serves as a memory aid.  When Glenda writes, “I have not worked out 
the customer acquisition cost associated with a radio campaign, but will do so before we 
meet”, she is creating a technologically extended memory.  Field-invariant aspects of 
audience establish the ethos of her ability to make the claim while field-dependent aspects 
create the ethos for her backing.  The reader uses the same invariant and dependent elements 
to interpret her argument.  The reader’s cognition is also technologically extended by the 
email in the sense of external memory.  The element of audience makes the Toulmin model a 
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useful heuristic for teaching, developing, and interpreting the structure of arguments.  
Crosswhite’s (2011) call for a richer pathway to invention does have merit if we remove the 
elements of technology, attention, argumentative reasoning, and audience from the model.  
Without these precursors and catalysts, the model is much less applicable to professional 
communication pedagogy.  Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor (1996) have argued that the 
Toulmin model is far less effective as a heuristic of invention than is classical rhetoric.  
Classical rhetoric reformulated as “new rhetoric” by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
Walton’s argumentation schemes of presumptive reasoning, and figurative language provides 
form and strategy to the structure provided by Toulmin.  James Crosswhite (2011) views the 
form as the recognizable aspect that identifies an argument as he states,  
every argument requires a speaker and audience, operating 
within the bounds that define argumentation, drawing on a 
shared world, shaping starting points into discourse, and then 
moving toward a claim in a way that has an identifiable form 
associated with an argumentative technique.  The form is not 
the only persuasive in the system, but it is the most prominent 
part of the model” (2656).   
Form is the next element in the triad of structure, form, and strategy that underpins 
technogenetic pedagogy.  Cognitive psychology has investigated argumentation as a 
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cognitive function of reasoning; investigations of the cognitive aspects of form have been a 
combined effort of cognitive psychology and rhetorical studies. 
3.2 Figuration and Figural Logic  
Many of the definitions of rhetoric written over the past 2400 years or so have hinted at the 
cognitive nature of rhetorical form.  One of the most cognitively focused definitions comes 
from Friedrich Nietzsche who wrote  “that what is called rhetorical, as a means of conscious 
art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language and its development, indeed 
that the rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of the understanding, of 
the artistic means which are already found in language” [1989, 21].   Language for 
Nietzsche is rhetoric, understood as tropes and schemes—some fresh, some forgotten—that 
populate every syllable of expression. Nietzsche believed all words to be figures that serve as 
image forming signs or opinions of the real that in and of themselves do not provide access to 
reality [23].  All language is metaphor – when human beings devise a word a series of 
metaphors are involved; first, a metaphor involving the transfer of a visual nerve impulse into 
an image and second, a metaphor transferring image to sound and a series of letters [1990, 
82].  For Nietzsche, the schemes and tropes of rhetoric are, to borrow a phrase from extended 
cognition theory [discussed below], scaffolding for language; or, what is much the same 
thing in this view, the scaffolding of cognition. 
In his 1890 publication English Composition and Rhetoric (2010), Alexander Bain 
provides a further associationist treatment of figures of speech (Chien & Harris  2011).  
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Figures of speech, for Bain, are “deviations” made for “the sake of greater effect;” nothing 
new there, but he goes on to link figures to what he defines as “the powers of understanding” 
[135].  Bain finds a connection between rhetorical use of language and the structure of 
human thought in three categories: discrimination, similarity, and retentiveness [135-36].  
Discrimination refers to the affinity humans cognitively have to contrast and relate.  Bain 
believes we are mentally predisposed to change and that figures such as antithesis and 
contrast linguistically reflect this affinity [135].  Similarity refers to the cognitive affinity of 
agreement; on either a conscious or unconscious cognitive level we are attracted to similarity.  
The figures that promote similarity include metaphor and allegory [135]; we might add 
personification, reification, topification, anthropomorphism, and a whole catalogue of” X-is-
similar-Y” figures.  Retentiveness refers to the mental ability to retain words, images, and 
impressions on the basis of empirical association, because we experience them together or in 
close succession; in what would later be called episodic memory.  Bain links the figure 
metonymy to retentiveness, as it is empirical association based on the memory of hearing the 
words, or seeing the images, in connection with each other, that allows for metonymical 
expressions such as “the throne” for a sovereign.   
Both Bain and Nietzsche view figurative language as scaffolding for mental activity where 
the form of language structures thought.  Nietzsche takes an extreme view where all language 
is metaphorical and thus rhetorical by default. (This view does not imply that rhetoric is not a 
conscious and planned form of language.  I read Nietzsche as finding rhetoric to be both an 
unconscious and a conscious activity in alignment with Sperber and Mercier.) Bain views 
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rhetorical figures more as a conscious communicative choice (again, Bain does not directly 
state figures work only on a conscious level, but the implication of his work is a one of 
communicative choice in meaning making).  Bain and Nietzsche have differing scholarly 
mandates; Nietzsche is explaining the reciprocal effects of language on thought, thought on 
language, while Bain is recommending strategies of communication and writing based on the 
structure of thought.  Both, however, develop hypotheses that the form of language does 
more than decorate meaning; rhetorical figures of speech are effective because they align 
with both mental activity, in the case of Nietzsche, and mental affinities such as a heightened 
attraction to things that change or are similar as opposed to static or unrelated elements, in 
the case of Bain.  
Rhetorical form engages cognitive affinities for contrast that develop formal assent.  
Cognitive scientist and philosopher Andy Clark describes language in general as “[a] form of 
mind-transforming cognitive scaffolding: a persisting, though never stationary, symbolic 
edifice” (2011, 44).  Rhetoric provides the form to the structure or scaffolding of thought.  As 
discussed above argumentative reasoning is a product of sub-personal intuitive inference 
engaged with working memory.  Form is the manifestation of this cognitive mechanism.  Just 
as in the case of a building, the scaffolding as structure remains hidden from the viewer.  The 
beams, girders, transoms, wall frames that support the structure reside beneath the outer 
aspects of form such as brick work, moldings, and so on.  Structure and form are indivisible. 
You cannot have one without the other. Form adds to structure and structure allows for form.  
The same applies to communication where form is what attracts or hails the audience.  
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Kenneth Burke conception of what he terms “formal assent” provides the definitive 
description of the relationship between form and structure.  Burke state that 
we know that many purely formal patterns can readily awaken 
an attitude of collaborative expectancy in us. For instance, 
imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions [“we do this, 
but they on the other hand do that; we stay here, but they go 
there; we look up, but they look down,” etc.]. Once you grasp 
the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless of the 
subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along 
with the succession of anti-thesis, even though you may not 
agree with the proposition that is being presented in this form. 
Or it may even be an opponents proposition which you resent–
yet for the duration of the statement itself you might “help him 
out” to the extent of yielding to the formal development, 
surrendering to its symmetry as such. Of course, the more 
violent your original resistance to the proposition, the weaker 
will be your degree of “surrender” by “collaborating” with the 
form. But in cases where a decision is still to be reached, a 
yielding to the form prepares for assent to the matter identified 
with it. Thus, you are drawn to the form, not in your capacity 
as a partisan, but because of some “universal” appeal in it. And 
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this attitude of assent may then be transferred to the matter 
which happens to be associated with the form (1950, 58). 
The “’universal’ appeal” promoting the acceptance of content Burke refers to is the effect of 
rhetorical forms on the structure of our thinking.  We are unconsciously attracted to the 
design of the content.  Just as Nietzsche and Bain see a connection between rhetoric and 
thought, Burke also sees the result; rhetorical figures grease the cognitive skids of what he 
terms identification.  Figurative language creates a connection between speaker (writer) and 
listener (reader) that supersedes content creating a degree of assent to meaning.  Burke 
alludes to the natural function of rhetoric in his oft-quoted definition: “For rhetoric as such is 
not rooted in any past condition of human society.  It is rooted in an essential function of 
language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and continually born anew; the use of 
language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols” (43).  Rhetoric is not mere “flattery” or “cookery” as Plato suggests to Gorgias, 
able to divert truth through a superficial aesthetic of language, though it might certainly be 
deployed to those ends by some people some of the time, or even by entire industries. 
Rhetoric is not solely a construction; it is a natural dimension of language resulting from our 
predisposition to form and cooperative action.  I am not denying rhetoric is a proactive 
mental activity that is consciously and strategically deployed, but as Nietzsche, Bain, and 
Burke suggest, the power of rhetoric lies in the conscious, and more importantly unconscious 
cognitive attraction of rhetorical form.  Staying with Clark’s scaffolding analogy, Burke’s 
formal assent suggests that the scaffold constructed by rhetoric and figurative language is 
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preexisting in a way that other linguistic constructs are not; the scaffold of antithesis 
exemplified by Burke is already in place waiting to semantically connect form and meaning.  
That is not to say that separate cognitive scaffolds exist for literal and figurative language—
as Nietzsche points out, all language is figurative—but it may be that the elements of 
figurative language that evoke cognitive affinities such as Bain’s discrimination, similarity, 
and retentiveness, produce more accessible linguistic scaffolds.    
Richard Gregg, in his neglected 1984 book, Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in 
the Foundations of Rhetoric, investigates the relationship between symbols and cognitive 
function through what he terms (borrowing from Burke), “principles of symbolic 
inducement” which “refers to those symbolic principles and functions which lead or invite us 
on to action and which begin in the workings of the mind-brain” (19).  While Gregg 
extensively utilizes Burke’s theories of symbolic action, he does not refer directly to Burke’s 
theory of formal assent. However, by aligning specific cognitive principles with the 
processing of symbols he nods to formal assent as he demonstrates how rhetorical language 
leads to the inducement of meaning.   While I take issue with Gregg’s narrowly cognitivist 
model, there is much in his work that can be repurposed to apply to an enactive and extended 
conception of cognition.  Gregg views cognition as a closed-loop system in which the mind-
brain manipulates symbols received from an external world through mental faculties of 
“choice”, “intention”, and “induction” in order to produce action (133).  The mind-brain is 
sealed off from the world and perceptually acquired symbols serve as inputs that are 
processed to produce cognitive activity.  As described in the previous chapter, I hold to an 
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enactive and extended model of cognition that mediates between symbolic information-
processing views of the mind and connectionist views of globally distributed states in the 
mind.  The term enactive refers to the perceptually guided action of the perceiver in her own 
local situation.  It is the embodiment of the perceiver and not the internal or external 
representation of a preexisting world that drives cognition.  Cognition is the coupling of the 
world with human systems of perception; perception and the world are interdependent.  
Enactive cognition is extended when external objects in the world (such as a string around a 
finger, notebook, abacus, smartphone, tablet computer, augmented glasses, etc.) become an 
integral part of the human system of perception, memory, and attention.  Gregg finds the 
world to be “representable” to the mind-brain through symbols while an enactive and 
extended view finds the world as “presentable” through embodied perceptual action.  This 
crucial difference brings into question Gregg’s conception of “inducement” as an either 
conscious or unconscious choice between alternatives.  If, however, we take Gregg’s 
foundational processes of cognition and repurpose them to fit an enactive and extended 
model, his matching of cognitive principles and symbolic interaction extends the work of 
Burke, Bain, and Nietzsche to align with the subsequent chapters on Digital media and 
composition. 
Gregg uses the terms “choice” and “intention” as foundational principles of a closed-loop 
cognitive system.  If we shift to a concept of “intentionality” that follows a Husserlian 
definition where linguistic symbols are formed through mind and world interaction it is 
possible to apply Gregg’s work to a cognitive scaffolding model of language.  Gregg 
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identifies six key cognitive principles that lead to symbolic inducement: “edging or 
bounding, rhythm, association, classification, abstraction, and hierarchic ordering” (134).   
• Edging or bounding refers to the perceptual capacity to create borders where none 
exist (exemplified by Gregg through an examination of visual perception) allowing 
for the ordering of symbols so that perception is continuous and theoretically making 
possible the formation of complex thought patterns such as ideology (134-35).  In an 
enactive sense, this principle results from the symbol being brought forth through 
phenomenological intentionality rather than a closed-loop representation, but the 
relationship between cognitive activity and thought holds true.   A cognitive scaffold 
is created by language in an enactive fashion that orders phenomenologically formed 
symbols.  In an extended conceptualization, digital media could participate in the 
edging and bounding through attention shaping genres such as twitter.  In fact, the 
very appliances through which we get digital media have bounded screens, which 
contain and frame. 
• Rhythm refers to the one of the chief pattern affinities of the mind-brain.  Gregg finds 
“perceptual models are constantly compared with relevant portions of our larger 
cognitive maps of reality” (135).  In an enactive sense, we form reality, but the 
affinity holds true (as current neurophysiological research has proven, discussed 
below).   
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• Association refers to the cognitive affinity for repeated neuronal firings making 
cognitive maps stable and accessible (135).  Figures such as metaphor, analogy, 
synecdoche, and metonymy all engage association.  We associate one mental space to 
another based on referred thoughts.  In other words, thinking analogically or 
combinatorically requires associating one concept to another.     
• Classification refers to the cognitive affinity for alternatives (similar to Bain’s 
conception of discrimination).  “We not only perceive this phenomenon rather than 
that phenomenon, but we choose to see the phenomenon in this particular way rather 
than that particular way” (135). 
• Abstraction refers to the mind-brain’s ability to abstract from its environment.  
Classification is continual abstraction to achieve an ordering of thought (50).  
Although Gregg does not refer to figuration directly, abstraction is closely associated 
with interpretation of figurative language (discussed below). 
• Hierarchy refers to the mind-brain’s ability to determine “meanings composed of 
subordinate and superordinate structures of meanings” (50), a dimension of thought 
that synecdoche relies upon.   
Despite the cognitive conception of cognition as a closed-loop system with a representational 
and processing bias, Gregg’s outline of cognitive principles or affinities provide a basis for 
the relationship between cognition and rhetorical language.  If we conceive of the processes 
acting on symbols created through an enactive coupling of the mind and its environment, 
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figurative language serves to engage thought on a phenomenological level and thus on an 
epistemological level.  Doing so supports, in a cognitive sense, amalgamates Nietzsche’s 
conception of persuasive ideological thought-formation; Bain’s conscious crafting of 
persuasion; and Burke’s theory of rhetoric as reciprocally persuasive identification that 
leverages formal assent.  Figures of placement, repetition, similarity, contrast, and 
association align with Gregg’s six foundational cognitive principles.   
In her essay, “Rhetoric in the Age of Cognitive Science,” (2005) Jeanne Fahnestock 
summarizes a number of studies performed in neuroscience and cognitive psychology that 
provide some evidence that the insights of Nietzsche, Bain, Burke, and Gregg have 
experimental validity.  Fahnestock cites a study by Robert Zatorre et al investigating the 
neural elements of speech in terms of loudness, pitch, duration, and cognitive origin where 
subjects were asked to identify separate syllables, pairs of syllables, and pitch differences 
while undergoing a PET scan.  Zatorre concludes, “our results, taken together, support a 
model whereby auditory information undergoes discreet processing stages, each of which 
depends on separate neural subsystems” (Zatorre et al, 848).  Fahnestock (2005) believes the 
study provides an initial foundation for a cognitive exploration of rhetorical stylistics in that 
it demonstrates “the manipulable parameters of a language” (166).  Before a cognitive basis 
of rhetorical language can be established, it is important that a baseline of linguistic (in this 
case aural) differentiation can be detected in brain activity.  Studies such as Zatorre’s do not 
prove the insights of our rhetoricians, but without a detectable variation in how aural 
language is cognized such insights can never move from theoretical to demonstrable.   
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Fahnestock also cites studies on the hemispheric differences in brain activity in terms of 
“tone”.  While the majority of language processing is done in the left hemisphere, studies by 
Borod, Bloom, and Santschi-Haywood (1998) have revealed the right hemisphere’s role in 
the appreciation of tone, for instance the ability to detect the inflection of a statement: “He 
has a PhD?” versus “he has a PhD?”.  While Fahnestock (2005) agrees that understanding 
where in the brain events occur is hardly useful for rhetoricians, “[t]he fact that prosodic 
construal has a separate location in the brain suggests that this dimension of an utterance can 
be manipulated separately” (167).  And if the construal of prosody can be manipulated 
separately based on differentiated neural function, perhaps other aspects more relevant to 
rhetorical language are also manipulable.  Other neuroscientists, such as Helmut Schnelle, 
have investigated neural comprehension of rhyme.  Schnelle finds that when two words 
rhyme,  
[t]he brain organizes the phonotactic structure of the words it 
hears, one after the other.  It may even be that the brain repeats 
several times the word sequence it hears.  Obviously in each 
case a distributed phonotactic category pattern is temporarily 
synchronized by a number of phonotactic categories.  Two 
synchronized patterns become short-term active one after the 
other.  If the repeated activation of the two words is direct, the 
following happens: The onset parts register quickly from one 
into the other whereas the rhyme parts remain the same in 
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phonetic repetition.  The brain signals a direct rhythm!  Thus 
the experience of a rhyme is automatic and absolutely simple.  
The example shows that synchronized prosody pattern 
comparison may have influence in feeling experience (Schnelle 
2010, 209). 
Schnelle’s work aligns with Burke’s theory of formal assent and with the work of Gregg in 
cognitive affinities and symbolic inducement.  There is a temporal difference in 
interpretation when words rhyme.  The figures of assonance and consonance naturally apply, 
as syllable repetitions necessarily rhyme.  Other figures also induce synchronized patterns.  
For example, in Burke’s epitome of formal assent, “we do this, but they on the other hand do 
that; we stay here, but they go there; we look up, but they look down” contains a number of 
figures that induce temporally short-term active patterns such as epanaphora – repetition of a 
word at the beginning of successive phrases, epistrophe – repetition of a word at the end of 
successive phrases, ploche – the “synchronized rhythmic repetitions of words” (Harris, 
2013b 3), and isocolon – parallel phrases of the same length (we do this …but they do that; 
we look up … but they look down).      
Fahnestock (2005) offers the strongest support for Burke’s theory of formal assent in her 
discussion of the neuroscientific research being done in the area of what she describes as 
“residual orality” (170).  A study by Mark Dubin (2002) found some areas of the brain 
believed to specific to language production were activated during reading comprehension: 
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“An initial explanation of this finding was that silent, covert subvocalization was occurring 
as part of comprehension.  That is, in trying to understand the words being heard, the person 
was rehearsing the speaking of those words without being aware of doing so” (51).  Dubin’s 
results demonstrate two important points: that reading rhetorical figures may have a similar 
effect as hearing them; and secondly as Fahnestock (2005) describes, 
[t]he research suggests that as someone listens to or reads a 
phrase or sentence, some part of the brain is also, in parallel, 
activated as though it were simultaneously constructing that 
phrase or sentence.  If the relevant segment is constructed 
according to a pattern with which the language user is already 
familiar, perhaps because it is established by a figure of 
repetition in the text, it will be more easily constructed as it is 
construed (171).  
Residual orality, demonstrated by Dubin’s work, aligns with both Burke and Gregg and 
provides experimental evidence of formal assent.  Cognitive affinities such as repetition in 
the form of neurological rhythm are also supported by parallel brain functions in terms of 
meaning making and figurative language.  
3.2.1 Interpretation of rhetorical figures 
Up to this point my focus has been primarily on rhetorical figures as linguistic 
constructions in the form of schemes where formal features such as repetition align with 
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foundations of cognition.  It is important for a professional communication pedagogy to not 
only look at the cognitive effect of rhetorical figures, but also how such linguistic 
constructions are interpreted.  Section 3.2.1, presents a model of figure interpretation that 
focuses on tropes such as metaphor, metonymy, and irony.  There are a number of theories 
on how figurative language is interpreted that develop cognitive viewpoints beyond the 
standard pragmatic and direct access views including; graded salience theory which 
promotes context over “literal” meaning, underspecification theory where words are 
analyzed for figurative use based on a comparison with the most common “literal” usage, and 
relevance theory which finds figurative language to be interpreted based on context and 
optimal relevance (Gibbs & Colston, 2012).  While these theories based on context and 
semantic differences have merit, the two theories that I will explore in detail are conceptual 
blending theory and embodied simulation theory.  An understanding of the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in the interpretation of figures is an important element of teaching their 
deployment.   
Conceptual blending is based on Gilles Fauconnier’s mental space theory.  Conceptual 
Blending is a theory that evolved out of ancient theories of space such as the already 
discussed topos, but also spatial organization theories such as Cicero’s memory-as-a-house, 
mnemonic.  According to Fauconnier, “Mental spaces are partial structures that proliferate 
when we think and talk allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge 
structures” (1997 11).   Mental spaces contain the elements of discourse that can be mapped 
onto one another.  For example, in the simple sentence “Martha is John’s wife” a base mental 
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space that contains “John” and “Martha” is created in the mind of the receiver alongside a 
mental space that contains the roles of husband and wife.  The receiver maps ”husband” to 
”John” and ”wife” to ”Martha” from the role space to the base space of discourse elements.  
As phenomena in the brain, mental spaces are “sets of activated neuronal assemblies, and the 
(mapping) lines between elements correspond to coactivation-bindings of a certain kind” 
(Fauconnier and Turner 40).  Mental spaces are partial in nature and are structured by frames 
of “long-term schematic knowledge” (40).  In our simple example, the frame of marriage is 
employed.  Frames developed out of work in frame semantics, developed by Charles 
Fillmore to represent encyclopedic meaning, and artificial intelligence frames, developed by 
Marvin Minsky as a data structure model.  A frame contains slots for relevant fillers of data.  
The data model of frames allows for individual differences in frames, as different minds will 
utilize different slots and fillers (Coulson 19).  With its utilization of frames, conceptual 
blending theory applies to tropes such as irony (conflicting frames) and metonymy (frame-
internal elements representing one another), as well as metaphor (the blending of ‘similar,’ or 
predicated-as-similar frames) (see Gibbs & Colston 2012, 109-13).  This aspect of the 
conceptual blending model is extremely important for digital composition pedagogy and will 
be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
The conceptual blending model consists of four main elements: inputs, cross-space 
mappings, generic space, and a blended space.  An input is a mental space that contains 
discourse elements.  Cross-space mappings are the connections between discourse elements 
in the input mental spaces.  A generic space is a mental space that contains what each input 
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space has in common.  Finally, the blended space contains certain elements from each input 
space to create a new and emergent structure (41).  According to Fauconnier and Turner, the 
emergent structure is the key element in the conceptual model.  Three cognitive processes 
construct and conceive the blend: “First composition of the elements from the inputs makes 
relations available in the blend that do not exist in the separate inputs [...] Second, completion 
brings additional structure to the blend [... and third,] the running of the blend is called 
elaboration” (43-4).  Composition refers to the utilization of discourse elements located in 
the inputs to create discourse elements that do not occur in either input mental space.  
Completion also refers to the access of background knowledge frames, “pattern completion is 
the most basic kind of recruitment:  we see some parts of a familiar frame of meaning and 
much more of a frame is recruited silently but effectively to the blend” (48).  For example, a 
conceptual blending interpretation of the metaphor “love is a rose” involves composing 
mental spaces for both “love” and “rose” and a generic space that contains salient features of 
each; love is a relationship between humans, an investment in emotions etc.; a rose is 
beautiful, has thorns (so, is dangerous to pick), etc. A third mental state is completed that 
contains elements of the rose and love, perhaps, beauty, thorns, emotional investment.  
Finally, as Figure 4 details below,  the blend is elaborated to create an interpretation of the 
metaphor; while love is beautiful, it is also dangerous. 
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Figure 5: Conceptual Blend of "Love is a Rose" Metaphor 
Elaborations, or the content that fills the mental spaces may vary from person to person, but 
the integration of mental states is the same.  Conceptual blending theory develops a model of 
mental activity engaged in interpreting figurative language that requires a theory of 
embodiment to be fully understood in terms of enactive and extended cognition.  
Embodied simulation theory views the interpretation of figurative language as a part of the 
overall process of embodied cognition where “just as properly seeing a cup sitting on a table 
requires us to imagine different bodily actions we may perform on that object, so too with 
language do we imagine ourselves engaging in actions relevant to the words spoken or read.  
Love
Pleasant feeling
Powerful
Relationship
Investment 
Rose
Aesthetically pleasing
Thorns
Short-lived
Picked carefully 
Generic 
Space
Love is an emotion
A Rose is a plant/flower
Love is a Rose
Beautiful and Dangerous
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Simulation processes, under this view, are not purely mental or neural, but involve and effect 
many full-bodied sensations” (114).  Embodied simulation theory aligns with the research 
summarized by Fahnestock on covert subvocalization where a residual orality is formed 
while reading.   
Gibbs and Colston present a number of examples of embodied simulation determined 
through experimental research (see Gibbs 2006) where subjects reacted to the metaphor “tear 
apart the argument”.  Subjects “exhibit significant embodied qualities of the actions referred 
to by these phrases (e.g., people conceive of the “argument” as a physical object that when 
torn apart no longer persists)” (116). Embodied simulation and conceptual blending are fully 
compatible, and can be seen as different parts of the same dynamic process; embodied neural 
constructs form when we engage a figure that serves as part of the mental blend of 
composition spaces.  For example, in our “love is a rose” metaphor, embodied simulation 
occurs when the elaboration space is created. On one level we interpret the blend as “love is 
wonderful but risky” based on the composition of the spaces “rose” and “love” while also 
simulating the pricking feeling we encounter when picking a beautiful, but thorny rose.  It is 
not a linear but a dynamic process with embodied simulation occurring in the mental activity 
of blending.  Embodied simulation may provide input to the frame and generic space of 
conceptual blending process.  Linguist Benjamin Bergan supports this notion when he states 
that  
[i]n an embodied approach to language, the experiences an 
individual has had in the world are viewed as vital to the 
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architecture of their cognitive faculties and their behavior. It 
seems that internal simulation, based on previous action and 
perception in the world, is essential to understanding literal and 
figurative language processing (279).    
Embodied simulation also points to other areas of interest for the deployment of 
arguments.  Embodied simulation is a key factor in the engagement of mirror neurons that 
serve as a neurological key to our ability to empathize. Embodied simulation is also an 
important factor in professional communication in its relationship with deep and hyper 
attention.  Perhaps the figurative embodied simulation provided during video and digital 
games plays a role in extended hyper attention where the user is engaging neurons and 
mental activities that simulate and thus stimulate feelings of movement and action.   
Figures undoubtedly play a role in the cognitive attributes and mechanisms of 
argumentative reasoning and communication.  Research in cognitive psychology supports 
Kenneth Burke’s argument that form plays a far greater role in the formation of identification 
than previously believed.  Figures are not ornamental language, added to the true nature of 
argument.  New research into “figural logic” by Jeanne Fahnestock and Randy Allen Harris 
expands the role played by figures in argumentation.  Neither Fahnestock nor Harris argue 
that figures do not have aesthetic or affective properties, but “in the best arguments, their 
aesthetic, emotional, and rational effects align into a vector of persuasive force” (Harris, 
2013a, 576).  It is easier to see how tropes like metaphor create what Harris (paraphrasing 
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Burke) defines as a “distilled linguistic correlate of perspective” (576). Of Burke’s four 
master tropes, metaphor superimposes one position on another (“love is a rose”); synecdoche 
uses part for the whole as logic of example (“the ranch employs forty hands”); metonymy 
associates concepts and objects by referring to a related name (“I am reading Aristotle”); and 
finally, irony where an affirmative response to one frame infers a negative response to 
another (“nice hat!” when the speaker means the hat is ugly) (576-577).  These tropes, and 
many others, serve as serve as epitomes of arguments.  Fahnestock (1999) observes that the 
view of figures as epitomes of argument is a “recapturing of an older view”; Aristotle did not 
refer to figures in The Rhetoric as aesthetic devices for the primary purpose of establishing 
an affective response; rather, “certain [figurative] devices are compelling because they map 
function onto form or perfectly epitomize certain patterns of thought or argument” (26).  
Both Fahnestock and Harris extend the epitomizing nature of figures beyond the heavily 
analyzed tropes to the neglected schemes9.  Fahnestock, in her book Rhetorical Figures in 
Science, presents the argument epitomizing nature of schemes such as antimetabole, 
antithesis, ploche, polyptoton, incrementum, and gradatio.  In one example, she highlights the 
figure gradatio in an argument for the preservation of wolves as the arguer details the 
progressive effects caused by the wolf killing an elk, whose carcass serves as fertilizer for 
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plants that are in turn eaten by an animal which is in turn eaten by another and so on up the 
food chain.  The figure of gradatio is the argument (109).  Harris (2013a) describes the 
figures, including antimetabole, in the predicate calculus of pioneering geneticist Gregor 
Mendal.  Harris provides a succinct description of figural logic: 
I want to be as clear as possible that I am not claiming Mendel had a rhetorical 
manual at his elbow, looking for the appropriate figure to decorate his text or 
epitomize his argument. The claim is much deeper than that. Reasoning depends 
on principles and processes that also underlie thought and language more 
generally and that have obvious manifestations in “style.” These principles 
include identity, similarity, contrast, and symmetry; processes include repetition, 
substitution, expansion, reduction, and inversion. The figural presence in 
Mendel’s formula is not such as to heighten its aesthetic salience. Rather, that 
figural presence heightens the formula’s functional salience, by compressing the 
reasoning into a distinctive harmony of patterns. (2013a 585) 
These principles and processes that underlie thought are the mechanisms that move intuitive 
inference from System 1 sub-personal reasoning to System 2 argumentative reasoning; in 
other words, from thought to language.  These mechanisms manifest the attributes of style 
(including identity, similarity, contrast, and symmetry).  All language would move through 
this process, even literal, or as Harris renames it, to signal a minimum of scheme-shifts as 
well (“literal” only evokes a paucity of trope-shifts), “bland” language.  Bland language 
“exhibits a lack of design or innovation, recycling routine diction and routine arrangement 
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for routine purposes” (575, 598n3); but this lack of innovation or design does not mean it is 
not produced using the same mechanisms as Harris finds: “Bland language is the effective, 
specialized residue of language that was developed, using all the resources of figuration, for 
various daily communicative routines (social routines, professional routines, religious 
routines). But the bland / figural distinction is one of degree, with some semiotic acts 
asymptotically approaching degree-zero figuration (degree-complete blandness), or 
conversely degree-zero blandness (degree-complete figuration), but no living, breathing 
semiotic act ever actually achieving either degree” (575).  There is an unconscious tendency 
to use figures to form arguments, but, more importantly for professional communication 
pedagogy, figures can be actively deployed to enhance the form of the structure (claim).  As I 
stated above, every professional communication is an argument even those written in 
supposedly bland language.  Educating professional communicators in figural logic provides 
an extra dimension to what seems to be routine communication.  I am not suggesting that 
professionals keep a database of figures on their bookmark bar (but maybe I am), but 
understanding the argumentative power of figural logic is vital in a professional world where 
the technological unconscious has made getting and sustaining attention a challenging 
endeavor.  One does not have to look very far for examples of figural logic in seemingly 
everyday professional communications; the figure polyptoton plays an important role in the 
establishment of criteria in marketing.  The word market has undergone a number of 
ployptotonic neologisms including “marketize”, “marketization”, and “go-to-market” that 
serve to argue for the importance of the marketing activity.  The subject lines of emails that 
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contain a scheme stand more of a chance of being read than those written in bland language.  
One can imagine our example email from Glenda with a subject line: “Significant Section of 
Budget for Broadcast Advertising”, as opposed to “Broadcast Advertising” moving into the 
sub-personal level of reasoning as it connects stylistic assonance with cognitive affinities for 
repetition.  Only communication communicates and once the subject line is brought from 
System 1 to System 2 reasoning, it is on its own, at the mercy of the hermeneutic capacities 
of a reader receiving one hundred and fifty emails a day. The professional communication 
simulation game will provide ongoing feedback and advice on the use of figures in 
argumentation.  Future versions will use natural language processing software to identify 
figures such as epanaphora (see…).  The current version will suggest figures selected based 
on the problem presented.  For example, if the student is charged with producing a marketing 
proposal, figures such as antithesis, gradatio, and ploche will be suggested.  Further details 
on implementation are discussed in chapter four. 
3.3 Discursive Strategy 
The third part of the triad is strategy.  Strategy entails making conscious decisions as to the 
manner in which reasons formulated through argumentative reasoning are deployed, what 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca name techniques of argumentation.  Strategy requires form 
and is executed within an argumentation structure of claim, grounds, and warrant.  Figural 
logic is in itself, strategic; using gradatio as the epitome of series reasoning to explain an 
ecosystem is a strategic decision.  Strategy also involves, however, the reasons and goals for 
the deployment of the form.  The first aim of a rhetorical strategy of argumentation is that of 
  124 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca term “presence”.  Making an idea or concept present 
involves accessing the selection system of the greater attention system of an audience and 
engaging the sustaining and controlling mechanisms.  Hailing as audience, whether one or 
one thousand other operationally closed mental systems, is challenging in technologically 
crowded communication spaces.  Figural logic, as discussed in the subject-line example 
above, is one strategy, but generally a second layer of strategy is required.  Reasons and 
purpose come into play at the moment of utterance (spoken or written); how do I structure 
my reasons to make them present to the selection system of this audience?  What will 
increase my chances of having my communication understood as closely to what I intend as 
possible?  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognized the dilemma of double contingency 
long before Luhmann developed his theory:  
If one finds that a properly developed syllogism, which was 
accepted by the hearer, does not necessarily induce him to act 
in accordance with the conclusions, it is because the premises, 
which were isolated during the demonstration, might have 
encountered obstacles once they entered the mental circuit of 
the person they were supposed to persuade (118).   
The producer of an argument has a choice not only in what reasons to put forward, but also in 
the strategic manner or technique they are presented.  As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put 
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it: “Questions of form and questions of substance are intermingled in order to achieve 
presence” (120). 
While, in addition to argumentation, professional communication does involve 
demonstration, I will discuss demonstration and its relation to strategy in the following 
section on visuospatial rhetoric and design.  I realize there is a discursive element to 
demonstration, but visuospatial rhetoric is required in order to demonstrate.    The strategic 
methods I will focus on in my discussion of discursive rhetoric are Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s formulation of quasi-logical, reality-based, reality-structuring, and concept-
dissociating argumentative techniques, as well as Douglas Walton’s argumentation schemes 
of presumptive reasoning. 
3.3.1 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Project 
The mandate of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s scholarly project is to develop a 
rhetorical theory of argumentation that moves beyond pure demonstration to the contingent 
world of human relations.  Their techniques are reformulations of established topoi and an 
amalgamation of classical sources like Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine, with 
contemporary European philosophy.  Each technique, however, is dissected and analyzed to a 
far greater degree than any of their classical precursors.  What follows is a necessarily brief 
overview of the four main species of argumentative reason. There is a significant degree of 
overlap between figural logic and strategic techniques of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that 
will become apparent.   
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The first argument technique is quasi-logical arguments.  These techniques are similar to 
demonstration in that they present grounds and backing as having the essence of 
mathematical reasoning.  An example is an “argument of reciprocity” where two distinct 
entities or situations are treated as symmetrical.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide an 
example from Quintilian, “what is honourable to learn is also honourable to teach” (221).  
“Learn” and “teach” are symmetrical activities in that they both involve a ‘movement’ of 
information, but in the opposite directions; they have a conceptual or semantic symmetry. In 
Quintilian’s example, they are connected by the value of “honour”.  The example is also a 
case of figural logic with the figures of ploche and isocolon attracting our cognitive affinities 
for (respectively) repetition and parallelism.  The strategic nature of the technique and figural 
logic is the presentation of two entities as having a conceptually symmetrical nature.  One 
could have said, “learning is good, but so is teaching”, but the phrase lacks the authority that 
symmetry provides.   
An example from everyday professional communication would be, “if it is bad for the 
company, it is bad for you”, a whole/part construction framed by epanaphora and enforced by 
isocolon.  To invoke the parallelism created by epanaphora and isocolon is a strategic 
decision that provides a quasi-logical foundation.  To invoke argument of reciprocity and the 
figural logic of epanaphora and isocolon is to create a mathematical essence to the statement.  
Other quasi-logical arguments include transitivity, where a relationship between two pairs of 
entities implies a relationship between all four, and division of the whole into its parts, where 
breaking an entity into its constitutive elements distributes superordinate qualities among 
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subordinate components.  The technique is best engaged using figural logic as Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca find that “these forms of argumentation can give rise to rhetorical figures” 
(236).  They give the example of “amplification” used by Vico in describing the destruction 
of a city by listing the destroyed districts.  Synecdoche also plays a prominent role in this 
form of argumentation.  There are other quasi-logical argument techniques that will be used 
in the simulation game.  The implementation of these techniques is discussed in chapter five 
“Arguments based on the structure of reality” is a technique of establishing a relationship 
between what has been previously accepted and what one is proposing (261).  Academic 
arguments, including the one in this dissertation, are based on the acceptance of a view of 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca term “reality” as we cite previous theorists as a basis 
for our claims.  In this dissertation I have claimed that the reality of the organization is 
structurating communication, based on the systems theory work of Niklas Luhmann.  
Luhmann is accepted by many sociologists and other scholars as having a viable theory of 
society.  The strength of his social systems theory is my basis for reality.  Other examples 
based on the structure of reality include sequential relations, or cause and effect; one has to 
believe in the reality of the cause to move to its responsibility for a stated effect.   
The three argument techniques which underlie the most deployed strategic forms in 
business communication are pragmatic arguments, which “[permit] the evaluation of an act 
or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences” (266); arguments of ends 
and means, where favorable ends overshadow the means to achieve them; and the argument 
of waste, where actions already taken would have been in vain and have serious 
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consequences. Arguments made for increased profit are often presented using one of these 
strategies.  For example, an argument put forward by the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers on their website is couched in the pragmatic and end-to-means argument strategy.  
The opening sentence, “Canada’s oil sands industry will provide a secure source of energy, 
reduce its impact on the environment and provide economic benefits to society while 
developing this globally significant resource” (2012, par 1) wedges the means between two 
ends making the pragmatic benefit of available energy and economic benefits superior to the 
means of production.  The superior establishment of the ends also implies an argument of 
waste; if we don not act now, we waste this valuable resource.  The simulation game will 
educate the student in the production of arguments based on the structure of reality, but also 
in their interpretation. 
Arguments that establish the structure reality are not limited to strategic business 
communication.  Communication that appears to be purely informational can also use 
argument by example, illustration, and modeling.  Figure 6 reproduces the Siri page from the 
iPad user manual. The apple user manual establishes a new reality where we are able to have 
a dialogue with our tablet computer.  The text illustrates a world where our tablet serves as a 
personal assistant.  The manual creates a reality where we talk to our device rather than 
communicating through touch.  The user manual uses the figure of personification to focus 
the argument.  Siri, a software program that uses the hardware available in the iPad, is treated 
as a person, someone you can talk to, ask questions and get answers.  The argument that 
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structures reality through illustration and personification is made to enhance Burkean 
identification between hardware/software and user. 
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Figure 6: Technical Description of Siri 
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Another prominent argument involving the establishment of reality is that of analogy.  Much 
scholarly work has been done on analogy (Holyoak & Thagard 1995, Duit 2006, Thagard 
1992).  Holyoak and Thagard (1995) define “analogic thinking” as understanding one 
situation in terms of another where the elements of the situations contain and engage 
cognitive affinities for similarity and structure within a recognized purpose (5-6).  Analogies 
are theoretically interpreted through the conceptual blending of mental spaces and embodied 
simulation (see 3.2.1).  Analogies are powerful versions of argument that engage more fully 
the cognitive mechanisms involved in conceptual blending such as similarity and association.  
Analogies also frequently engage our cognitive affinity for narrative.  Mark Turner 
designates “parable” as the “root of the human mind” (1996, 2) where narratives are 
analogically placed in relation to each other to produce meaning (5).  For example, a business 
analyst attempting to explain the current problems encountered by Research in Motion could 
argue by example and point to Apple’s rise from irrelevance in the late nineties to the most 
valuable company in the world by 2012 or he could use the same evidence in the form of an 
analogy by telling Apple’s story and letting the receiver do the cognitive work of creating the 
structure, drawing similarities and associations, and finally establishing the purpose of the 
message.     
The last argumentative strategic technique used in my professional communication 
pedagogy is the dissociation of concepts.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the 
technique as establishing opposition to connections made between situations and concepts 
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purported to be interdependent (411).  Dissociation is the strategy of objection, the ability to 
invent counterarguments.     
For example, if a manager sitting listening and reading the claims made by the proponents 
of a new tablet computer being designed by her organization, is unsatisfied with the 
connections being made between a competitor’s situation and their own, she would form 
grounds to disassociate the example.  The manager would disassociate the appearance of an 
example from the reality.  Argument techniques that support a reality such as a pragmatic 
look at cause and effect; the manager could point out that the competitor’s product was 
successful, not solely because it creates a new category of tablet computer, but due to the 
ecosystem that supports it.  The appearance/reality pair is the most effective argumentative 
technique out a number of philosophical pairings including ends/means and relative/absolute 
(416-20).  The ability to disassociate the synthesis of concepts and situations is a vital skill 
for professionals, especially managers and will be an integral element of my pedagogy. 
3.3.2 Walton’s Argument Schemes 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecca provide what David Hitchcock (2010) calls a “bottom-up 
approach” (159) to argument generation.  While offering a rich and dynamic set of 
generalized argumentative schemes, the inventional strategies of the new rhetoric are less 
interested in the response of particular audiences.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
strategies account for a universal audience, but make no claims on the effects of their 
schemes on a contextually situated audience.  The presumptive reasoning schemes of 
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Douglas Walton offer an adjunct to the New Rhetoric that accounts for audience or 
interlocutor response.  While many of Walton’s schemes overlap with schemes developed by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Walton presents a strategic method ideal for an online 
technogenetic environment.  While a detailed description and discussion of Walton’s 
extensive work on argumentation schemes is beyond the scope of this dissertation, two key 
elements in his work are critical to the objective of improved feedback in an online setting.  
Presumptive reasoning entails the deployment of an argumentation scheme with one 
defeasible premise presupposed (Walton 2009).  For example, a manager could make the 
proposition, “I have not heard back from Susan on the budget, so I am going to go ahead and 
issue the purchase orders”.  The manager is making an argument using Walton’s “argument 
from sign” (loc. 1504) where the sign in question is a lack of response from Susan.  The sign 
is being used to argue that the manager is cleared to move ahead with a proposed budget.  
The missing premise, in an Aristotelian enthymematic sense, is the proposition that a non-
response from Susan indicates an affirmative response.  The manager presupposes that basis 
of the sign is an implicature agreed to by her audience.  The premise is, however, defeasible.  
Walton provides a series of “critical questions” aimed at demonstrating the defeasibility of 
the scheme—such as, “is there any other event that could reliably account for Susan’s non-
response?”—thereby countering the unstated premise (loc 1505).  While presumptive 
reasoning is similar to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s quasi-logical schemes, it differs in 
its attention to response.  Walton has developed over sixty argument schemes, ranging from 
“argument by example” to “argument by analogy” (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008), that 
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serve as presumptive reasoning.  What is important to the Professional Communication 
Simulation game and technogenetic pedagogy are these specific identifiable schemes, as well 
as the concept of critical questions.  Walton’s schemes are utilized in natural language 
processing and artificial intelligence projects in argumentation (discussed in detail in chapter 
six) and are ideal for the annotation engine of the simulation game.  The schemes are more 
easily annotated and the critical questions present a feedback opportunity that occurs in real 
time.  For example, if a student deploys the scheme “argument from expert opinion”, they are 
able to annotate the sentences representing the stated premises.  The artificial intelligence of 
the simulation game is then able to ask the critical questions, such as, “is there a possible bias 
on the part of the expert” that create a real argumentative dialogue.  Walton’s schemes add to 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on general argumentative invention to create a 
complete argumentation pedagogy for technogenetic rhetoric.  
3.4 Extra-Discursive Rhetoric 
The truth of the statement, “every professional communication is an argument,” requires an 
acceptance of the notion of extra-discursive rhetoric.  As I discussed above, a simple meeting 
request carries an argument that goes beyond the overtly stated claim and grounds, the ethos 
of the sender, the receiver’s perspective on the importance of the issue at hand, and the 
quality of the discursive rhetoric, the writing. Extra-discursive elements of the argument are 
also vital.  Joddy Murray (2006) defines some of the elements that I am designating extra-
discursive as “non-discursive”, which she describes as including “the many other ways 
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humans use symbols to create meaning – methods wholly outside the realm of traditional 
word-based discursive text.” She adds that  
[w]ith this distinction in symbolization, then, comes a distinction in rhetoric; 
non-discursive rhetoric is the study of how these symbol systems persuade, 
evoke consensus, become epistemological, and organize or employ intended 
results in human behavior (12). 
Murray includes film, dance, gesture, and vocal elements in her view of the non-discursive 
rhetorical realm.  I believe the Foucauldian term extra-discursive, is more appropriate for 
professional communication, as the effects often overlap with discursive and visuospatial 
rhetoric.  Extra-discursive symbolization focuses on two rhetorical appeals that play an 
important role in professional communications: ethos and pathos.  While ethos and pathos 
are at times dealt with directly in discourse through explanations of skills, experience, and 
word choice, logos dominates the strategies discussed above.  Figurative language is often 
used to evoke emotion, but figural logic implies the use of figures to establish logical 
arguments.  The appeals of ethos and pathos, or credibility and emotion, are dealt with in a 
cursory fashion in most professional communication texts.  Both are dealt with as discursive 
rhetoric. “How do you establish credibility in your text?” they ask. “What words evoke 
emotion in the reader?”  Both ethos (I will use ethos to stand in for the combination of 
credibility and character) and emotion (I will use emotion rather that pathos to avoid 
confusion when discussing research from cognitive science, psychology, and neurology) are 
primarily appealed to through extra-discursive symbols; the manner in which you carry your 
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body, the tone of your voice, the appropriateness of gestures, clothing, and timing (kairos) 
are vital signals of ethos.  The use of visual images, movement, volume, as well as all of the 
aspects of ethos listed above, extra-discursively appeal to emotion.  Ethos is appealed to in 
every professional communication while emotion is appealed to in varying degrees that fall 
along a continuum ranging from intense – as found in advertising – to subtle praotes, the 
subdued calmness displayed in many technical communications (see Aristotle, 130) The 
three appeals; logos, ethos, and emotion are entwined and interdependent.  I am suggesting a 
conscious effort to teach extra-discursive symbolization as part of professional 
communication pedagogy beyond aspects of tone, body language, and visual rhetoric.  Just 
as cognitive science and psychology are finding a cognitive role for discursive rhetoric in 
our ability to communicate and reason, extra-discursive rhetoric as purveyor of ethos and 
emotion serves a vital cognitive role as well.   
While ethos is accepted as a crucial element in effective professional communication, 
emotion often gets a bad rap. In the heat of an argument, one often hears, “don’t get 
emotional”; emotions in a professional argument are often viewed as an aspect of weakness.  
The discursive strategies discussed above are based on quasi-logic, structuring and the 
structure of reality; there is little discussion of emotion.  As Murray writes, however,  
Recent work done by neuroscientists suggests … that 
consciousness is ‘the feeling of what happens,’ so for our field 
[rhetoric] to attempt to continue to view affect as distinct from 
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reason simply becomes nonsensical; reason is part of our 
consciousness, and, therefore, reason must be affective (85).   
The “feeling of what happens” references a concept developed by neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio in his book of the same name (1999).  Damasio refers to the role of emotions in 
consciousness where a state of emotion can be unconsciously engaged causing a state of 
feeling to be unconsciously represented, and when a state of emotion comes into contact with 
a represented feeling, a state of feeling becomes conscious (37).  Feelings are based on 
reasoning in light of emotions, making emotions an important dimension for reasoning.  
Earlier I discussed the evaluative nature of arguments. We evaluate our own reasoning 
(System 1 evolving into argumentative System 2 reasoning), and we evaluate the reasoning 
of others, all in the presence of conscious feelings or unconscious intuitions.  To ignore the 
affective nature of professional communication seems a remnant of the positivist frame of 
Taylorism.  In reality, emotions are present in the reception of every communication albeit on 
a continuum ranging from practically dormant to highly engaged.  Judgments of ethos are 
essentially based on emotions.  Ethos is a feeling.  Ethos is a belief and the poster child for 
emotionally based reasoning.  Returning to my meeting request example, when one receives 
the request and reads the discursive argument, she does so in a state of emotion that given the 
right circumstances could become represented as a feeling.  The state of emotion may have to 
do with the timing of the meeting, the location, the importance of the subject matter, or 
possibly with the ethos of the sender.  As I discussed above, if the sender has a reputation for 
calling pointless meetings, or lacks the authority to take a leadership role on the subject, the 
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emotional state of the reader may become represented as a feeling of anger, disgust, 
amusement, and so on.  Emotions and feelings shape the argumentative System 2 reasoning; 
should I respond in the affirmative or negative; should I reply to all or just the sender?  Most 
of the argumentative elements that shape these questions are extra-discursive; the status, 
authority, and credibility of the sender are judgments made from long-term memory and are 
based on images of the sender made by the receiver. 
3.4.1 A Review of the foundations and images 
Before discussing the term “image”, it is important to revisit the foundation of my 
conception of professional communication pedagogy and technogenetic rhetoric.  
Organizations, as social systems are constituted by communication.  Members of the 
organization, as mental systems, are capable of producing communication, but incapable of 
communicating; only communication communicates.  When we form communication 
through intuitive inference and argumentative reasoning, we are attempting to identify with 
others, forming a consubstantial relationship where we share substantive understanding.  In 
order to develop identification, we have at our disposal rhetoric, a way of configuring 
language into tropes, schemes, and strategies that find affinity with the cognitive attributes 
and mechanisms (repetition, similarity, association, symmetry, and so on) of other mental 
systems.  We do our best to reason out our unconscious intuition into language and to 
organize that language into patterns and arrangements that stand the best chance of achieving 
identification and consubstantiation through understanding.  To sum up, we have covered 
how we arrange language into figures and strategies of discourse that appeal to the cognitive 
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affinities and argumentative reasoning capabilities of an audience, both universal and 
particular.  The question remains; how are such cognitive affinities, mechanisms, and 
reasoning functions accessed and how are they defined.  In order to begin to answer such 
questions, the concept of “image” must be defined. 
The term “image” in professional communications has generally stood for two things: the 
ethos projected by a person or product, for example BlackBerry’s brand image; and image as 
a picture, a visual presentation of something.  The definition of image that I employ could 
encompass both senses, but I will use the word image to mean “mental image”, a mental 
construct that fills Fauconnier’s mental spaces.  I use Antonio Damasio’s (1999) conception 
of image as multi-sensory; an image can be constructed by sound, touch, taste, smell, as well 
as by vision.  According to Damasio, 
The business of making images never stops while we are 
awake and it even continues during part of our sleep, when we 
dream.  One might argue that images are the currency of our 
minds.  The words I am using to bring these ideas to you are 
first formed, however briefly and sketchily, as auditory, visual, 
or somatosensory images of phonemes and morphemes, before 
I implement them on the page in their written version.  
Likewise, those written words now printed before your eyes are 
first processed by you as verbal images before they promote 
the activation of yet other images, this time non-verbal, with 
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which the ‘concepts’ that correspond to my words can be 
displayed mentally…Even the feelings that make up the 
backdrop of each mental instant are images, in the sense 
articulated above, somatosensory images, that is, which mostly 
signal aspects of the body state (319). 
Images may be representations, mental constructs of the contents of memory, such as 
remembering a face (320).  These representations are not facsimiles or reproductions of the 
world; they are rather, the product of enactive engagements with the world.  Images are 
neural constructs of interactions between our bodies and other systems.  Returning to 
Luhmann’s application of Varela and Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis, mental images are 
what form when we structurally couple with other systems.  As operationally closed mental 
systems, human beings enactively construct neural patterns that form mental images.  
Emotions play a key role in the formation of images. In fact emotion is involved in the 
formation of every image; “emotions shade everything we know and understand.  Without a 
slight emotional shade to the image of an object, we can not ultimately connect the image 
with its value, or meaning, or level of familiarity we have with it” (Murray 2006 100).  
Damasio (1999) theorizes a constant hum of emotions that he terms “background feelings” 
(286).  As discussed above, we are constantly in an emotional state that ranges from low to 
high in terms of engagement; we are not always happy or sad; afraid or angry.  Damasio 
suggests we function most often in a state of background feelings that arise from background 
emotions and consist of states such as “fatigue, energy, excitement, and relaxation.  We may 
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or may not be consciously aware of our background feelings depending upon their degree of 
intensity and they can be a result of psychological or physiological stimuli.  Murray 
summarizes why we need to teach the engagement of emotions in composition: 
1. Reason and affectivity are not in opposition; even rational states such as intellectual 
interest or concentration are constituted by emotion 
2. Every image carries an emotional charge or affective component 
3. Background feelings run all the time creating a “mood” or baseline context for 
emotions 
4. Emotional behavior is neither rational or irrational; emotionality does not indicate 
emotional value; one can experience a valueless emotion (not liking insects and so 
on) 
5. Affectivity and images are central to reasoning (104-05) 
From a professional communications perspective, the question becomes how do we account 
or engage emotions and background feelings.  While engaging affect through discursive 
rhetoric of word choice and figuration is inevitable, extra-discursive rhetoric also engages 
emotions, perhaps to greater effect.  The ability to enactively engage more senses with sound, 
smell, touch, taste, as well as sight provides more opportunity to connect with background 
feelings and emotions.  Emotion is omnipresent to System 1 and System 2 argumentative 
reasoning and plays a critical role in the engagement and maintenance of the greater attention 
system.  Background states such as “energetic” or “relaxed” affect the degree to which the 
selection system is motivated to attend to objects or situations (Lang & Davis 2006).    Let’s 
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look at an example from professional communications where a CEO is speaking to all 
members of an organization at the company’s annual meeting.  The extra-discursive mental 
image of ethos held by the receiver of communication for a sender may engage a background 
state of energy, and maybe even the full emotional state of excitement.  Emotion directs and 
focuses attention, and researchers Renee Thompson et al (2011) have found that when 
attention is directed not only at a signal, but also at the emotion itself, the subject switches 
attention between signal and a desire to control the level of affect.  This engagement of the 
switching mechanism of the selection system points to a movement between mental images 
of the signal and that of the receiver’s emotional state.  Using Fauconnier and Turner’s 
theory of conceptual blending, one could diagram the integration of mental space images of 
ethos, message, and emotional self-awareness into a blended mental space of identification 
and consubstantiality, as in Figure 7..   
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Figure 7: Conceptual Blend of Extra-Discursive Qualities in a CEO Speech 
The extra-discursive rhetorical qualities of leadership, trust, expertise, and so on, blend with 
a mental space of personal affective reflection consisting of pride and accomplishment, and 
the message content of a successful year for the company into a mental space where the 
accomplishments of operationally closed human systems are consubstantial.  Focusing on the 
extra-discursive rhetorical formation of mental images is as important as our attention to 
discursive rhetoric.   
Grounding
Ethos
Non-discursive rhetoric
of reputation - vocal qualities
bearing - appearance 
Argument
Discursive rhetoric 
presented by the CEO 
Emotional State
An emotional state is only a mental space
if the mind is aware of the state - the mind 
recognizes and objectifies the emotion -
on this case excitement and pride 
Listening to a CEO
Present the “state of the company”
at the annual general meeting
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So far, my focus on extra-discursive rhetoric has been on unwritten and unspoken 
formation of mental images.  Images of ethos, engagement of emotion and attention are, for 
the most part, rhetorically evoked through extra-discursive factors; the tone, pace, and 
volume of a speaker engages emotion and attention; the gestures and bearing of a speaker 
form mental images of ethos.  The purpose of our communication is the creation of a mental 
image in the mind of the receiver that matches as closely as possible to the image in our own 
mind.  Extra-discursive factors help frame content as information increasing the likelihood of 
understanding and identification.  By framing, I mean the extra-discursive expresses context 
that limits interpretation of communication.  For example, the extra-discursively expressed 
credibility of a writer or speaker evoked through vocal tone, intonation, volume, gestures, 
and so on, in the case of speech; ink density, paper size and texture, and so on in the case of 
print.  Extra-discursive elements combine with information retrieved in long-term memory to 
establish the frame of ethos.  Extra-discursive elements can frame arguments in rhetorical 
appeals of ethos and affect by appealing not only sight and sound, but to all senses.  In 
professional communications, however, there are opportunities to engage the senses of touch, 
such as the tactile feel of a report, the appropriate firmness of a handshake, or the raised 
letters on a business card.  There may be fewer opportunities to engage smell and taste except 
perhaps in marketing based communications, but the smell of a presentation room and the 
taste of the food offered at lunch are extra-discursive elements of rhetorical appeal.  The 
methodology of extra-discursive rhetoric that will accompany the structure, form, and 
strategy of discursive rhetoric is visuospatial rhetoric manifested as design. 
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3.5 Visuospatial Rhetoric and Design  
Both discursive and extra-discursive rhetoric are designed.  There are elements of visual 
language in both. The concept of visual language is difficult to define; many scholars provide 
many definitions.  The best explanation is provided by University of California at San Diego 
psychologist Neil Cohn. Human beings have only three ways to communicate the products of 
our minds, he notes: the production of sounds, moving our body in gesture including touch, 
and by producing visual images   Cohn theorizes that “when any of these conceptual 
channels takes on a structured sequence governed by an underlying rule system (a grammar), 
it becomes a language” (1).  Sounds become spoken languages, gestures become sign 
languages, and sequential images become visual language (1).  Cohn presents comics as the 
archetypal example of a visual language, but I believe the structured sequence of images can 
also be applied to any visual image used to extend and enhance a narrative or argument.  Just 
as a word or phrase is structured spoken language, a single image may be structured in a way 
that makes it visual language.  Cohn’s definition does not directly account for writing, but if 
one sticks to his definition, writing is a visual language.  All three modes Cohn defines are 
motivated to produce understanding in another human being. All three involve meaning; the 
difference is the medium.  In terms of professional communication, the language of 
argumentative reasoning produces information using all three modes, sometimes all at once 
as in a spoken presentation where voice transmits communication as sound, body language 
and physical movement as gesture, and digital images projected on a screen as visual 
language.  The structure, form, and strategy play a role in both the discursive and extra-
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discursive elements of all three languages.  This means that design plays a role in all three.  
The vocal delivery of the information is designed in the sense that the uses of inflection, 
volume, pace, and tone are consciously considered and planned for; a speaker may speed up 
at certain points in the presentation to engage attention and emotion.  There is a design 
element to the reasoning offered in the argument itself in the deployments of figures and 
strategy, as well as in the organization of the structure itself, the placement of the claim, 
grounds, and backing.  There is a design element to the gestural language including 
conscious decisions such as when to move out from behind a podium and approach the 
audience or moving one’s arms in a gesture of gathering when speaking of community and so 
on.  And there is absolutely a design element in all visuospatial aspects of the presentation 
from typeface for the text, the presenter’s clothing, the lighting of the room, the placement of 
cameras for online transmission and recording of video, the graphical presentation of data, to 
the choice of images for the slides.  At times design choices such as these are out of the 
presenter’s control; the typeface options are chosen by the Microsoft or Apple; the lighting a 
decision of the interior designer of the room.  Design becomes the driver of the elements of 
purpose, audience analysis, and decisions of scope that are part of current professional 
communication pedagogy. Design links purpose, audience, and scope to the praxis of 
structure, form, and strategy of discursive and extra-discursive rhetoric. 
While the design of discursive rhetoric is entirely proactive and established in 
consciousness, some elements of extra-discursive rhetoric cannot be proactively designed, 
such as the positive ethos of successful projects. However, most can be; the extra-discursive 
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elements of speech are selected, organized, arranged, and delivered within a conscious 
design.  The extra-discursive elements of written communication from choice of typeface to 
medium are most definitely designed.  Visuospatial rhetoric and information design provide 
the concepts and methodologies for professional communication pedagogy.  Visual rhetoric, 
as defined by Marguerite Helmers and Charles Hill (2008), investigates “the relationship 
between visual images and persuasion” (76).  Visual rhetoric is an emerging field struggling 
with identity issues:  
some people seem to think of visual elements only in relation to expressing 
quantitative relationships in charts and graphs.  Other scholars concentrate 
solely on the ubiquity of visual elements on the Internet.  Much of the more 
culturally oriented work is based in art history and art theory, giving the 
impression that, when we speaking of “visuals” and “images”, we mean 
artistic artifacts exclusively (98). 
The concept of visuospatial rhetoric that I employ in technic-cognitive rhetoric moves 
beyond the visual image to the intersection of visual and space created by technology.  
Visuospatial references aspects of communication related to the increase in visual elements 
of communication brought about by digital media.  Information design, on the other hand is 
focused on meaning.  Information Design researcher, Erik Reel, defines information design 
as  
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transform[ing] data into clear, meaningful, easily accessed 
information. It originally derived its techniques from graphic 
design, cognitive psychology, human factors research, and 
industrial design; and continues to draw from these and any 
other field that provides insight into how humans assimilate 
and understand information and the media through which it is 
conveyed (1).   
Professional communication pedagogy requires a rhetorical theory of design that incorporates 
the salient aspects of visuospatial rhetoric into the practical mandate of information design 
allowing the triad of structure, form, and strategy to be applied to visual language.  The 
approach to information design I will employ is based on the work of Charles Kostelnick and 
Michael Hassett, as well as that of Edward Tufte.  Kostelnick and Hassett develop a theory of 
visual language based on conventions created by discourse communities.  They find 
ubiquitous conventional practices to exist in all forms of professional communication and 
argue that the  
principles that structure these disparate forms can best be 
discovered by defining how users collectively shape and 
normalize them within group – some large and some small, 
some well defined and others loosely knit (2003, 5).   
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They present a convincing case for the analysis of convention: conventions encourage 
invention as they are in a constant state of flux; conventions exist in all forms of design; 
conventions operate in social contexts; and conventions are essentially rhetorical (5-6).  
Using a theory of discourse community conventions fits well with a social systems and field 
conception of communication and professional organizations.  Discourse communities that 
serve as the environment for the constituting communication inhabit Toulmin’s field 
conceived as communication systems.  Conventions are the structuring elements of 
information design.  While Kostelnick and Hassett do not delve into pedagogy, conventions 
can be used both heuristically and hermeneutically.  The student will uncover the 
conventions of a field in order to challenge or conform to them.  The work of Edward Tufte 
provides the tools for the creation of great design.  Everything from the use of data-ink, 
colour, and layering, to the escape of flatland is prominent in the pedagogy of Ametros.. 
3.6 Summary 
All professional communication is rhetorical, an argument addressed to an audience to be 
evaluated.  The most routine communication carries a rhetorical weight in discursive, extra-
discursive, and visuospatial forms.  To summarize the rhetorical basis of a techno-cognitive 
rhetorical professional communication pedagogy, let’s return to our fictional marketing 
manager Glenda.  Glenda has been tasked with producing and presenting a market analysis of 
a new geographic region for her organization’s product.  After completing the necessary 
research, Glenda will develop discursive and extra-discursive rhetoric aimed at creating the 
highest degree of identification between herself and her audience.  Glenda will analyze the 
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data to create a claim based on grounds to support her warrant.  She will structure her case as 
an argument aimed at persuading her audience of the merits of her analysis.  Glenda 
establishes the basic structural elements of her argument, for example a claim “we should 
launch our product in country X”, based on grounds such as “the data demonstrates 
alignment between our new market criteria and the demographic profile of the citizens of the 
country”, establishing a warrant that “the company will sell more product by entering the 
market of country X”.  As they stand, the claim and grounds of the argument, even with 
backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals, are insufficiently weak in terms of persuasive capability.  
Glenda moves to the elements of form and strategy.  She may decide to follow a strategy 
based on the current structure of her firm’s reality; for example, “if we do not move into the 
market, out competitors will; the lost opportunity cost of not selling in the market justifies the 
immediate investment”.  Glenda will develop her backing based on the strategy to build a 
strong case for her claim and grounds.  She will use qualifiers such as “potential” and “high-
probability” that align with the language of her industry’s field.  She will work from larger 
scale strategies to strategies of figuration and figural logic that will at once help support the 
quasi-logical arguments based on projections, while appealing to the audience’s cognitive 
affinities for elements such as repetition.  Figural strategies take place at the micro level, the 
sentence and paragraph and add another layer of strategic argument to her case.  For 
example, she may employ the figure gradatio to demonstrate the increased organizational 
financial benefits with each step of opening a new market and Glenda may use the figure of 
epanaphora to appeal to cognitive affinities; “We will establish profitable retail partners; we 
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will establish profitable regional sales teams; and we will establish a profitable overall 
market in country X”.   
On an extra-discursive and visuospatial level, the same structure, form, and strategy apply 
to the formation of mental and visual images.  The organization of Glenda’s argument, the 
thoroughness of her research, and the effectiveness of her strategies will develop her ethotic 
appeal.  The audience creates a mental image of the credibility of Glenda.  She will use 
visuospatial design to increase her ethos; the design of her documents, presentations, along 
with her charts, tables, and figures all affect the audience in terms of both attention and 
emotional. 
The next chapter presents the execution of techno-cognitive rhetorical pedagogy capable of 
instilling the strategic and theoretical tools that allow students communicate in a professional 
world of hyper attention in the grasp of the technological unconscious.  
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Chapter 4 
Pedagogical Foundation of Technogenetic Rhetoric 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the rhetorical basis of professional communication pedagogy is 
at once discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial.  Professional communication involves 
composition of textual discourse, composition and delivery of oral discourse, as well as 
visual discourse in the form of infographics.  It also involves extra-discursive appeals to 
ethos and affect through credibility gained or lost in the historical context of previous 
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accomplishments, the design of information, and deployment of visual images.  In the 
previous chapter I looked at the structures, forms, and strategies available to technogenetic 
rhetoric; namely, argumentation, figurative language, figural logic, and information design 
delivered and received in the context of the sender and receiver’s cognitive mechanisms and 
affinities.  Viewing human beings and organizations as operationally closed autopoietic 
systems enframed by technology where only communication communicates, calls for a 
cognitive approach to rhetoric and composition in a professional setting.  An individual 
develops beliefs, ideas, and methodologies from intuitive inference that are subjected to 
argumentative reasoning before being expressed as discursive, extra-discursive, and 
visuospatial language.  Once the communication is formed it is at the mercy of the 
interpretive abilities of the receiver who follows the same process in reverse by moving 
language into argumentative reasoning and subjecting her interpretation to intuitive 
inference.  Cognitive rhetoric is developing out of work done in cognitive science, 
psychology and rhetorical studies on argumentation and reasoning, cognitive effects of 
figuration, figural language and logic, as well as mental images, and affect.  Cognitive 
psychologists Sperber and Mercier have conducted extensive research into the argumentative 
nature of reasoning.  Scholars Jeanne Fahnestock and Randy Allen Harris have followed up 
Kenneth Burke’s intuition that form leads to assent in the reception of a message to develop 
theories of figuration and cognitive affinities, and figural logic; theories that are supported by 
experimental work in cognitive psychology on the effects of cognitive affinities for 
repetition, assonance, and so on in the enhanced reception of language (see Zatorre, 1992).   
  154 
George Lakoff, Raymond Gibbs, Gilles Fauconnier, and Mark Turner have conducted 
extensive research into the epistemic nature of figurative language. For the purposes of 
professional communication pedagogy, I propose placing the multidisciplinary scholarship of 
cognitive rhetoric in the context of digital media technologies in contact with the cognitivist 
theories of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky.  My conception of technogenetic rhetoric is 
focused upon elements of production and reception of communication consciously and 
unconsciously embedded in technology rather than solely the cognitive processes of 
composition as metacognition.   
A technogenetic rhetoric, emerging in a multidisciplinary fashion, investigates what is 
going on beneath the theory of composition as metacognition developed by Linda Flower and 
John Hayes in 1981.  Originally named “cognitive rhetoric”, Flower and Hayes developed a 
process model consisting of cognitive systems of planning, translating, and reviewing (372-
74).   Planning involves generating ideas and constructing internal representations from long-
term memory.  Translating is the process of “putting ideas into visible language” (373).  
Reviewing involves cognitive processes of evaluation and revision.  These three process sub-
systems (sub-system as each process involves other processes) operate with the guidance of a 
monitor that determines when to move from one process to another.  Technogenetic rhetoric 
investigates the underlying cognitive mechanisms that generate these activities.  Sperber and 
Mercier’s work on System 1 and System 2 reasoning as intuitive inference and argumentative 
reasoning describes the mechanisms involved in planning, translation, and reviewing (see 
also…).  The work on figuration and argument done by Fahnestock and Harris move beyond 
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Flower and Hayes to develop theories on why figures appeal to our mind/brain and how 
figures induce identification through quasi-logic while Lakoff, Gibbs, Fauconnier, and 
Turner present theories of epistemic reception for figurative and rhetorical language.   
Technogenetic rhetoric is ideally suited to the development of professional communication 
pedagogy from a perspective of social systems theory.  Understanding the mental processes 
and mechanisms involved in receiving communication increases the likelihood of successful 
communication.  For example, recognizing that figures such as antimetabole appeal to our 
cognitive affinity for repetition increases the likelihood of establishing identification and 
consubstantiation with one’s audience.  Understanding the argumentative nature of our 
reasoning mechanisms in combination with the ability to structure and strategize an argument 
increases the likelihood of establishing identification inducing understanding.  Producing and 
receiving identification inducing communication, however, is not a cognitive activity 
occurring in a vacuum, argumentative reasoning, conceptual blending, and the deployment of 
figurative language occurs simultaneously to the enactive cognition of context. Context is the 
manifestation of communication as identification; context is the non-material and material 
substance serving a consubstantiating purpose.  In other words, context is the shared objects, 
discourse, and visuospatial mental images produced by communication.  Consubstantiation, 
formed through identification is knowledge formed through both cognitive mechanisms of 
reason in the presence of catalytic mental images of shared and situated context.  Context, 
that in a complex system of organizations, is more often than not, digitally situated.  Mental 
images of digitally situated context are shared based on commonly held properties and 
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situation.  For example, two marketing managers discussing a new project share contextual 
mental images of high level product strategy, the language that describes the marketing 
activities (neologisms such as CPA – cost per acquisition), the individuals that form their 
teams, and so on.  This shared context is situated in Toulmin’s fields and the conventions of 
discourse communities and these fields and discourse communities take on new elements of 
meaning if they are digitally situated.  For example, the same meeting taking place via Skype 
call consciously or unconsciously adds another dimension to the context; consciously if the 
presenters are managing the visuospatial dimensions of the call such as angle of the camera, 
lighting, and so on; unconsciously if the technology is affecting extra-discursive elements of 
ethos by such factors as vocal pitch and tone.  If it is to be used in the development of 
professional communication pedagogy, technogenetic rhetoric requires a theory of context 
and knowledge that is shared and digitally situated. 
Chapter 4 develops a complex, digitally situated pedagogical basis for technogenetic 
rhetoric.  Section 4.1 describes technogenetic pedagogy in relation to the cognitive 
composition work of Linda Flower and John Hayes.  Section 4.2 defines shared and situated 
knowledge in terms of the constructivist pedagogy of Piaget and Vygotsky as a prelude to the 
introduction of a digital simulation game that aligns learning and experience.  Section 4.3 
further develops technogenetic pedagogy by introducing Gee’s theory of semiotic domain as 
a strategy to deal with the complications of organizational space created by Luhmann’s 
system theory.  Section 4.4 reviews selected examples of current professional communication 
pedagogy in comparison to technogenetic pedagogy.  Section 4.5 calls primarily on the work 
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of Byron Hawk to establish a post-process pedagogy capable of dealing with the conception 
of audience as assemblage of technological and human systems.  Finally, section 4.6 
repurposes the work of Margaret Syverson on composition and complex systems, as well as 
actor-network theory to develop two analytical methods focused on the dimensions and 
attributes of communicative assemblages.  These methods serve as the pedagogical 
underpinnings of the professional communication simulation game.       
4.1 Technogenetic Composition Theory 
Linda Flower, in her 1989 paper “Cognition, Context, and Theory Building” recognizes the 
need for a cognitive theory of writing to be integrated with a theory of context.  Flower 
presents a theory where cognition and context construct one another:   
Let me propose three principles that inform this more 
complicated interaction and suggest that both cognition and 
context may in a sense construct one another. One principle is 
that cultural and social context can provide direct cues to 
cognition. The second is that that context is also and always 
mediated by the cognition of the individual writer. And the 
third is that the bounded purposes that emerge from this 
process are highly constrained but at the same time meaningful, 
rhetorical acts (287). 
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Flower describes in her first two principles what in essence is an enactive and situated 
theory of context and cognition.  The individual mental system enactively engages the world 
to form a reality that exists in immediate consciousness, but also in working and long-term 
memory.  For example, a professional composing the business case for a proposed marketing 
program will enactively engage visual, auditory, and kinesthetic perception to produce the 
text using a computer (the document could include text, visual images, sound), move from 
System 1 intuitive inference to System 2 argumentative reasoning while calling on relevant 
data stored in long-term memory to situate the information.  The document is transmitted and 
detached from the composer.  The hermeneutic treatment of the message by the receiver is a 
combination of perception, digital literacy and existing knowledge that combine to form new 
knowledge.  Flower’s third principle relates to the management of Luhmann’s double 
contingency, the individual choices of contextual knowledge are contingent just as the 
interpretation of the message is at the mercy of the contextual knowledge the receiver brings 
to the table.  Flower is pointing to the effect of rhetoric on choice: 
When we look closely at how writers construct these bounded 
purposes we do not see a single statement of purpose, but a 
web of purpose—a complex network of goals, plans, 
intentions, and ideas (Flower, "Construction"). The creation of 
this web is a richly interactive social and cognitive event; 
however, the way in which people manage or mediate the 
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constraints upon them may depend on whether they recognize 
the significance of their own choices within this web (292). 
The goals, plans, and intentions Flower refers to, align with conscious choice of structure, 
form, and strategy in producing professional communication.  The choices made with the 
intention of enhancing identification and consubstantiation are based on rhetorical choices 
that bring the operationally closed mind/system of the composer closer in substance to the 
operationally closed mind/system of the audience.  As Flower adds, however, the execution 
of these choices is an “interactive social and cognitive event”, and if I take social to refer to 
context, a technogenetic rhetoric suitable for professional communication pedagogy must 
account for shared and situated knowledge.  
4.2 Shared and Situated Knowledge 
The next issue a technogenetic rhetoric must address is the origin of shared and situated 
knowledge.  The discussion above clearly demonstrates, from the perspective of social 
systems theory, the constructivist nature of knowledge formation through identification 
forming discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric.  In epistemological terms, 
technogenetic rhetoric and social systems theory hold to the social constructivism of Richard 
Rorty.  Rorty (2009) argues against a “foundation” for knowledge; knowledge does not exist 
out in the world ready to be visually perceived or represented.  Rorty would like to do away 
with epistemology altogether as a vacuous pursuit of something that does not exist.  Rorty 
calls for a “hermeneutics” that is not a discipline, but an “expression of hope that the cultural 
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space of epistemology will not be filled” (315).  Hermeneutics, for Rorty, serves as a 
reference to the constructed nature of knowledge.   
The work of Jean Piaget (2000) offers a cognitivist theory of knowledge that aligns with 
social systems theory and technogenetic rhetoric.  Piaget develops a theory of stages in which 
a child develops cognitive structures called schemata through accommodation and 
adaptation:  (1) sensorimotor, (2) pre-operation, (3) concrete operational, and (4) formal 
operational.  Grounding knowledge develops as concept patterns termed schemata.  For 
example, the schemata for living thing will evolve through the stages from “all things that 
move are alive” in the pre-operation stage to sophisticated definitions based on biology in the 
formal operational stage.  Individuals construct knowledge through cognitive adaptation and 
accommodation where schemas are experienced and internalized.  The individual mind/brain 
adapts to the requirements of her environment by adapting existing schemas formed through 
rhetoric.  For example, the child in the pre-operation stage believes a car to be alive because 
it moves and takes on food in the form of gasoline. As the child enters the concrete 
operational stage, she adjusts her schema to remove automobiles from the schema of what 
makes a thing alive.  New information such as the concept of a “driver” and “gasoline is not 
a food” causes the adaptation.  Discursive rhetoric as language and visuospatial rhetoric as 
the actions of a driver play a vital role in the child’s ability to accommodate schemata.  Such 
information can be deemed rhetorical in cases where other individual mental systems are 
structurally coupling with the child as mental system through discursive, extra-discursive, 
and visuospatial communication.  There is a persuasive element of identification at work in 
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accommodation; the child wants to identify with the adult world and the adult world wants 
the child to identify with it.  Piaget offers a constructivist epistemological theory that aligns 
with Luhmann’s autopoietic and operationally closed social and mental systems.  Social 
systems are constituted by communication that serves to develop cognitive mechanisms and 
schemata in human beings from birth to adulthood.  Although Piaget believed the mental 
system of the individual to be the primary space of adaptation and accommodation, he did 
offer what I take to be an explanation of autopoietic structural coupling as rhetorical 
identification in 1967 when he wrote: 
In the realm of knowledge, it seems obvious that individual 
operations of the intelligence and operations making for 
exchanges in cognitive cooperation are one and the same thing, 
the “general coordination of actions” to which we have 
continually referred being an interindividual as well as an 
intraindividual coordination because such “actions” can be 
collective as well as executed by individuals. (360) 
The “operations of the intelligence” and “cognitive cooperation” Piaget refers to 
correspond closely to the systems of argumentative reason and formal assent studied and 
theorized by Sperber and Mercier, and Kenneth Burke.  Knowledge is constructed by the 
individual mental system in an environment of communication as social system.  Context as 
shared and situated knowledge is at once the defining manifestation of the social system and 
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the product of individual mental operations.  These operations, including intuitive inference, 
argumentative reasoning, conceptual metaphor and blending, and figural logic, strive for 
identification with either one’s self as thought or with others as communication.  
Technogenetic rhetoric offers a theory of discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial 
communication as the way in which autopoietic, operationally closed human mental systems 
cooperate and function in social systems of communication.  Discursive rhetoric of 
argumentation and figuration align with cognitive mechanisms of reasoning, as well as 
cognitive affinities for various mental functions such as repetition and symmetry.  
Technogenetic rhetoric moves beyond pedagogy of current-traditional methodologies of 
process towards pedagogy that accounts for technological cognitive extension towards the 
development of strategies that provide students with insights into the problems of 
communication in a professional world dominated by a technological unconscious where 
cognitive systems of attention and memory are unconsciously extended and altered by 
networked technology.  The next section of this chapter presents a teaching methodology 
aimed at providing a strategy for communicating in a world of technological unconscious, 
but also a strategy for reaching technologically unconscious students. 
Foundational to a technogenetic rhetoric is the work of Russian psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky.  Vygotsky is focused on the transformation of interpersonal thinking into 
intrapersonal communication.  While Piaget establishes a relationship between the operations 
of intelligence and social cognition, a gap developed between educators and psychologists on 
the mechanism of transfer.  In his forward to the 2012 edition of Vygotsky’s classic Thought 
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and Language (1986), Alex Kozulin describes the disconnect: “the popularity of Piaget’s 
theory only reinforced the conviction that children should first reach an appropriate level of 
conceptual reasoning (evaluated by psychologists) in order to be ready for the corresponding 
level of instruction (provided by educators)” (xi).  Vygotsky placed a far greater emphasis on 
the socio-cultural effects on learning (Kennedy).  He conceived the “Zone of Proximal 
Development” (ZPD) which measures the difference between a learner’s mental age level 
and the age level she can solve problems with assistance (Vygotsky, 198); Kozulin describes 
the ZPD as “a psychological ‘space’ where students’ experientially rich spontaneous 
concepts meet the teacher’s systemically organized academic concepts” (xviii). Vygotsky 
performed experiments in which children of equal mental age were given problems beyond 
their stage of cognitive development.  One child was given assistance in the form of leading 
questions or the first step of a solution while the other was left on their own.  The child 
offered assistance was able to solve problems beyond their mental age level (198).  A 
thorough discussion of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but the notion that cognitive ability increases with social contact supports and 
expands Piaget’s theory of social cognitive cooperation.   
Vygotsky identified a clash between the spontaneous concepts held by a child and the 
academic concepts taught by the educator.  Kozulin provides a concise description of the 
conflict: 
Vygotsky outlined several aspects of this problem.  Firstly, he 
indicated that there is a significant difference, even a conflict, 
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between spontaneous concepts that we acquire in our everyday 
experience and that might be adequate for daily life (e.g., “the 
sun rises in the morning”) and the corresponding academic 
concepts essential for scientific and technological reasoning 
(“what appears as a sun rise is the result of the rotation of the 
earth around its axis”).  Secondly, he alerted educators to the 
fact that children do not come to the classroom as a tabula rasa 
but bring with them their preexistent everyday concepts.  
Thirdly, Vygotsky asserted that acquisition of academic 
concepts would not happen without deliberate instructional 
activity.  Such activity should be carried out in the student’s 
ZPD (xviii) 
The goal of education is to align instruction with experience; to align identification and 
consubstantiation between operationally closed mental systems.  The learner requires context 
in order to internalize instruction.  Identification is not only dependent upon rhetoric as a 
cognitive catalyst, social relations as situated and embodied knowledge (context) is required.  
Vygotsky’s work on situated learning influenced theories of pedagogical simulation that 
serve as the basis for simulation game delivery of technogenetic pedagogy presented in the 
next chapter.   
Vygotsky and his successors believed thought to be a product of socio-historical factors 
and not solely the result of mental activities (Moll & Greenberg, 319).  Human 
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consciousness, for Vygotsky, is a result of interaction between mind and objective reality not 
dissimilar to enactive cognition.  Although his social theory of cognition appears at first 
blush to be a version of realism, Vygotsky does not claim a pre-given outer world. Objective 
reality rather, is a precondition of cognition, and we must have an objective world with 
which to interact (Bakhurst, 67).  Some have questioned the clash between Vygotsky’s 
realism and constructivism (Edwards, 100), but it is this combination of perceived outer 
world cognitively constructed into thought, an intuitive inference of enactive cognition, that 
will serve as a foundation for professional communication pedagogy.  Vygotsky and Piaget 
provide a pedagogical platform for bridging the teleological gap between rhetoric as 
cognitive catalyst and the identification it engenders between human beings.  Piaget offers a 
cognitive explanation for learning as identification between operationally closed mental 
systems while Vygotsky presents a theory of social cognition that aligns with enaction, 
situated, and embodied knowledge.  Both the interpersonal pedagogical work of Piaget and 
the intrapersonal work of Vygotsky play an important role in the development of my 
professional communication simulation game.  The role interpersonal and intrapersonal 
learning activities serve in simulation games are discussed in Chapter five but before entering 
into such a discussion there are two areas that must be covered; discursive, extra-discursive, 
and visuospatial rhetoric need to be placed in a context suitable for pedagogical development 
and the issue of pedagogical space needs to be addressed. 
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4.3 Pedagogical Space 
The structure, forms, and strategies of discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial 
rhetoric that make up technogenetic rhetoric are most pedagogically effective in the context 
of an online simulation game for professional communication.  Before I can begin to argue 
the merits of simulation and game design in a Vygotskian context, however, the concept of 
pedagogical space needs to be clarified and established.  I began by describing the space of 
an organization as the communication exchanged by its members.  Organizations are systems 
constituted by communication in an environment of member mental systems as human 
beings.  Organizations and their member/environment mental systems also form a space of 
communication that serves as a field in terms of technogenetic rhetoric.  Toulmin’s concept 
of the field determines what can and cannot be symbolically expressed by its inhabitants and 
is the primary determinant of what may be symbolically used to back a claim and grounds.  A 
field is a discourse community that creates and follows conventions, but a field is also a 
communication system of conventions that serves as environment for organizations and their 
members.  What is needed is a method of defining a field based on the conventions of 
technogenetic rhetoric that is suitable for pedagogy of professional communication in a 
technology driven world.  Toulmin’s concept of field as a description of space is appropriate 
for my discussion thus far; the space of organizations formed by communication bounded in 
fields of convention and community.  Functioning, however, as an operationally closed 
mental system striving for identification with other equally closed mental systems in a world 
made increasingly complex by technology and the technological unconscious it induces, 
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requires a more precise definition of the field as semiotic domain.  James Paul Gee (2003) 
calls for an expansion of literacy from primarily text based to one that accounts for the 
multimodal nature of technological communication (14).  Semiotic domains encapsulate both 
discursive (print) and non-discursive (visual and mental images) literacies.  Gee believes that  
We need…to think first in terms of what I call semiotic 
domains and only then get to literacy in the more traditional 
terms of print literacy.  “Semiotic” here is just a fancy way of 
saying we want to talk about all sorts of different things that 
can take on meaning, such as images, sounds, gestures, 
movements, graphs, diagrams, equations, objects, even people 
like babies, midwives, and mothers, not just words.  All of 
these things are signs (symbols, representations, whatever term 
you want to use) that “stand for” (take on) different meanings 
in different situations, contexts, practices, cultures, and 
historical periods (17-18). 
Gee’s semiotic domains provide a description of the overlapping spaces of social and mental 
spaces by including all of the discursive and non-discursive rhetoric of identification 
produced by mental systems that constitute social systems.  Semiotic domains contain the 
conventions and communities of Toulmin’s fields of argument in discursive, extra-discursive, 
and visuospatial terms.  In other words, Toulmin’s fields are biased towards discursive 
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language, what can and cannot be said with field specific language and knowledge.  Semiotic 
domains open the field to visuospatial elements of visual image, design, gesture, and so on 
that communicate on an emotional level.  Pedagogy of professional communication takes 
place in semiotic domains of specialization such as marketing, finance, law, and computer 
software, but also in semiotic domains of learning such as collaboration, simulation, and 
game theory.  The technological inclusiveness of semiotic domains adds a level of 
complexity to their pedagogical application.  For example, the semiotic domain of the 
marketing presentation presents a complex mixture of literacies to be mastered.  Print literacy 
is obviously required, the reading and writing of the presentation text in cognitively 
rhetorical structures, forms, and strategies; visual literacy is also required, the selection, 
creation, and deployment of visual images using various software applications; kinesthetic 
literacy is engaged, the execution of gesture and movement as structure, form, and strategy, 
in addition to the ability to “read” audience gestures and body language; auditory and vocal 
literacy is equally important, the management of vocal tone, volume, and pace, in addition to 
the ability “read” the sounds emanating from the audience, such as the tone of a question or a 
sigh.  Finally the semiotic domain of the technology engaged interacts with all literacies.  
These semiotic domains—textual, visual, kinesthetic, and vocal/auditory—require different 
rhetorical structures, forms, and strategies that are made more complex by technology; 
reading body language and gesture during a Skype or videoconference call; aligning visual 
image and text; and managing vocal tone and volume on a podcast are but a few of the 
complex literacy challenges.  There is the semiotic domain of the organization/system that 
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within itself, several other semiotic domains exist such as the marketplace, the discipline of 
marketing, as well as marketing the specific product or service.  The complex nature of the 
semiotic domains problematizes pedagogy.  The traditional banking model of education 
where an expert deposits knowledge into the mental account of the student is all but 
impossible in this context.  The odds of aligning instruction and student held experience are 
quite high.  The following section discusses complexity theory in terms of composition while 
developing a matrix from which to build a pedagogical tool capable of accounting for 
complex semiotic domains. 
4.4 Current Pedagogy of Professional Communication 
The goal of my project is the development of a practical pedagogy of professional 
communication that is grounded in theories of cognitive rhetoric and constructivist teaching 
strategy.  In order to differentiate the post-process pedagogy I am developing from current 
process oriented practical strategies, I will briefly outline some examples of current 
professional communication pedagogy.  This content takes the form of textbooks.  The 
textbooks I have surveyed focus on business and technical communication.  The six 
textbooks I have selected to survey represent a valid cross-section of the standard texts in use 
in post-secondary institutions.  The textbooks are written for first or second year students in 
either a business administration or information-processing program at a university or college.  
The six texts are: 
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• How to Write for the World of Work (WW), seventh edition, Donald H. 
Cunningham, Elizabeth O. Smith, and Thomas E. Pearsall  
• Communicating for Results (CR), second edition, Carolyn Meyer 
• Business Communication Now (BN), Canadian Edition, Isobel M. Findley 
• Business Communication: Building Critical Skills (BB), fourth edition, Kitty O. 
Locker, Stephen Kyo Kaczmarek, and Kathryn Braun 
• Technical Communication (TC), fourth Canadian edition, John M. Lannon and Don 
Klepp 
• Strategies for Technical Communication in the Workplace (STC), second edition, 
Laura J. Gurak and John M. Lannon  
 
All six texts organize content around specific document types, such as emails, memos, 
research reports, business letters, resumes, and user manuals.  The texts divide business 
communication into persuasive and non-persuasive messages.  CR, BB, and BN further 
divide business communication into positive (routine) and negative messages.  WW offers a 
wider range of genres that include instructions and mechanism descriptions.  All four cover 
visual and oral presentations with WW providing the most comprehensive coverage of visual 
communication. The TC and STC technical communication textbooks break down the 
elements of technical documents (such as user manuals) into component parts that include 
definitions, instructions, and processes.   All six textbooks take a practical process oriented 
approach to producing business and technical communications.   
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The six texts provide an excellent description and discussion of key instrumental aspects of 
business and technical communication.  They all cover the nuts and bolts of producing 
documents in the proper format, strategies for routine, negative, and persuasive messages, 
and communicating across cultures in an ethical manner.  All six present strategies and 
processes for audience and scope analysis, as well as provide sections on grammar and word 
choice.  Attention, as a cognitive function, does not appear in the index of any of the text, nor 
does argumentation or figuration.  WW does cover scientific argument and details induction 
and deduction, while all four cover the three Aristotelian appeals (logic, emotion, and 
credibility) in detail.  The content in the textbooks surveyed is comprehensive and a valuable 
addition to professional communication pedagogy.  What I am suggesting would add another 
layer to the content provided on specific document and communication types.  The cognitive 
rhetoric developed in my dissertation is aimed at providing a framework that takes 
instrumental and practical content with a focus on effectiveness in the face of systems based 
organizations, the technological unconscious, and complexity.  Rather than focus on routine, 
negative, persuasive messages, empathetic audience analysis, and structured appeals, a 
pedagogy rooted in cognitive rhetoric seeks out communication strategies of argumentation, 
figuration, visual, and mental images that increase mutual understanding as identification and 
consubstantiality.  The missing key to effectiveness in these textbooks is precisely what my 
approach supplies, an alignment of communication with cognitive affinities and mechanisms.  
An online simulation game provides a medium that allows students to experience the 
complexity and double contingency of communication.  Before presenting the case for a 
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game as pedagogical tool, I need to return to Gee’s conception of semiotic domain and how it 
relates to communication processes and content. 
The problem, as I see it, with professional communication textbooks and standard lecture-
based pedagogy is in what Gee calls the “content view”.  The semiotic domain of 
professional communication is not, as Gee puts it, “a set of facts and principles, [i]t is rather 
primarily a lived  and historically changing set of distinctive social practices” (2003, 21).  In 
other words, teaching the principles of audience analysis, the process of prewriting, or the 
structure of an email, as a set of facts and procedures that will lead to a positive 
communicative outcome is incomplete.  Exercises, such as cases that ask the student to write 
a positive or negative message based on a set of circumstances graded on rubrics that are 
focused on purpose, audience, and scope (see Appendix A) do not account sufficiently for the 
complex issues of attention, technology, reception of the message, and so on.  Such a passive 
approach to the semiotic domain of professional communication does not provide the 
experience of communicating in a doubly contingent setting.  The writing process becomes a 
step-by-step series of check boxes rather than the interaction of operationally closed mental 
systems.  Writing only for the teacher limits the ability to develop and engage the cognitive 
rhetoric necessary in today’s technologically unconscious and complex environment.  The 
next section describes the basis for a post-process pedagogy of professional communication.  
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4.5 Establishing a Post-process Technogenetic Pedagogy  
A number of composition scholars have taken on writing process pedagogy (Kent, 1993; 
Sanchez, 2005; Dobrin,Rice & Vastola, 2011; Hawk, 2011).  In his 2011 essay 
“Reassembling Post-process: Toward a Posthuman Theory of Public Rhetoric”, Byron Hawk 
summarizes the assumptions of a post-process theory of writing: “writing is public, writing is 
interpretive, and writing is situated” (75).  Public refers to the exchange of communication 
between writer and audience; interpretive refers to the double contingency of communication 
where operationally closed mental systems can hermeneutically engage with only 
communication and not the mind of the other; and situated refers to the individual context in 
which each communicative event takes place.  Writing is also public, interpretive, and 
situated for Thomas Kent (1999) who takes writing process theory to task for avoiding the 
“hermeneutic guesswork” involved in all communication.  For Kent, teaching process is 
impossible as the only way to reveal process is to look back at each individual situation (5).  
Writers, for Kent, need to make educated guesses as to what will be effective communication 
based on experience.  The more writers investigate what works in certain situations, the 
better communicators they will be.  Communication is dialogic. Individuals produce, receive, 
and interpret language in what Hawk calls a “hermeneutic circle” (76).  Kent’s view of 
process is not dissimilar to a complex social systems view of communication where only 
communication communicates and understanding is doubly contingent.  Kent’s view also 
supports technogenetic rhetoric’s call for attention to the way rhetorical symbols interact with 
cognitive affinities and mechanisms; if human beings are incapable of directly accessing the 
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mind of another and are subject to the double contingency of communication, understanding 
the affinities between cognitive mechanisms and aspects of discursive and non-discursive 
language is indispensible.  Kent’s post-process theory is language centred and does not 
account for engagements with non-discursive rhetoric of technology.  Communication, for 
Kent, is between human beings and he has little to say on the posthumanist reality formed by 
technology and the technological unconscious.  
Byron Hawk (2011) calls for a rearranging of Kent’s theory.  Rather than have writers 
analyze audiences, conceive of strategies, and then engage with situations, Hawk calls for a 
reversal where situations call forth communication through enactive and embodied 
interpretation of a world that creates a public.10 The goal of his conception of post-process is 
to 
Build a new constellation of concepts that can reground post-
process in a posthuman model of netwrks to ultimately argue 
that the subject of writing is the network that inscribes the 
subject as the subject scribes the network (75)   
Hawk redefines post-process theory as follows: 
                                                
 
 
10	  Hawk weaves together Deleuze and Guttari’s (1987) theory of assemblages, Heidegger’s 
(1962) theory of interpretation, and Latour’s (2005) conception of the public, to develop a 
post-process theory that is grounded in context and situation.   
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• Situatedness demarcates an assemblage or territory in relation to the chaotic world 
around it and sets the conditions of possibility for the manifold assignments it gathers 
• Interpretation organizes the internal assemblage once it is distinguished from its 
milieu and participates in the coproduction of the world the situation gathers: and 
• Public expression opens the assemblage back to the outside world in order to make 
new connections with it possible, continually enacting the process through the 
invention of new rhetorics (91) 
Situatedness, interpretation, and public are presented as the interaction of assemblages of 
humans, non-humans, and objects that express worlds rather than communication.  In other 
words, composition is the result of situated assemblages produced through interpretation and 
not recursive hermeneutic guesswork.  For Hawk, 
Humans don’t just test their theories on other humans: they 
connect these theories to complex situations to express worlds.  
Such an approach isn’t based on concious debate about 
effective guesses, but on embodied enactions with a complex, 
evolving world that includes innumerable objects at various 
levels of scale.  This is a posthuman image of the world that 
includes humans but decenters them in relational models of 
assemblage and expression (77).               
  176 
Hawk uses assemblages instead of Kent’s conception of audience as the ground for his 
version of post-process theory as assemblages make reference to more than just people.  
Objects of technology also participate in the assemblage.   
In terms of professional communication, the concept of assemblage expands the actors 
involved.  While a model of organization as operationally closed social system is required in 
the development of a pedagogy based on cognitive rhetoric, there is a likelihood that the 
theory will fall into what DeLanda (2006) defines as an “organismic metaphor” where the 
removal of one part of a system (an organ) causes it to lose its identity (8).  For example, 
removing the liver from the biological system in which it participates changes its makeup.  
By focusing on rhetoric’s cognitive affect on mental processes of production and reception of 
communication within complex networks of mental and social systems it is possible to focus 
on the micro, individual-to-individual viewpoint that the macro viewpoint of system 
interaction is ignored.  Thinking in terms of assemblages allows for the dissection of 
communicative events from the overall interaction of systems without losing the vitality of 
the individually situated communicative event.  In other words, we are able to pull as 
assemblage such as a presentation out of the overall functioning of the system for both 
composition and analysis.  I interpret Deleuze and Guttari’s assemblage as a contextually and 
technologically situated audience within a semiotic domain(s).  Using assemblage rather than 
Kent’s concept of public (audience) allows for inclusion of technology and technologically 
unconscious cognition.  Audience, as assemblage grounds the technological and socio-spatial 
dimensions of professional communication by fusing technology and context.  For example, 
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participants in a videoconference are situated in context, a common semiotic domain, but are 
also situated in technology and in the case of a videoconference the contextual and 
technological situations are indistinguishable and inseparable.  Thinking in terms of 
assemblage instead of audience moves professional communication away from the purely 
dialogic.  Of course, each participant in the videoconference is both a producer and receiver 
of communication, but so is the technology.  The hardware and software of the 
videoconference assemblage has an effect on the discursive and non-discursive rhetoric of 
the communication network.  An assemblage consists of technologically situated individuals 
who serve as universal cognitive audience (as discussed in the previous chapter), as well as a 
field variant and invariant particular audience.  An assemblage as field-dependent, field-
invariant, universal, and particular reside within a semiotic domain.   
In Hawk’s theory, interpretation is no longer trial and error executed through retrospection; 
communication is not exchanged, but coproduced.  The public is not an audience to be 
analyzed, but a creation of discursive and non-discursive rhetoric.  In other words, 
assemblages form and disband as communication systems.  Hawk’s conception of 
interpretation grounds the psychological and temporal dimensions of the professional 
communication matrix.  A speaker imagines the cognitive universal audience of a semiotic 
domain in the formulation of her argument by taking into account field-invariant aspects of 
values and beliefs that universally appeal to all members of a semiotic domain, as well as 
field-dependent aspects of values and beliefs specific to the members of an organization 
within a semiotic domain.  For example, an audience of software engineers is universal in 
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terms of cognitive mechanisms and affinities; universal in terms of knowledge, values, and 
beliefs attributable to software engineers while also particular in knowledge, values, and 
beliefs attributable to members of ABC Software Inc.  The assemblage, in this case, consists 
of the particular audience and their contextual and technological situation.  The particular 
audience is created and constructed by communication in the same way an organization is 
constituted by communication.  The assemblage is made public at the moment of such 
communication.  Post-process theory, in Hawk’s conception, aligns with social systems 
theory, complexity and emergence and provides a foundation for technogenetic rhetoric.   
The concept of assemblage is better suited to professional communication than the 
traditional concept of audience as a particular person or group of people.  Thinking about 
audiences as universal members of a semiotic domain defined by a design grammar replaces 
audience analysis as it is promoted by process theory. The concept of assemblage adds 
another dimension to analyzing a particular audience.  It is not enough in a world constrained 
by the technological unconscious to restrict audience analysis to the receiver’s hierarchical 
position within the organization, their attitudes, interests, experiences, knowledge level, 
expectations, and likely response.  Audience as assemblage includes this information, but 
adds technological situation to the mix.  Technological situation, in traditional prewriting 
analysis is accounted for as medium, separate from audience.  An assemblage folds one into 
the other; technology determines an assemblage just as an assemblage determines 
technology.  An assemblage is, what Gee defines as an “affinity group”, the citizens of a 
semiotic domain, situated in both the world and semiotic domain (31).  The audience in a 
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face-to-face presentation is not the same audience in a Skype or videoconference presentation 
even if the individual human beings are the same.  The structural couplings of mental 
systems are different in each case and, as a result, the pathways to identification and 
consubstantiation are significantly altered.  Both situations involve actors that include human 
beings and technology.  In the Skype presentation, the actors include presenter, viewers, 
computers, monitors, operating systems, Skype software, cameras, microphones, and perhaps 
multimedia software such as PowerPoint.  These actors form an assemblage or network 
consisting of human and non-human agents that Bruno Latour refers to as an actants (84).  
Assemblages as networks form complex systems of communication that are engaged by 
technogenetic rhetoric.  The next section develops a theory of complex systems into a 
pedagogical model for professional communication.     
4.6 Complex Systems and Networks 
Melanie Mitchell defines a complex system as: “ a system in which large networks of 
components with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to collective 
behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution”; she 
also provides an alternative definition that incorporates emergence where the actions of a 
system produce something different from the individual components: “a system that exhibits 
nontrivial emergent and self-organizing behaviors” (2009, 13).  Mark C. Taylor provides a 
more detailed definition that breaks down the vital emergent qualities of a complex system:  
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Complex systems display spontaneous self-organization, which 
complicates interiority and exteriority in such a way that the 
line that is supposed to separate them becomes undecidable.  
The structures resulting from spontaneous self-organization 
emerge from but are not necessarily reducible to the 
interactivity of the components or elements in the system.  
Inasmuch as self-organizing structures emerge spontaneously, 
complex systems are neither fixed nor static but develop or 
evolve.  Such evolution presupposes that complex systems are 
both open and adaptive.  Emergence occurs in a narrow 
possibility space lying between conditions that are too ordered 
and too disordered.  This boundary or margin is “the edge of 
chaos” which is always far from equilibrium (2001, 142-43).  
Complex systems theory applies to both adaptive (systems that evolve and learn) and non-
adaptive (weather) complex systems.  Complexity theory does not completely align with 
Luhmann’s social systems theory; social systems of communication and mental systems of 
consciousness are operationally closed rather than open and can only couple to other systems 
through communication.  In social systems theory, emergence through complexity is a result 
of the double contingency of communication where neither sender nor receiver is capable of 
controlling communicative outcome.  Understanding is contingent on the translation of 
thought into language by the sender and language into thought by the receiver.  This 
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contingency creates emergent outcomes through complex interactions.  Complexity 
intensifies instrumentally through technology that ontologically, in Heidegger’s sense of 
enframing, situates the rhetorical formation of communicative action on the part of the 
sender, as well as on the part of the receiver into semiotic domains.  Ecology of 
communicative action is formed where learning and evolution are achieved via the vital 
emergence of identification and consubstantiality between human and social systems.  The 
primary mode of this communicative action is rhetoric. 
Social/organizational and mental systems interact to form complex semiotic domains.  As 
semiotic domains require an extension of literacies (reading and writing), new metaphors of 
composition have developed.  Although the ecology model has primarily been directed at 
writing, I will take composition to include all activities of communication production.  The 
metaphor of ecology provides a way of viewing technology-saturated communication as 
multimodal.  Margaret Syverson, in her book The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of 
Composition, develops a theory of writing as complex ecology.  Syverson finds writing to be  
complex system[s] of self-organizing, adaptive, and dynamic 
interactions [that are] actually situated in an ecology, a larger 
system that includes environmental structures, such as pens, 
paper, computers, books, telephones, fax machines...as well as 
other complex systems operating at various levels of scale, 
such as families, global economies, publishing systems...and 
language itself (5).   
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Syverson brings the technics of communication to bear on complex systems theory; social 
systems such as professional organizations that are constituted by communication are 
populated by human beings who, as mental systems of consciousness, are situated by 
technology.  Technology interrelates complex systems into what Syverson designates an 
ecology.  The goal of her research is to determine whether or not one can understand 
composition as an ecological system (5).  I apply her model to professional communications 
pedagogy where technology becomes the manifestation of the constitutive communication of 
an organization.  While she is a technological generation behind (pen, paper, and fax 
machines have for the most part been replaced by word processing applications, email, text 
messaging, Facebook, Twitter, etc.), Syverson’s model of an ecological matrix for describing 
professional communication remains rich and applicable.  Four cognitive attributes 
(distribution, emergence, enaction, and embodiment) are mapped against five analytical 
dimensions: physical material, social, psychological, spatial, and temporal.   
Distribution refers to the situated nature of cognition; the production of communication in 
the workplace is never the product of the writer/designer/speaker in isolation.  What one 
writes/speaks is always a continuation of previous discourse and always an opportunity for 
future discourse.  The vast majority of professional communication is achieved through 
collaboration in both content and production. I add extended cognition to Syverson’s concept 
of distributed and situated cognition, for the purposes of technogenetic rhetoric.   
Distributed cognition refers to cognition shared by different mental systems in particular 
situations while extended cognition refers to technology that exteriorizes cognitive systems 
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such as memory.  Cognition is extended from a purely mental activity (or collection of 
mental activities) to a technological device. Technology such as the address book application 
in a smartphone is an example of such a device, but so is a paper notepad.  Extended and 
distributed cognition are closely related and the terms are often interchanged.  For my 
purposes, I will use distributed to refer to cognition shared by human beings as mental 
systems and, as discussed above, extended to refer to technological extension of cognitive 
abilities that lead to a technological unconscious.   
Syverson’s conception of emergence in composition aligns with the definition given 
above: “emergence refers to the self-organization arising globally in networks of simple 
components connected to each other and operating locally” (11).  Communication emerges 
from words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, and texts, as well as design, images, and vocal 
qualities— a result of the structural coupling through linguistic, visual, and kinesthetic 
symbols between mental systems as human beings.  Emergence is the result of the 
engagement of the cognitive principle.] 
As discussed in the previous chapter: edging/bounding, rhythm, association, classification, 
abstraction, and hierarchy with discursive, extra-discursive and visuospatial rhetoric.  
Emergence may occur as a result of conceptual blending, embodied simulation, and/or 
System 1 and System 2 argumentative reasoning.          
Enaction refers to Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s theory of enactive cognition described 
above.  Individual mental systems bring forth a world through embodied perceptual 
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connection to the objective world.  Embodied and enacted cognition help explain how mental 
systems interact in situations constituted by communication. Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
in their book The Embodied Mind, offer an enactive explanation of communicative action: 
Yet another way to express this idea would be to say that 
cognition as embodied action is always about or directed 
toward something that is missing: on the one hand, there is 
always the next step for the system in its perceptually guided 
action; and on the other hand, the actions of the system are 
always directed towards situations that have yet to become 
actual.  Thus cognition as embodied action both poses the 
problems and specifies those paths that must be treat or laid 
down for their solution. (205). 
In other words, enactive cognition accounts for the recursive nature of communication in 
social systems.  One mental system as sender produces communication while the receiver is 
simultaneously producing a response.  What is missing is the next communication; it is 
recursively produced by the preceding communication.   
Embodiment, for Syverson refers to both the physical activity of composing (pen, paper, 
keyboard, sitting, standing) and the conceptual structures of the human mind (13).  Our 
physical experiences “ground” our concepts as analogic frame.  The HUMAN BODY IS A 
CONTAINER, SADNESS IS LOW, ANGER IS HOT are a few examples.  In terms of 
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technogenetic rhetoric, embodiment is closely related to technology and extended cognition.  
We are increasingly technologically embodied where the demarcation between body and 
technology is difficult to discern.  Wearable computing is an example of technological 
embodiment that affects professional communication, as a technology such as Google Glass 
(or a similar wearable device) extends and distends cognitive aspects of memory and 
attention.  Technological embodiments such as Google Glass create a tangible version of 
Burke’s terministic screens; Google Glass “selects and deflects” the world in an immediate 
sense that is beyond the analogical (1966, 45).   
To summarize Syverson’s four cognitive attributes in terms of pedagogy of professional 
communication: distributed and extended cognition relate to the interaction of mental 
systems and situations/technology; emergence refers to the products of mental and social 
systemic interaction as communication that engage the greater attention system; enaction 
refers to the perceptual interpretation of communication; and embodiment relates to both the 
physical and technical situation in the interaction of mental systems based on embodied 
conceptual structures.  I will add the cognitive attribute of affinity to Syverson’s list.  Affinity 
refers to the cognitive attraction we have to specific formations and patterns of language and 
objects, both discursive and non-discursive.  For example, we have an affinity for 
argumentation where logical and quasi-logical presentations of information appeal to the 
argumentative nature of System 2 argumentative reasoning mechanisms.  We have an affinity 
for linguistic and object patterns of repetition, symmetry, association, and rhyme.  We also 
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have an affinity for emotional language and images. Affinity is the cognitive attribute most 
affected by rhetoric and is a primary area of study for technogenetic rhetoric.  
Syverson defines the five analytical dimensions of the matrix in relation to writing; 
physical relates the instruments of writing, pen, paper, computer, desks and so on; the social 
dimension involves a number of human relationships from collaborations to political 
movements; the psychological dimension involves cognitive aspects of writing such as those 
theorized by Linda Flower and John Hayes (1984); the spatial dimension refers to the 
physical and digital space taken up by writing (books, journals, blogs and so on); and the 
temporal dimension relates to writing in its “historical trajectory” (Syverson, 18-21).  The 
dimensions as defined by Syverson do not align directly with the theories of social systems, 
technological unconscious, attention, and extended cognition outlined above.  The 
technological dimension refers to the technics of communication that construct an 
organization; language, speech, writing are foundational while network, text, image, and 
voice producing software applications provide the medium.  Argument refers to the structure, 
form, and strategy invoked in the communication.  The attributes of discursive (language), 
extra-discursive (ethos, kairos, tone), and visuospatial (visual design) are analyzed as 
separate elements that come together as one argument.  Finally, semiotic domain refers to the 
conventions and communities of rhetoric that make up the structure, form, and strategies of 
communication within fields of argument.  Semiotic domains, according to Gee (2003), 
exhibit a “design grammar” that defines what is acceptable and not acceptable in terms of 
communication within and about a semiotic domain (30).  Understanding the design 
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grammar of a semiotic domain in terms of language, use of technological media, and 
communication format is a crucial factor in successful professional communication.  The five 
dimensions do not align in a parallel existence separate from one another; they overlap on a 
multidimensional plane.   
As an example, how would a typical professional communication event such as a technical 
briefing on a new product break down in the matrix dimensionally and in terms of cognitive 
attributes?  On the technological dimension, the event would involve presentation software 
that utilizes text, image, and perhaps sound; collaboration software such as Google Drive, 
Facebook, and/or Twitter could also have been involved in the production, as well as follow 
up communication.  The meeting room, video-conferencing site, on-line meeting software, 
microphones, pointers, and online Q&A applications are just a few of the other aspects of the 
technical dimension.  Discursive attributes include the written and spoken language of the 
argument put forward.  Extra-discursive attributes could include the timing of the 
presentation, the reputation of the presenter, and the tone of the delivery (excited, somber, 
cajoling, neutral informing, and so on).  Visuospatial attributes include the design of the 
slides, the attire of the presenter, images used, infographics, and so on.  Through its design 
grammar, the semiotic domain determines the rhetorical elements of argument structure, 
form, and strategy and the conventions of the field.  The presenter may decide to structure 
their claim and grounds on a strategy based on changing an accepted reality using an 
argument from expertise scheme and figural logic in the form of an analogy.  The presenter 
will follow conventions of language and design in delivering her message.  For example, 
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there may be a conventional order to a presentation of this sort where specifications are 
defined in the introduction and so on.  
Each cognitive attribute is mapped onto the dimensions.  Distributed and extended 
cognition engages technology to the extent of the distribution and extension of mental 
systems that vary depending on the technological situation; are people viewing the 
presentation remotely? Is technology allowing an increase in the interaction among 
participants?  What emergent new communicative spaces as ideas and strategies form as a 
result of the presentation?  Does the presentation enactively invoke the appropriate missing 
elements on the part of the audience?  In other words, does the argument invoke sufficient 
identification?  How is the embodied state of the presenter and audience affected by the 
discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial dimensions? What structures, forms, and 
strategies of technogenetic rhetoric deployed within the conventions of the semiotic domain 
make the argument effective? These are a few of the units of analysis brought forth by the 
dimension/attribute matrix. Figure 8 is an example of the dimension/attribute matrix as 
applied to a routine instant messenger (in this case BlackBerry Messenger) exchange. 
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Figure 8: Blackberry Messenger Conversation 
Magdalena Paige
Looking Forward to Launch
Thomas Dylan
Thomas Dylan
Thomas Dylan
Magdalena Paige
Magdalena Paige
Magdalena Paige
Fri 2:15 PM
Fri 2:22 PM
Fri 2:23 PM
Fri 3:33 PM
Fri 3:33 PM
Fri 4:27 PM
Hey Maggie, is Mary coming to launch event 
I have 50 customers coming expecting her
R
As far as I know she will be there - but she
has not confirmed
Please let me know by 3pm today
I have to set the agenda
R
Sorry, still waiting for confirmation
I have made arrangements for the
local MD to cover this
R
Mary will be arriving at 5:50 and is 
expecting to speak
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The exchange occurs between peers preparing a for a major product launch.  Thomas is 
responsible for organizing a customer event, at which he has promoted the CEO Mary as 
keynote speaker.  An analysis using the dimension/attribute matrix is presented in Table 1. 
 Technological Discursive Extra-Discursive Visuospatial Semiotic 
Domian 
Distribution 
& Extension 
Short- instant 
messages – 
occur in 
dialogic fashion 
– recorded 
dialogue 
extends 
memory 
 Using BBM 
instead of email 
establishes 
urgency and 
relationship of 
communicators 
Hybrid 
between video 
chat and text 
chat 
Informal 
communication 
medium used 
for crucial 
interactions - 
Embodiment Delay between 
linguistic 
reasoning and 
thumbs typing 
Thomas’s 
argument 
from sign is 
dictated by 
his location 
at the event 
The “R” for 
read notification 
creates a sense 
of asynchronous 
conversation 
Pictures of 
communicators  
create visual 
engagement 
Thomas is on 
the front line of 
the business 
while 
Magdalena 
appears in the 
rear 
Attention 
System 
Buzzing of the 
message 
notification. 
“Read” 
notification 
causes 
extended focus 
The “read” 
notification 
belies 
urgent 
language 
 Delay in 
response by 
Magdalena 
affects tone of 
Thomas’s 
proposition – 
hard tone 
 
Cartoon like 
dialogue box 
for statements 
creates 
informaility 
Waiting for 
the “read” 
notification to 
appear 
Organization 
uses instant 
messaging to 
initiate text 
conversations 
– notifications 
are considered 
confirmations 
of message 
Enaction Technologically 
induced face-
to-face 
conversation – 
dissonance 
caused by 
paradox of 
atemporal 
conversation 
Presumptive 
reasoning: 
Mary is not 
reliable  - 
and Thomas 
is 
responsible 
for customer  
Delay in 
Magdalen’s 
response to 
Thomas’s 
presumptive 
proposition  
provides 
affirmation that 
is revoked  
 A non-response 
to a proposition 
sent by BBM is 
considered 
acceptance 
Table 1: Dimension/Attribute Analysis of BBM Conversation 
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The dimension/attribute matrix Table 1 reveals the complexity of communication events as 
networks.  The bolded quadrants represent key relationships in terms of identification and 
consubstantiality.  In this case the key dimension is the psychological.  The key cognitive 
attribute is the attention system (emergence).  The “R” or “read” notification is applicable to 
a number of the cognitive dimensions and rhetorical attributes. The matrix demonstrates how 
this simple communication is a complex combination of cognition, technology, and rhetoric.  
The technological medium creates dissonance in the attention system by creating a dialogue-
like situation with visual image of the respondent and a notification when the person has read 
the message.  The dialogue is not, however, experienced in the manner of a phone, Skype, or 
face-to-face communication as the respondent does not have to respond immediately.  Only 
the expectations created in the semiotic domain of the organization regulate response time.  
The interconnection of attention and technology affect Thomas’s argument from sign.  The 
hidden premise is deemed accepted by the response gap, even though a critical interjection of 
say, “hold on, you know Mary, her schedule is unreliable, but she always shows” or 
something to that effect.  The matrix demonstrates both the strengths and potential pitfalls of 
one type of digital medium. 
The matrix is also a tool of invention especially in the composition of digital media where 
discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric play equally important roles.  The 
matrix could be used in both large and small projects, from the design and composition of a 
blog to a complete application interface.  As a pedagogical tool, the matrix is designed to 
deal with practical as opposed to theoretical content.  In other words, the matrix is used 
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primarily as a composing as opposed to analytical/critical tool and it will be embedded, in a 
simplified interface as part Ametros.   The matrix will provide a series of pre-determined 
analysis points available in drop down menus that allow the student to construct the 
assemblage using the dimensions and attributes.  As the dimension/attribute matrix’s domain 
is cognitive, it requires the addition of a social methodology capable of dealing with the 
relationships formed between technology and systems. 
One of the limitations of the dimension/attribute matrix is the focus on objects of 
communication.  The matrix offers an effective heuristic for the analysis of communicative 
events and is an excellent tool for the deployment of technogenetic rhetoric in the form of 
argumentative reasoning, figuration, and figural logic.  The matrix displays the ways in 
which cognitive attributes, mechanisms, and affinities relate to the dimensions of a 
communicative event.  It aligns with the Vygotskian pedagogical model that attempts to 
construct an intersection of instruction and experience.  The dimension/attribute matrix is an 
example of third generation activity theory with its focus on cognition and communicative 
events as objects (see Cole & Engerstrom, 1993).  Human beings as represented by the 
psychological dimension of the matrix are “mediated” by the material objects of the 
dimensions such as space, technology, and semiotic domain. Activity theory does not 
differentiate between cognition and social and presents a model that aligns with distributed 
cognition; “human activity at the individual level is a dialectic among humans and their 
mediators” (Spinuzzi, 2008, 70).  Mediation becomes the activity of the network leading to 
development or, in other words, the interactions between dimensions and attributes lead to 
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communication.  The reification of communication produced by the matrix provides an 
assemblage perspective crucial to technogenetic rhetoric.   
The problem encountered involves the reconciliation of communication as object with 
social systems theory that views communication as the non-material essence of social 
systems (such as organizations).  While it is necessary to pull out the non-material 
communicative events and treat them as objects in order to take a cognitive perspective (how 
operationally closed mental systems integrate in systemic environments of communication), 
treating communication solely as object reduces our ability to examine social cognition and 
technology relationships formed during the formation of assemblages.  For example, using 
the dimension/attribute matrix, we are able to analyze and/or produce a new product 
presentation through the intersection of cognitive attributes and dimensions of technology, 
space, psychology, temporality, and semiotic domains.  What the matrix does not offer, 
however, is a method for examining the relationship between mental and social systems.  The 
matrix allows for the analysis and/or production of communication between individual 
mental systems, but it does not allow for the examination of the effects on the social system 
(organization and functional systems) as a whole, in other words, the effect of 
communication on social cognition. 
Actor-network theory (ANT) provides a method for analyzing the formation of networks in 
terms of assemblages of mental systems and technology where agency is distributed among 
human and technological actors.  ANT moves analysis from the reification of the 
dimension/attribute matrix to the personification of technology as technogenetic actor in a 
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realization of Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance (17). ANT is a loosely defined theory of the 
relationships between various human and non-human actors in a network.  The theory is most 
often associated with the work of three science and technology scholars: Bruno Latour 
(1987), John Law (1992), and Michel Callon (1991).  Callon (1991) defines actor-networks 
as the configuration of 
all groups, actors, and intermediaries [that] describe a network: 
they identify and define other groups, actors, and 
intermediaries, together with the relationships that bring these 
together... the network of intermediaries accepted by an actor 
after negotiation and transformation is in turn transformed by 
that actor.  It is converted into a scenario, carrying the 
signature of its author, looking for actors ready to play its roles.  
For this reason I speak of actor-networks: for an actor is also a 
network (142: also quoted in Spinuzzi, 2008, 84). 
The key activity of actor-network theory is identifying and analyzing instances of 
translation.  Translation is the term used by proponents of ANT to describe the changes 
exhibited by actors as they interact.  Crawford (2005) defines translations as: 
Transport without deformation, as distinguishable from 
diffusion (transfer without distortion). [Translation] is both a 
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process and an effect [that] establishes identities and conditions 
of interaction, [while] characterizing representations (2).   
Translation is a form of transformation (see Spinuzzi, 2008, 88) where actors enter into 
emergent relationships where the resultant network is more than a sum of the parts.  While 
the attribute/dimension matrix looks at the cognitive relationship between sender and 
receiver in a communicative event, ANT takes a more comprehensive perspective.  The 
matrix is a micro view while ANT provides a macro view. 
Scholars are beginning to apply ANT to technical communication (Potts, 2009; Spinuzzi, 
2008).  Potts applies ANT to what she terms “social software” in the form of online photo 
sharing sites developed in response to the London bus bombings of 2005.  Spinuzzi applies 
ANT to the analysis of networks as knowledge producers in telecommunications.  Both 
scholars use ANT to offer a macro-level analysis of communication networks.  Applying 
ANT to our instant messenger example outlined in Table 1, we get an expanded view of the 
interactions between sender and receivers of the communication.  Rather than looking at how 
the discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial arguments cognitively engage the sender 
and receiver, ANT looks at the formation of the communicative network as a whole.  The 
sender and receiver are in essence translators who engage information and technology to 
either accept or reject identification.  The instant messenger technology in our example is an 
attempt at the formation of a communication network.  The actors include Thomas, 
Magdalena, the BBM software application, the BlackBerry hardware devices, the mobile 
network, and the BlackBerry network.  Thomas is attempting (in Callon’s 1986 and Latour’s 
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1987 term) to problematize the lack of stability in the customer event planning process of the 
organization.  The second stage of translation is interessment, or the interpositional strength 
of network connections where Thomas attempts to define the identity of the other actors as 
allies in both recognition of the problem and its suggested solution, in this case only one 
human actor, Magdalena (Callon, 1986, 208).  It is at the interessment stage that non-human 
actors emerge.  In order for interessment to take place, pathways for participation must be 
provided, in this case, BBM application on a BlackBerry device over the mobile and 
BlackBerry Networks.  The third stage of translation is enrollment where sender and receiver 
engage in expanding the network by participating in Thomas’s problematized argument.  The 
software and hardware actors participate by displaying “sent” and “read” notifications that 
bring the non-human actors actively into the network as they “poke” or “hail” Thomas and 
Magdalena notifying each that the other has read their message.  Both hardware and software 
actors through notification exacerbate delays in response and create the frustration of an 
asynchronous conversation where the hearer of a message says “I hear you, but I am not 
answering”. The final stage is mobilization where actors, both human and technological 
become promoters of the network through participation in the form of recruitment (217).  
The difference between enrollment and mobilization is in the selection of technological 
actors.  During enrollment, viewers decide on the actor they wish to engage with. Thomas 
may wait patiently for the BBM actor to announce Magdalena’s reading of the message or 
Thomas may recruit more actors, human or technological into the network, perhaps by 
placing a phone call. Figure 9 presents a diagrammatic view of the partial actor network 
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centred on Thomas – there are other relationships between the other actors such as 
Magdalena and hardware, BBM and the cell network are not displayed.  The thickness of the 
lines represents the importance of the relationship between actors.  The relationship between 
Thomas and BBM is second only to the relationship between Thomas and Magdalena. 
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Figure 9: Actor Network Diagram of BBM Conversation 
 
ANT is useful as an analytical tool, as demonstrated by Potts (2009) and Spinuzzi (2008), 
but also as a strategic method.  In addition to analyzing a cognitive universal and particular 
Thomas
Magdalena
BBM
BlackBerry
Device
Mobile 
Network
BlackBerry
Network
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audience, the producer of communication is able to project the network of actors, human and 
non-, that will be formed.  Problematization aides in the determination of argument structure 
and strategy while interessment, enrollment, and mobilization help develop strategies of 
engagement and identification.  Each stage of an ANT analysis serves to ground strategic 
choices of cognitive rhetoric in technology.  Actor-network theory’s treatment of 
technological artifacts as participant actors in networks of communication links cognitive 
rhetoric and technology in the act of Heideggerian enframing.  Technology distributes and 
extends cognition that is engaged by rhetoric.  Technology such as PowerPoint extends and 
distributes the speaker’s ability to engage the cognitive attributes and mechanisms by 
allowing the speaker’s message to exist as discursive and non-discursive rhetoric 
simultaneously; the voice of the speaker is accompanied by strategically timed animations of 
text, and data presented as images.  Although design scholar Edward Tuffte (2003) criticizes 
the way PowerPoint is typically used as a crutch by the presenter rather than platform for the 
extension and distribution of cognition, PowerPoint remains a technological actor capable of 
transforming text and speech into Tuffte’s conception of “cognitive art” (1990, 9).  
PowerPoint presentations that undergo a strategic cognitive rhetorical analysis using the 
attribute/dimension matrix and actor-network theory are capable of forming communication 
networks of identification and consubstantiation. 
4.7 Summary 
The goal of my project is to develop a post-process pedagogy based on the intersection of 
argumentation, figuration, and cognitive attributes The professional communication 
  200 
pedagogy is based on a foundation of technogenetic rhetoric that moves beyond the 
pioneering work of Linda Flower and John Hayes on the cognitive processes involved in 
composition. Technogenetic rhetoric is the product of multidisciplinary research from the 
fields of rhetoric, cognitive science, and psychology.  Rather than taking a process 
perspective, where rhetoric serves as a composition template, technogenetic rhetoric aligns 
strategic decisions of language and form with our cognitive affinities for such features as 
repetition, rhythm, association, and symmetry, as well as our natural propensity to engage 
argumentative reasoning.  Pedagogy must align instruction with experience by situating 
pedagogical content in contexts that students will deploy professional communication.  I take 
a Vygotskian constructivist perspective that expands the student’s zone of proximal 
development by providing two heuristics.  First, the attribute/dimension matrix provides a 
heuristic for the microanalysis of rhetoric, technology, situation, and cognitive attributes.  
The matrix focuses on the producer and the cognitive universal and particular audience.  
Second, the adaptation of actor-network theory provides a macro analysis of the assemblages 
of human and non-human actors that form communication networks.  The challenge faced by 
teachers of professional communication is how to deploy the heuristics in a manner that 
engages discursive and non-discursive rhetoric with situated experience.  The next chapter 
introduces the online simulation game as a vehicle for deploying my pedagogy of 
technogenetic rhetoric. 
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Delivery
Simulation Content Play Game Complexity
Chapter 5 
The Professional Communication Simulation Game       
Pedagogy of professional communication based on technogenetic rhetoric requires a medium 
that integrates instruction and experience.  How do we escape what Gee calls the “content 
trap” where instruction on theoretical underpinnings dominates the curriculum?  Traditional 
and lecture-based delivery inevitably slides into process teaching: first you do this; then you 
do that.  Following a process model, the student is lectured on the how of professional 
communication: how to write a bad news message, how to write a persuasive report, and so 
on, to be followed by workshops designed to practice through heuristics.  The goal of my 
project, however, is to escape the process model of current-traditional rhetoric and move 
towards a rhetoric anchored in the engagement of cognitive mechanisms and attributes 
through technologically enframed discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial means.  The 
goal is ultimately the development of communicative skills necessary to be effective in a 
complex array of systems that are operationally closed off from one another.  As I discussed 
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in chapter one, Luhmann states, only communication communicates, suggesting that the 
teaching of process in contextual isolation is the least effective pedagogy.  Communication 
production has to be based on elements of reception, or in other words, how does one 
produce communication that forms identification and consubstantiation with another closed 
mental system?  A medium is required that will immerse the student in the practice of 
communication in specific situational context.  The culmination of my project is the 
development of such an authentic learning environment in the form of a professional 
communication online simulation game. The following chapter outlines the pedagogical and 
technical basis of such a game following the work of James Paul Gee (2003), Schaffer and 
Resnick (2005), and Ian Bogost (2007) in game based learning.  Section 5.1 reviews current 
research into digital gaming and pedagogy while section 5.2 investigates the relationship 
between content and learning in a digital world with special emphasis on the work of Sealy 
and Brown.  Sections 5.3 and 5.4 introduce the game world and play of Ametros.  The 
elements of play, games, content, and authentic situated learning are applied to the design of 
Ametros.   
  Before describing the elements of Ametros, the meanings of simulation and game that I 
deploy need to be discussed. Simulation refers to both the role the student takes on, as well as 
the focus on the results and ramifications of communication practice.  The student plays a 
specific professional role (marketing manager, software engineer, associate in a law firm, and 
so on) that composes communication and responds to its results.  Examples of this type of 
simulation are discussed in depth in the game mechanics section.  Game refers to the nature 
  203 
of the experience of Ametros.  There is a play aspect to the experience where the student 
strives to accomplish communicative tasks with objectives of achieving objective 
measurements of success beyond the letter or numeric grade. 
If we think of knowledge in terms of Gee’s semiotic domains, where discursive, extra-
discursive, and visuospatial elements of communication serve as signs or representations that 
determine the complex translations between human beings and technology, the facile nature 
of content and process pedagogy becomes apparent.  When all actors, both human and non-
human, are accounted for, complexity makes establishing process extremely difficult.   
Ironically, the problem of how to escape process pedagogy involves process as how does one 
focus on the communication produced by a networked system without an understanding of 
the processes involved?  Clearly there is a process to composition, as Flower and Hayes 
(1981) have demonstrated but a step-by-step process pedagogy of composition based on 
either the practical writing method of purpose-audience-scope or the invention-arrangement-
style-memory-delivery process of classical rhetoric becomes overly simplistic in the face of 
the complexity of digital communication media.  Both the practical and classical processes 
remain valid, but incomplete.  A pedagogical method that links instruction, digital media and 
experience is required. 
  In 2005, learning-systems scholars, Schaffer and Resnick developed the theory of a 
“thickly authentic” learning environment 
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where activities are simultaneously aligned with the interests of 
the learners, the structure of the domain of knowledge, valued 
practices in the world, and the modes of assessment used (para 
3). 
A thickly authentic learning environment involves aligning instruction with experience 
situated in defined contexts of professional activities.  While traditional case study based 
pedagogy does present authentic problems to be analyzed and solved via traditional 
processes; identifying and defining the problem, determining a purpose for the 
communication, analyzing primary and secondary audiences, selecting a medium, selecting a 
rhetorical strategy, and so on, what is missing is Shaffer’s conception of “thick” authenticity, 
the immersion in the identities, values and practices of the semiotic domain.   Gee describes a 
thickly authentic learning environment when he describes the ideal educational video game 
as taking place in  
a domain of authentic professionalism [where the game] will 
intelligently select the skills and knowledge to be distributed, 
build in a related value system as integral to gameplay, and 
clearly relate any explicit instructions to specific contexts and 
situations (2005, para. 20). 
Thick authenticity is difficult to establish in both classroom and online settings.  Case 
studies serve as a window to the professional semiotic domain where the student is able to 
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peer into a situation without ever connecting with identities and values, or in other words, 
students are unable to develop a significant degree of identification and consubstantiation 
with practitioners in the field.  Somehow the student needs to pass through the window 
opened by the case as a participant in the experience of the situation, an authentic experience 
rather than as an outside observer performing analysis in a vacuum. 
Shaffer (2005) offers a method of developing thickly authentic learning environments 
through the engagement of epistemic frames and what he has termed “epistemic games” 
(para. 10).  Shaffer suggests that 
Rather than constructing a curriculum based on the ways of 
knowing mathematics, science, history, and language arts, we 
can imagine a system in which students learn to work (and thus 
to think) as doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, journalists, 
and other valued reflective practitioners – not in order to train 
for these pursuits in the traditional sense of vocational 
education, but rather because developing those epistemic 
frames provides students with an opportunity to see the world 
in a variety of ways that are fundamentally grounded in 
meaningful activity and well aligned with core skills, habits, 
and understandings of a postindustrial society (para. 8). 
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Shaffer’s epistemic games are simulations that have students take on the identity of 
professionals within specific domains.  He cites an example, “Madison 2200” where students 
take on the role of urban planners in a simulation of a street redesign project.  The students 
receive a package from the mayor and city council detailing plans and budgets.  Teams are 
formed and student urban planners work though the process of planning a street and in so 
doing experienced the way in which urban planners see the world (2005, para. 11-13).  
Epistemic games are more simulation activities than games per say.  However, Shaffer’s 
concepts of thick authenticity, epistemic frames, and epistemic games, buttressed by Gee’s 
focus on the values instilled through simulating the role of professional, provide a foundation 
from which to develop a simulation game that will allow students to deploy technogenetic 
rhetorical strategies and heuristics in a setting that meshes instruction, digital media and 
experience. 
Ian Bogust (2005, 2007) provides a way of looking at the work of Gee and Shaffer from a 
meta-game perspective.  While Gee and Shaffer are primarily concerned with situated 
learning in a context of simulation, Bogost looks at the rhetorical nature of the procedures 
inherent in educational games.  He defines a “procedural rhetoric” where the processes of the 
game itself produce rhetorically driven action (2007, 28).  In Ametros, for example, the 
processes involved in completing a project, drive the simulation and values based pedagogy 
as they direct the student’s actions.  The process of meeting with the Senior Director game 
character to receive instructions is procedurally rhetorical in the sense that such a meeting 
(procedure) is required to move forward in the simulation and such a meeting reveals values 
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such as punctuality and engaged listening that are important to professional 
communication.11  Bogost also presents a “procedural literacy” where procedures promote 
“experimentation with the basic building blocks” (2005, 36) towards a deeper understanding 
of complex systems.  By their very nature, simulation games promote procedural literacy 
through the procedures of simulation.  Ametros is designed as a simulation game that 
exposes students in the practices and values of professional communicators while engaging a 
procedural literacy and rhetoric.  The following section outlines current research into digital 
games and education. 
5.1 Current Research in Digital Games and Education      
The term video game is most often used by scholars of digital pedagogy.  For my purposes 
I will use digital game to signify technology-based games that include discursive, extra-
discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric, and may be applied in a hybrid or purely online learning 
environment.  In addition to the work of Gee, Shaffer, and Bogost, scholarship on digital 
games and education is wide ranging and extensive. Lamberti and Richards (2012) 
investigate the effect digital games have in creating the “democratic classroom” where 
“students are encouraged to articulate and to act according to their own goals and have the 
                                                
 
 
11	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  word	  “process”	  at	  the	  root	  of	  procedural	  rhetoric	  is	  
markedly	  different	  from	  the	  use	  of	  “process”	  in	  composition	  theory.	  	  Bogost	  derives	  process	  
from	  computer	  programming	  and	  provides	  a	  wide	  definition	  that	  includes	  all	  interactions	  
driven	  by	  the	  rules	  or	  boundaries	  of	  a	  system	  (2007,	  5).	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opportunity to refine their social habits and skills as they encounter an ever expanding 
network of others” (482).  Apperley and Beavis (2011) examine the critical nature of 
“gaming literacy” and the treatment of such games as “text” and “action” (134).  They 
conclude text and action form paratexts that lead to higher levels of multi-modal literacy in 
students.  Charsky (2010) calls for the designers of serious educational games to pay 
attention to the characteristics of successful entertainment games including goals, rules, 
challenges, and rewards (177).  Shultz-Colby and Colby (2008) examine the difficulties of 
implementing game play as pedagogy caused by the work/play dichotomy.  They point to the 
“theory of emergent gaming” established by researchers of massively multiplayer digital 
games such as “World of Warcraft” as an opportunity to bring composition and game 
pedagogy into contact (301).  Daisley (1994) finds the problem of play and instruction to be 
solvable through the empowerment of students in terms of the “rules of the game” (107).  By 
involving students in the design of play based pedagogy helps improve oral skills in a 
democratized classroom where the teacher is not the only voice (118).  De Freitas (2006) 
looks at perceptions and attitudes of teachers and students to the pedagogical use of games 
and simulations.  De Freitas finds that research done on leisure games has been “forced” on 
pedagogical games and simulations causing a disruption in the acceptance of games as 
pedagogical tools.  Mason (2013) finds a connection between technical communicators and 
gaming communities in terms of “rhetorical uses of technical communication genres” (219).  
Through involvement in common genres such as user guidebooks, process descriptions, and 
reviews, technical communication should embrace game studies as she states, 
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The futures of online gamers and technical communicators are 
joined by the overlapping genre ecologies of these two 
discourse communities. Already, ‘‘serious gaming’’ in areas 
such as defense, health care, education, and engineering has 
provided an opportunity for technical communication to 
increase its influence within fields in which it has traditionally 
held sway (233). 
Egenfeldt-Nielsen (2011) develops a theory of educational games that reformulates Gee’s 
concepts of probing and hypothesizing into a four part model of (1) concrete experience, (2) 
reflective observation, (3) abstract concepts, and (4) active experimentation that create a 
constructivist pedagogy similar to Shaffer’s thickly authentic simulations (2005, 189).  While 
my research review found only Lamberti and Richards (2012) and Apperley and Beavis 
(2011) refer to Bogost’s procedural rhetoric, all find the procedural nature of games to have a 
significant effect on pedagogical value.  Although often not cited, Bogost’s procedural 
rhetoric and literacy are evident in the majority of educational game scholarship reviewed in 
this dissertation.    
James Paul Gee (2003, 2005, 2006), David Shaffer (2007, 2005, 2009), and Ian Bogost 
(2005, 2007) have produced the most extensive body of research into online/video games, 
learning, and literacy.  The following section investigates the relationship between content 
and learning in educational digital games. 
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5.2 The Relationship Between Content and Learning   
Gee agrees with Shaffer on the situated nature of knowledge and meaning.  Semiotic 
domains align with epistemic frames in terms of establishing the content and design of 
potential learning environments.  Gee defines a process of “reflective practice” provided by 
digital games as “the probe, hypothesize, reprobe, rethink cycle” (2003, 90).   Gee’s cycle is 
a way of learning not readily available in the offline classroom.  The virtual world created by 
the online simulation allows the student to “probe” the environment, exploring available 
options and actions; the student then forms a “hypothesis” on how best to proceed engaging 
the challenge offered; equipped with the hypothesis, the student “reprobes” the virtual world 
looking for results; finally, the student “rethinks” her hypothesis based on feedback from the 
game environment (90).  Students practice Gee’s cycle every time they play an entertainment 
based videogame.  Gee argues that all videogames offer a learning environment that is 
situated, value-laden, and epistemic.  Douglas Thomas and John Seely Brown (2007) state 
the issue succinctly – current pedagogy is based on “learning about” while video and digital 
games are about “learning to be” (149).   
The relationship between learning and content is complex and context dependent. Thomas 
and Brown argue in A New Culture of Learning (2011) that content has shifted from a 
question of “what is the information” to “where is the information” as technology has 
unconsciously extended memory (Loc. 1256).  To the student with a smartphone, 
remembering is about the process of launching applications and designing search strings.  In 
other words, “where” is the information?  Again, it comes down to attention: what is 
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important to attend to; what is important to move from short to long-term memory?  
Attention shifts to the technological context of media.  Information is literally found with the 
fingers.   Technological media context frames attention.  Thomas and Brown feel that  
reframing knowledge as a where question underscores the 
increasing importance of context.  In a world where context is 
always shifting and being rearranged, the stability of the what 
dimension of knowledge comes into question.  Only by 
understanding the where of a piece of information can we 
understand its meaning (2011, loc. 1279).    
McLuhan’s dictum “the medium is the message” takes on a deeper, darker meaning.  The 
shifting context Thomas and Brown refer to is rearranged by digital media and digital media 
may well be the message in and of itself, but the ramifications of a where focus on 
information, where technological media context precedes content, places a new evaluation 
stress on the individual.  A student using Google to search for information on climate change 
will be presented with hundreds of thousands of entry points to journal articles, blog articles, 
news reports, videos, and podcasts.  If she narrowed her search to Facebook, she would find 
thousands of profiles. And if she searched #climatechange on Twitter, she would find a long 
and vibrant conversation.  Gaining expertise on the topic requires more than the ability to call 
up information; expertise shifts from a knowledge of accessibility to skill in evaluation where 
understanding technological media context predominates.  The information on climate 
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change to which the student has access will range from journal articles in Nature presenting 
the scientific evidence to the slick video presentations of Alex Jones “uncovering” the 
climate change hoax.  While this sort of evaluation expertise may seem obvious and common 
sense, technological media context, especially the professionally presented blogs and 
YouTube channels, muddy the waters of information appraisal.  In his book PresentShock: 
When Everything Happens Now, NYU media scholar, Douglas Rushkoff presents Gallup 
and Pew research that finds that “from 1985 to 2005, the number of Americans unsure about 
evolution increased from 7 percent to 21 percent while those questioning global warming 
increased from 31% in 1997 to 48% in 2010” (49).  Rushkoff finds ideological cable news 
and religious programming, posing as news to be at the heart of the shifts in opinion.  While 
information may have shifted to a question of where form one of what, the challenges of 
students with information at their fingertips have increased rather than decreased. 
While Thomas and Brown do not delve into the ramifications of a shift from what to where 
of information (note – there has always been a where), their pedagogical concept of 
“making” offers a direction for the teaching of critical evaluation.  The “making” that 
Thomas and Brown refer to is the hands-on creation of technological media context:  
When we build, we do more than create content.  Thanks to 
new technologies, we create context by building within a 
particular environment, often providing links or creating 
connections and juxtapositions to give meaning to the content.  
Learning now, therefore, goes far beyond a simple transfer of 
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information and becomes inextricably bound with the context 
that is being created.  Where one choses to post, where one 
links to, or where one is linked from does not just serve as a 
locus for finding content.  It becomes part of the content itself 
(loc. 1316). 
“Making” media exposes the student exposed to the message making power of the context.  
Creating a blog or a YouTube video opens the student to the meaning making potential of the 
medium.  Thomas and Brown continue: 
Through the process of making, we are also learning how to 
craft context so that it carries more of a message, which helps 
solve many of the issues of information overload.  Thus, as 
context begins to play an increasingly important role, it 
becomes easier to talk about things like visual arguments; 
expanding the notion of literacy to include images, colour, and 
sound; and how information is transmitted through new 
phenomenon, such as viral distribution (loc. 1316). 
Making becomes a critical tool to battle the where focus of information.  The 
dimension/attribute matrix and actor network theory discussed in Section 4.6 provide abstract 
tools for critical analysis in terms of cognitive rhetoric of digital media, but they can also be 
applied in a practical sense to critically “make” arguments in technological media contexts.  
  214 
The where of information embedded in technological media context and a pedagogical focus 
on making bring us back to Schaffer and Gee and their conception of thickly authentic 
epistemic games.  An epistemic simulation game that immerses the student in the 
technological media context is the platform of my pedagogy of professional communication.  
Before moving on to a description of the game platform itself, however, the concept of play 
needs to be addressed. 
As soon as one suggests games, even simulation games, as a pedagogical foundation the 
specter of play arises.  Thomas and Brown (2011) find play to be treated as “secondary or 
incidental” and not a part of “serious” learning (loc. 1347).  I have implanted and tested a 
number of game-like pedagogical experiments in a post-secondary setting and I have found 
that many, if not most instructors view play as the opposite of serious; and games are the 
domain of play, therefore a game cannot be a serious pedagogical tool.12  Most instructors 
                                                
 
 
12	  While	  interesting	  and	  important,	  this	  statement	  is	  anecdotal	  and	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  
utilized	  as	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  data.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  I	  designed	  a	  teaching	  module	  on	  
analogy	  and	  argumentation	  around	  an	  analogy	  contest	  where	  student	  teams	  competed	  in	  
the	  formulation	  of	  an	  analogy	  for	  climate	  change.	  	  The	  analogies	  were	  judged	  by	  a	  random	  
selection	  of	  students	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  class,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  a	  Google	  survey.	  	  The	  
analogies	  were	  graded	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  my	  judgment	  and	  outside	  student	  
responses.	  	  While	  each	  team	  received	  a	  grade,	  the	  winning	  analogy	  received	  a	  2.5%	  bump	  
to	  their	  final	  grade.	  	  The	  contest	  was	  part	  of	  a	  simulation	  where	  student	  teams	  serve	  as	  
communication	  consultants	  specializing	  in	  environmental	  issues.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  my	  peers,	  
while	  finding	  the	  exercise	  interesting,	  did	  not	  choose	  to	  add	  the	  simulation	  game	  activity	  to	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that I have interacted with have felt games to be an interesting adjunct to serious pedagogy, 
but only as a peripheral activity.  However, I want to make the case that in a world of 
contextually unconscious technological media, simulation games are a more effective 
pedagogical tool than readings, lectures, and workshops .  Serious pedagogy of the lecture, 
decontextualized cases and workshops, measured through tests and abstract assignments are 
less effective in teaching discursive, extra-discursive, and visuospatial rhetoric professional 
communication.  I am not saying there is no place for theoretical explanations or tests of 
skill, but traditional delivery methods of the lecture monologue and the artificial case study 
cannot provide the thick authenticity necessary to develop skill in argumentation, figuration, 
and information design.  The stumbling block to games being viewed as a viable alternative 
to serious pedagogy is the notion of play.   
In his seminal work on play Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga found play to be an activity 
apart from culture, a concept found in activities of other species, and a concept very difficult 
to define as solely a biological, psychological, or social activity.  For Huizinga, play is 
defined by its characteristics: 
Here, then, we have the first main characteristic of play: that it 
is free, is in fact freedom.  A second characteristic is closely 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
their	  course	  modules	  at	  our	  curriculum	  meeting.	  	  Most	  viewed	  the	  activity	  as	  fun,	  but	  
incremental	  to	  existing	  tests	  and	  assignments.	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connected with this, namely, that play is not “ordinary” or 
“real” life.  It is rather a stepping out of “real” life into a 
temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own 
(8). 
Huizinga’s claims that play is freedom and not of the ordinary are they key reasons 
simulation games are the best pedagogical alternative in the teaching of professional 
communication.  The student is given the freedom of agency in a simulation game.  She 
locates and evaluates theoretical and skill based information as required in order to complete 
the simulation (the details of how this is effected are discussed below).  The path through 
theory and skill development is less linear and emerges as the student navigates the narratives 
of the simulation.  Even though all theory is covered in the simulation, the student chooses 
their path through the game; freedom of play instills agency.  Huizinga also states, however, 
that “first and foremost, then, play is a voluntary activity.  Play to order is no longer play: it 
could at best be but a forcible imitation of it” (7).  And while technically this is true of a 
game made pedagogy, the diametrical opposition to traditional practices redeems it as play.  
The same holds for a simulation game in terms of Huizinga’s claim that play steps outside 
“real” life; while a simulation does strive to mirror real life seemingly contradicting this 
characteristic of play, the real life that is stepping away from is the ordinary life of the 
classroom.  If we compare a simulation game as pedagogical tool to a first-person shooter 
video game in terms of freedom, the real, and agency, the educational game falls short of 
Huizinga’s mark.  The video game, however, is not our point of comparison.  The simulation 
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game needs to be compared to traditional process based lecture and workshop pedagogy in 
relation to play.  Compared to traditional pedagogy, the simulation game offers more 
freedom (agency); is apart from what is expected from pedagogy by the student (out of the 
ordinary); and the choices made by the student appear more voluntary than the completion of 
a workshop exercise.   
A simulation game provides “thick authenticity” to pedagogy while a critical focus on 
technology and the technological unconscious helps move into a where from a what 
perspective in terms of pedagogical content.  The digital native student, raised in an era of 
instant information is able to use the search skills they have honed all of their lives in a 
fashion guided by the cognitive rhetorical principals of argumentation, figuration, and figural 
logic they uncover and are exposed to as they move through the narrative of the game.  
Rather than try to force a what perspective of information (content) through lectures and 
workshops, the simulation allows the student to discover and engage theory in consequential 
action.  Consequential in the sense that actions lead to reactions and responses that measure 
the degree to which the student has internalized theory.  The goal of both traditional and 
simulation pedagogy is the same: to instill theoretically informed praxis that the student is 
able to call on in real life situations.  I am not arguing that traditional pedagogy is wrong; 
rather that it is less effective (see discussion in chapter three) in the face of media 
proliferation and technological unconscious.  The agency, out-of-the-ordinary, and attitude of 
choice offered by the simulation allow for the word game and its association with play to be 
  218 
added without losing pedagogical rigor.  The next section provides a breakdown of the 
structure of a professional communication simulation game. 
The professional communication simulation game (Ametros) of my project immerses the 
student in the practices of the organization as system and is designed for post-secondary 
institutions.  Ametros is designed to be agnostic to genre; the content of the communications 
can come from any area of professional communication including business, technical, and 
legal.  
Section 5.3 describes the nature and design of Ametros, the simulated environment that 
immerses the student. Section 5.4 describes the way in which she navigates through and 
engages that environment. 
5.3 Game World 
Ametros is framed as a fictional organization.  The prototype version of the game takes 
place in a software firm specializing in online presentation applications.  A detailed 
backstory is embedded in the game that includes product descriptions, markets, competitors, 
production, research and development, organization charts, and a company history.  Students 
can access archives of blogs, newsletters, and the like, to research this backstory right at the 
outset of their play, or they can encounter it as they progress through the game, filling gaps 
for themselves as necessary. The backstory includes how the student is related to the 
company as a new hire, including a job description that details responsibilities, expectations, 
and assumed skills, which helps to frame the functionality and gameplay of Ametros.   
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The online environment includes a 3D animated office where the student, in a first-person 
perspective, interacts with the characters generated by the artificial intelligence engine, and 
in the future other students.13 The student completes tasks using a dashboard like interface 
that includes links to outside software residing in the cloud of the post-secondary institution 
(applications could include Skype, PowerPoint, Sync-In, SlideRocket, Prezi, Wordpress, 
Twitter, and Facebook). 
Characters include a Senior Director and a Mentor.  The Senior Director provides the 
student/manager with theoretical content (argumentation theory, strategies, figural logic, 
dimension/attribute matrix, and so on) in the form of meetings, readings, and forums.  The 
Senior Director fulfills the role off the instructor/professor in a classroom setting, the 
relationship, however, is professional rather than academic.  The Mentor character provides 
ongoing support for the student/manager in the form of draft reviews, comments, and 
suggestions.  Both the Senior Director and the Mentor contain human and artificial 
intelligence elements.  The Instructor or Teaching Assistant of the course may choose to use 
the artificial intelligence agent to deliver lecture/meetings and readings while engaging in 
discussion forums in the role of the Senior Director.  In the early version of Ametros, a 
                                                
 
 
13	  The	  initial	  version	  of	  Ametros	  will	  focus	  on	  interactions	  between	  Senior	  Directors,	  
Mentors,	  and	  Students	  in	  the	  animated	  office	  setting.	  	  Student	  to	  student	  contact	  will	  take	  
place	  via	  message	  boards	  and	  Skype.	  	  Subsequent	  versions	  of	  the	  game	  will	  include	  group	  
VoIP	  (voice	  over	  Internet)	  discussions	  in	  the	  animated	  office.	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Teaching Assistant plays the Mentor, in terms of reading drafts and offering suggestions as 
well as providing feedback as performance review/grades.  The goal of the Ametros project 
is the development of an artificial intelligence agent capable of increasing the time a 
Teaching Assistant has for composition response.  The natural language processing and 
corpus building aspect of Ametros is detailed in section 6.2.  The student/manager is not 
directly informed as to whether the Senior Director or Mentor is played by a human being or 
an artificial intelligence agent. 
The game world of Ametros is designed to immerse the student in a professional setting 
subject to the interactions of Level 1 and Level 2 technological systems.  The student 
navigates a series of projects utilizing a number of technologies from Skype to Wordpress in 
an attempt to develop and deliver communication that moves the mission of the organization 
forward.  
 
5.4 Game Play 
The student assumes the role of a Manager in an organization who then proceeds to 
complete a series of communication challenges.  The student has a choice of gender, while 
other factors such as educational background, ethnicity, interests, and specialties are selected 
by Ametros in order to assure the student moves through various contexts imbibing ( 
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‘learning’ in the old model) the most effective theorized praxis.14  The gameplay objective is 
to successfully complete all challenges achieving a series of promotions culminating in a 
position of Director (pedagogical objectives are discussed in Chapter 6).  Each week the 
student attends a meeting or presentation where projects and tasks are discussed and 
administered.  The meetings and presentations include theoretical, as well as situational 
material.  For example:   
The student logs into Ametros through the post-secondary institution’s learning 
management system (LMS).  They now have a first person view of a lobby/reception 
area where an animated receptionist lets the student know the Senior Director is 
waiting for them in the conference room (he points to the conference door).  The 
student’s avatar walks into the conference room and provides an introduction using 
their keyboard (note on possible voice).  The animated characters of the Senior 
Director and associates welcome the student, alongside avatars of other students in 
other roles, by providing an orientation to the organization, what business they are in, 
markets, structure, and so on.  The Senior Director then proceeds to contextually 
describe a communication task that is being assigned to the student.  The Senior 
                                                
 
 
14	  Future	  versions	  of	  Ametros	  will	  incorporate	  intercultural	  communication	  into	  the	  project	  
modules	  by	  allowing	  students	  to	  designate	  ethnicity	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  recognizing	  cultural	  
differences	  in	  communication	  as	  part	  of	  the	  peer	  review	  process.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  student	  
will	  analyze	  factors	  of	  politeness,	  directness,	  and	  so	  on	  in	  other	  students	  work.	  	  Such	  a	  
module	  will	  require	  research	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  version	  one.	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Director emails the student background material that includes a detailed description 
of the situation, the appropriate communication/argumentation/figural 
logic/information design theory necessary to the task, and detailed instructions on 
how to carry out the assignment.  The meeting will have duration of approximately 
ten to fifteen minutes.  The student exits the conference room and logs off to read 
the material that has been emailed to their LMS email account.     
The student/manager is assigned a mentor as both a human Teaching Assistant (TA), as 
well as in the form of a character-based artificial intelligence engine (AI).  The character of 
the Mentor (a senior manager of randomized gender and ethnicity) provides the student with 
clarification of the readings, videos, and other materials that might have been assigned during 
the meetings; the relevant context of the situation or problem; advice about the projected 
audience; and so on.  The Mentor (AI) delivers the information through a combination of 
monologue and quasi-dialogue.  The student can set up a meeting with the Mentor 
immediately or at a future time.  For example: 
The student sends a meeting request to the Mentor (AI) complete with time and 
subject to be discussed.  If the request is vague or incomplete (lack of specified time, 
name of project, and so on) the Mentor (AI) emails back with questions rather than 
acceptance providing repeated learning opportunities in drafting routine messages.  
The Mentor as Teaching Assistant accepts the meeting and provides the place; the 
meeting can take place in the conference room with the animated AI Mentor 
(allowing the Mentor to use slides to augment the discussion) or via text or voice 
  223 
chat.  The Mentor (AI) gives a monologue presentation on theorized practices, the 
situation, and tips for completing the task, using presentation software.  The Mentor 
(AI) will review the student’s draft and proffer context specific questions based on 
natural language algorithms that detect elements of argumentation (discussed in 
chapter 6.0)  
• “have you considered using an argument based on reality, where you look for 
aspects that have been previously accepted…?”, or  
• “have you considered using the figure gradatio to organize your points? Gradatio 
involves…”, or  
• “this situation requires a clean design, pay special attention to the leading and the 
amount of white space.  Leading is the…,” and so on.   
When the student has exhausted the information available through the Mentor, she 
proceeds to complete the task.  
Meeting with the Mentor (AI) before interaction with the Mentor as Teaching Assistant 
allows for a preliminary level of response that will develop into a version of Nancy Sommers 
(1982) conception response as engagement with the intended meaning (in this case argument) 
of the student.  As the corpora of student work grows, the Mentor (AI) will provide ever 
more detailed and student specific critical questions.  The Mentor (AI) serves to “sabatoge 
our student’s conviction that the drafts they have written are complete and coherent…forcing 
[them] back into the chaos” (154).  The Mentor (AI) helps deal with what Sommers views as 
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a “confusion of process and product” by calling out what can only be elements of product 
(154).  The feedback provided by the Mentor (AI) at this stage is incomplete and designed to 
free the Mentor (TA) time for in-depth response further into the project.     
The tasks will range from requesting information, completing a research report, writing a 
message in a crisis environment, giving bad news, recommendations, proposals, research 
reports, Tweets, Facebook posts, text chats, Skype chats, as well as PowerPoint, Prezi, or 
Sliderocket presentations.15  The tasks will be part of the overall narrative of the simulation.  
A business communication Ametros could have a marketing focus (such as the launch of a 
new product), a management focus (issues such as team building), operational, financial, or a 
crisis situation.  For example: 
 
 
 
The student is tasked with recommending a website design firm from three finalists.  
Using the finalist’s websites and information provided by the Senior Director, the 
student analyzes the three firms in terms of services and design capabilities in 
relation to the needs of the student’s organization and the situation.  The student 
                                                
 
 
15	  Outside	  software	  applications	  will	  be	  accessed	  via	  an	  embedded	  link	  in	  the	  game	  
interface.	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drafts a recommendation report that requires the engagement of argumentation, 
figural logic and design theory (the structure, form, and strategy triad discussed in 
chapter two).  The report is emailed to the Mentor who responds with questions and 
concerns.  The Mentor could send the report back to be revised and/or accept the 
report with questions.  The student then revises the report or answers the questions 
until the Mentor is satisfied.  It is at this stage, the part of the Mentor is played by the 
real-life Teaching Assistant (the next section details the development of the artificial 
intelligence engine using corpora building and natural language processing to aid 
and augment the Teaching Assistant).  When the Mentor (TA) deems the report 
satisfactory, it is sent to the Senior Director (also a TA at this point in the simulation) 
for grading.  Feedback is provided throughout the process.  The task is iterative; the 
student does not compose a report to be evaluated as much as draft a report for a 
grade as work though drafts that result in a finished product suitable to be evaluated 
as a communicative object.  There are a number of supporting exercises that include 
annotating argument structure, schemes, and figural logic.  The annotations are 
performed using a point-and-click interface and allow for a host of activities including 
visualization and dialogue interactions.  The annotation engine is described in detail 
in the next chapter.       
 
The Mentor (TA) responds to what in essence is a second draft through a Skype video or 
voice conference.  The method of response is at the discretion of the Instructor, but could be 
based on what Richard Haswell (2006, 3) refers to as “discourse activity” where a field 
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dynamics similar to the use of Actor Network Theory examined in chapter 4.6, integrates 
human and technological actors.16  The Mentor (TA) will conference for five to ten minutes 
with each student to discuss the effectiveness of the communication (style and grammar in 
text, as well as design elements in image and organization should be addressed only when 
effective meaning is established).  The live or recorded conference follows Jeff Sommers’ 
conception of “Response 2.0” where Instructors respond with audio comments.  Sommers’ 
research finds student’s feel the feedback is more “personal” as tone and inflection can put 
comments into the appropriate context (2013, 25).  Ametros will deploy both audio and video 
feedback where the TA responds first to the rhetorical and argumentative aspects of the work 
followed by engagement with design and style.    
                                                
 
 
16	  Haswell	  integrates	  his	  discourse	  activity	  theory	  with	  Paul	  du	  Gay’s	  “circuit	  of	  culture”	  as	  
way	  of	  explaining	  the	  role	  of	  response	  and	  its	  complexities.	  	  I	  am	  appropriating	  the	  notion	  
of	  discourse	  theory	  as	  a	  way	  to	  map	  response	  onto	  the	  technogentic	  theories	  of	  complex	  
systems	  and	  actor	  networks.	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 Figure 10 shows the basic progression of one task from student log on to completion. 
 
Figure 10: Ametros Project Flow Through 
 
Student signs into PCSG through Post-Secondary Instiitution LMS
Student checks messages to either continue with an existing task
or move to next project
New Project Project in Progress
Meeting with Senior Director
Details of project/task(s)
Situation and theory readings
Meeting with 
Mentor Request 
Mentor provides guidance
on project/task and
communication theory
Student composes/designs
communication object
makes revsions
Drafts are exchanged with Mentor who may have 
questions or desire revisions
Final draft is submitted to Senior Director for evaluation
Student receives feedback
possible promotion or performance review
Instructions provided on how to proceed to next project or
schedule a performance review
Student completes final draft
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Ametros consists of three projects with a total duration of twelve weeks.  Each project 
contains elements of a traditional professional communication curriculum: routine messages, 
formats, negative information, research, and so on.  The elements of curriculum, however, 
are secondary to the goal of the project, which is to simulate the use of the elements of 
curriculum in real-world type settings and contexts.  Sections 5.4.1 - 5.4.3 present three 
example projects based on a business-writing version of Ametros.  The content of the 
projects are not discussed in great detail.  For example, details of the lectures and 
presentations provided by the artificial intelligence engine (Mentor AI) are not provided.  
The content of these presentations is fluid and can be developed by the course developer.  It 
can be assumed that a project with a heavy emphasis on design would involve multimedia 
presentations on the pedagogical material presented earlier in this dissertation.    
5.4.1  Example Project One – New Website Design Partner 
The student meets with the Senior Director who provides details on their first project.  The 
organization is in the process of choosing a new website designer/Internet consultant and the 
student is given the task of researching three finalists, recommending one company, and 
communicating a rejection to the two remaining firms.  Figure 11 displays the four tasks of 
the project: requesting research (from the artificial intelligence engine of Ametros, playing 
the role of the research department), drafting a recommendation report, drafting notifications 
via the company’s social media (Twitter, Facebook, and Blog), and finally notifying the 
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remaining firms that they were not selected.  A number of traditional curriculum areas are 
covered (writing a routine message, research, persuasive writing, formatting an informal 
report, writing for social media, and writing negative messages) in a dynamic format where 
cognitive rhetorical theory is put into practice.  The communications produced serve specific 
purposes other than just functioning as objects to be graded. The communications drive 
responses that affect the forward motion of the project.  For example, if the request for the 
research documents does not provide sufficient detail (names of the reports, appropriate 
format, reasons for why they are being requested, clarity about timeline, and so on), Ametros 
will send back a request for further information until the request is complete.  The Mentor is 
provided drafts of the final three tasks before they go to the Senior Director for approval.   
The Mentor (TA) responds to the students work as discourse activity providing suggestions 
and advice that student may use to make improvements.  .  
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Figure 11 displays a sample project for weeks one to three of a Ametros with a marketing 
focus. 
 
Figure 11: Web Design Partner Project 
 
 The Senior Director (TA) must accept a task as complete before the student can continue 
with the project.  Each task has a hard deadline that requires an effective request 
communication if an extension is required.  Finally, the Senior Director provides a project 
Project 1: New Web Design/Strategy Partner - Weeks 1-3
Task 1    Request Information from Research Team
Acceptable: Move to Task 2 Unacceptable: Resubmit Request
Task 2    Compose and Design a Recommendation Report
Acceptable: Move to Task 3 Unacceptable: Revise Report
Task 3:    Compose Twitter/FB/Blog Posts Announcing Web Partner
Acceptable: Move to Task 4 Unacceptable: Revise Posts
Task 4:  Inform Unsuccessful Finalists  
Acceptable: Project Completed Unacceptable: Revise Notification 
Move to Next Project 
with Promotion and 
Salary Increase
Move to Next Project Performance Review 
3 Days
7 Days
4 Days
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review (grade) based on a detailed rubric for the overall project that falls into three 
categories: 75-100 move on to the next project with a promotion and salary increase in the 
form of two bonus marks; 60-74 move onto the next project without promotion or increase in 
salary – the student must draft an email to the Senior Director acknowledging areas that 
require improvement; and finally, 0-59 requires a performance review where the student is 
required to resubmit revised task documents in order to move onto the next project.  The 
process mimics the business environment in an exaggerated fashion where strong work is 
rewarded and weaker work requires more work.  The goal is not to punish, but to drive home 
the fact that communication creates effects that result in action or inaction, some positive and 
some negative.  As discussed above, the Mentor/Senior Director functions of the Teaching 
Assistants are designed to minimize ineffectual communication.  Figure 12 presents the 
promotion and salary levels achievable in Ametros.  There are twenty-seven different 
possible outcomes in terms of achievement: the student may receive a promotion and bonus 
on one project and not on another. 
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Figure 12: Ametros Achievement Levels and Incentives   
5.4.2 Example Project Two – Brand Review   
Project two involves performing four individual tasks in a group setting.  The situation is a 
Brand Review that is being compiled by the Senior Director.  The overall goal of the project 
is a comprehensive review of the organization’s brand strengths and weaknesses.  Teams of 
four are created with each member student tasked with converting raw data that includes 
numbers and focus group results – for example, converting raw sales figures and a ranked list 
of brand qualities into a visual using information design and visuospatial rhetoric.  Each 
student will also be assigned a geographic market in which they will prepare a review of 
competitive offerings.  For example, one student in the group may be tasked with the 
Canadian and another the United Kingdom market.  The parameters of the report such as 
number of brands, product offerings, analysis of social media presence, and so on, will be 
provided.  For task three, group members will meet via Skype to discuss and plan task four, 
the composition of a set of presentation slides using the results of task one and two.  The 
slides will be developed on an online presentation application such as SlideRocket or Prezi.  
The Mentor (as artificial intelligence engine and not TA) will provide guidance in the form 
of lectures and multimedia presentation on elements of design and visuospatial rhetoric.  In 
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this project, the students peer review each other’s work.17  Rather than have the Mentor (TA) 
provide feedback, the students review and authorize the work of the other group members.  
Issues such as draft due dates become very important in this project.  Once the group has 
authorized the tasks, the students move onto the next task or project.   
 
5.4.3 Example Project Three – Formal Proposal 
The final example project involves collaboration in both the composition and analysis of a 
formal proposal.  The students work in the same teams as project two and once again they 
work independently on a collaborative project.  The purpose of the project is the composition 
of a formal proposal detailing the opening of a new geographic market for the organization.  
The proposal is broken into functional sections including finance, product planning, human 
resources, and marketing.  The structure of the proposal is predetermined so that the 
functional content does not dominate the project.  For example, the human resources section 
involves planning the number of employees required, where they will be hired, 
qualifications, and so on.  The Mentor provides the detail required to complete the section 
without previous knowledge of human resources.  The content provided by the Mentor is 
                                                
 
 
17	  There	  is	  large	  stream	  of	  excellent	  scholarship	  on	  peer	  review	  and	  writing	  studies	  that	  is	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation	  including	  Lee-­‐Ann	  Kastman	  Breuch	  work	  on	  virtual	  
peer	  review	  (2004)	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vetted by functional area experts (preferably from the hosting post-secondary institution).  
Hyperlinks are provided to Internet and scholarly resources that allow the student to focus on 
composing their section rather than on research (note).  The team meets via Skype to discuss 
the proposal and delegate sections.  The individual students compose their section of the 
written proposal, as well as slides accompanied by an audio description.  The students meet 
to compile the report and the presentation assuring that proper transitions are in place for 
both the written proposal and visual/audio presentation. 
The project occupies the final four weeks of the course with the proposal and presentation 
completed in the first three weeks of the project.  The finished products are then transmitted 
to another group who will vet the written proposal and presentation, producing a written 
critique and response.  The situation requires the proposal to be prepared for the Senior 
Director, but before any proposal is sent on, it is critiqued and responded to by another team.  
Once the proposal critique and response are complete, the composing team will have the 
opportunity to make edits before submission to the Senior Director.  Completed individual 
tasks are uploaded to the Mentor as they are completed; for instance, when the individual 
completes their section and slides, they send them to the Mentor, who, as artificial 
intelligence, will provide a checklist of key factors.  The Senior Director (TA) grades the 
final proposals, digital presentations, critiques, and responses.  The proposal and presentation 
are graded by individual section.   
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Chapter 6 
Objectives and Further 
Research   
  The primary objective of a technogenetic 
pedagogy of professional communication is 
the development of teaching methodologies 
that account for the effects of digital media 
technologies on cognition and 
communication in a world of human and 
organizational closed complex systems.  
Chapter one defined the context of technogenetic rhetoric while chapters two through four 
outline a pedagogy based on argumentation, figural logic, visuospatial rhetoric and 
information design that attempts to reconcile the conscious and unconscious technological 
extension of cognition.  Technogenetic rhetoric focuses on the interrelationships of language, 
image, technology, and extra-discursive elements such as ethos, kairos, and tone from a 
cognitive perspective.  Specifically the cognitive affinities and mechanisms we have for 
language and image as argumentation, figuration, vision, sound, and space.  Chapter five 
describes a delivery mechanism for a technogenetic pedagogy in the form of a simulation 
game in which students are immersed in the theory and practice of professional 
communication in a setting of play and exploration.  The Professional Communication 
Assessment
Feedback
Corpora
NLP
Research
Objectives
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Simulation Game (Ametros) has a set of objectives beyond the development of teaching 
methodologies.  Ametros is primarily an online offering, and while it can be deployed in a 
hybrid classroom/online setting, gameplay is designed for online education.  The following 
chapter outlines a series of Ametros objectives for online pedagogy that focus on feedback 
(section 6.1), a research program and protocol inherent to the PCGS involving corpora 
building and natural language processing (section 6.2), assessment (section 6.3), and finally, 
a brief outline of further research (section 6.4).  Technogenetic rhetorical pedagogy for 
professional communication has four objectives: 
1. Develop pedagogy and methodologies suitable for the conscious and unconscious 
extension of cognition and communication 
2. Develop pedagogical and natural language processing protocols that provide feedback 
superior to classroom-based courses by developing a corpora of professional 
communication suitable for natural language processing. 
3.  Develop assessment protocols that align the needs of the institution with the reality 
of the professional organization. 
4. Develop a research protocol and on-going program to study communication 
immersed in digital media through the construction of corpora and natural language 
processing applications. 
Chapters one through four address the enormity of objective one.  This final chapter 
discusses feedback, assessment, and research program objectives in relation to the 
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implementation of Ametros and future work.  While the theoretical foundation, pedagogical 
implications, and structure of Ametros are well defined and are in the process of being 
implemented, the path to objectives two, three, and four are far from clear and will constitute 
an ongoing research program.   
6.1 The Challenge of Online Feedback 
Studies such as Bernard et al. (2003) and Zhao et al. (2005) report what most educators 
involved in online learning already know: the more engaged the instructor, the higher the 
degree of feedback, resulting in a higher degree of student satisfaction.  Since its inception, 
online education has struggled with the issue of feedback.  The strength of online education, 
primarily the ability to reach more students through the virtual classroom is often offset by 
the limited feedback an instructor is able to provide.  If an Instructor is responsible for five 
hundred students, and ten Teaching Assistants fifty students each, the level of feedback that 
can be offered is limited by time.    Providing detailed feedback on fifty average size (5-6 
page) reports requires anywhere from ten to fifteen hours. When weekly workshops, major 
projects, and time spent answering posts and emails are added to the mix, the one-hundred 
hours allocated to the Teaching Assistant are easily consumed, most often without the 
provision of adequate feedback.  The online and solitary nature of the pedagogy is most often 
the crux of the problem.  In a traditional lecture setting, students listen and perhaps join in a 
discussion on the content of the course.  The instructor assigns assignments based on what 
she is capable of grading and offering feedback in a reasonable amount of time, very often 
between four and six assignments and tests per term.  Class size also determines the number 
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of assignments and tests; in a class of twenty students, the instructor is able to provide 
feedback on weekly exercises such as blog posts and reflections, while a class of forty-five 
makes such a feedback unrealistic or, if attempted, insufficient.  The student understands the 
tradeoff.  The availability of the instructor during office hours and after class, in a 
combination with the setting where the student is one of a visible group, makes acceptance of 
the level of feedback probable.  In an online setting, the student sits alone at their computer 
viewing a multi-media presentation as lecture, without the opportunity to ask questions or 
join in a discussion.  Emailing questions to a TA or posting to a discussion board is the 
available means of interaction in most online environments creating a delay that dilutes the 
effectiveness of feedback.  At the same time, the student is asked to produce more content in 
the form of workshops, assignments, and tests than they would in a traditional setting.  
Content lectures in an online setting are of a significantly shorter duration than in a face-to-
face lecture. Ninety minute lectures/discussions are not feasible online.  To offset the smaller 
content lectures, online courses increase the degree of actual practice performed by the 
student.  On the whole, this is a good thing and one of the strengths of online education.  The 
problem lies in feedback.  The student rightfully expects feedback for most, if not all 
activities they have completed.  In a writing and communication course, the feedback issue is 
critical; automatic marking is not applicable in most cases.  Automatically marked quizzes on 
theory are often implemented, but in communication and writing pedagogy, only feedback on 
actual practice leads to praxis.  Students expect comment and correction on their work and as 
most online classes are significantly larger than face-to-face tutorials, this is, for the most 
  240 
part, impossible.  A real-world example is found at the University of Waterloo: face-to-face 
tutorials for the academic writing course (ENGL 109) are capped at twenty-five, while the 
online business writing course (ENGL 210F) is capped at fifty students.18  
Ametros attempts to alleviate the feedback issue in online education by expanding the 
opportunities available to the student to test and analyze the validity and effectiveness of 
their work.  Feedback in Ametros is provided at a number of points in the course beyond the 
grading of work.  Feedback is received from multiple sources that include Instructors, 
Teaching Assistants, peers, and artificial intelligence agents.  The key conduit of feedback is 
the Mentor character, both artificial intelligence and human being, described in the previous 
section.  The Mentor offers numerous feedback opportunities beyond the grading of 
assignments.  The two primary feedback mechanisms are dialogue and analysis.  Dialogue 
occurs on four levels, two of which function through the Mentor and two through peer 
interaction.  Each Mentor and peer dialogue involves a live stream and interaction with an 
artificial intelligence agent.  Analysis also takes place on four levels: analysis performed by 
the student on their own work, analysis performed by the student on the work of peers, 
analysis by the Mentor, and limited analysis by human Instructors and Teaching Assistants.  
Constant dialogic and analytical opportunities provide a level of feedback superior to that of 
                                                
 
 
18	  In	  a	  review	  of	  the	  comment	  sections	  of	  five	  online	  course	  evaluations	  for	  ENGL	  210F	  and	  
found	  the	  “lack	  of	  feedback”	  complaint	  to	  be	  second	  only	  to	  “lack	  of	  communication	  with	  
TA/Instructor”	  in	  terms	  of	  frequency.	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both traditional online and face-to-face teaching environments.  Before describing the 
feedback mechanisms, two core ontologies that allow dialogue and analysis to take place via 
artificial intelligence agents is described.  The first, the Argument Interchange Format (AIF), 
applies to argumentation, while the second is, the Rhetorical Figure Ontology (RhetFig), an 
ontology still in development.  The AIF and Rhetfig provide an intermediate language that 
will allow the development of web-based feedback applications. 
6.1.1 The Argument Interchange Format 
 The AIF is a joint project of a research community in computational argumentation 
based out of the Argument Research Group of the University of Dundee.  The goal of the 
project is the development “of a core ontology for expressing argumentative information” 
(Bex et al. 2013, 953) that allows the many diverse research projects focused on 
computational argumentation a common intermediary language.  It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to provide a detailed technical description of the AIF.  There are a number of 
papers on the AIF and its applications that provide such detail (…).  The following describes 
the AIF and the applications it supports in connection to the pedagogical value afforded 
Ametros.  The AIF is an abstract representation of classes and relations in the elements of 
argumentation theory represented as an ontology of argumentation classes that is based on 
graph theory where arguments are represented in nodes that are connected by edges.  The 
ontology contains two parts, an Upper Ontology that contains the basic, abstract elements 
that allow for the development of Argument graphs and a Forms Ontology that contains the 
specific definitions (953).  There are two types of nodes in the Upper Ontology, information 
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nodes (I-Nodes) and scheme nodes (S-Nodes).  I-Nodes hold the information content while 
S-nodes contain the argumentation scheme (what I have called strategy in this dissertation).  
Information nodes contain data as propositions and sentences while scheme nodes contain 
very basic reasoning strategies such as preference, inference, and conflict (953).  CA-nodes 
denote conflict schemes, PA-Nodes denote preference schemes, and RA Nodes denote 
inference schemes.  Edges are represented by lines that define the relationship between 
nodes, for example CA or inference nodes are a sub-class of schemes.  The Forms Ontology 
contains nodes and edges that allow for specific argument schemes and relationships.  The 
Upper Ontology represents the syntax of the ontology while the Forms Ontology represents 
the semantics of the AIF (3).  Figure 13 represents the ontology as a graph.    
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Figure 13: AIF Ontology - (Bex, Modgil,Prakken & Reed  2013 955) 
The AIF ontology supports particular argument schemes of Perelman and Olbreachts-
Tytecca, and Douglas Walton discussed in chapter three.  Using AIF, it is possible to create 
graphs of specific argument schemes that can be displayed visually using another ARG 
software tool Araucaria.  Araucaria is able to engage an AIF ontology that has been moved 
from abstract graph to reified intermediary language (written in OWL) to produce visual 
models of arguments (see Figure 14). 
  244 
 
Figure 14: Sample Argument Diagram 
 Araucaria allows the user to enter the text of an argument, select premises, and determine the 
argument scheme in use.  Figure 15 shows the scheme “argument from a position to know” 
engaged in the premises displayed in the top two boxes. 
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Figure 15: Araucaria Argument Scheme Dialouge Box 
A reified AIF ontology also allows for interactive argumentation using applications such as 
Arvina  (Reed et al. 2011).  AIF arguments that are stored in a database are accessible to 
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Arvina, which allows a student to interact with the claim and ground statements of previous 
participants.  While other students create the statements, the artificial intelligence robot of 
Arvina calls up the relevant propositions and interacts with the student.  At the time of this 
writing, Arvina is in the prototype stage.   
The AIF ontology, along with the applications Araucaria and Arvina provide a second 
level of feedback on top of traditional marking and review as the student is able to conduct a 
fine grained visual and dynamic analysis their own arguments, as well as those of other 
students.  For example, the student is able to visually diagram the claims, grounds, and 
backing of the argument they made in project one, the selection of a web partner.  The 
student is also able to interact and question arguments made by other students in favor of the 
other companies.  The AI Mentor will assign these activities as part of the review and 
feedback sessions prior to final submission to the Senior Director.  The engagement of 
Ametros and a reified AIF offer a number of other possibilities.  I plan to integrate Araucaria 
and Arvina (when the final version is available) into the interface of Ametros as 
supplemental activities required to complete each project.19   
The second ontology Ametros will engage is the Rhetorical Figure Ontology (RhetFig).  
RhetFig is a project of Randy Allen Harris and is currently in an early stage of development.  
                                                
 
 
19	  Both	  applications	  are	  products	  of	  the	  Argument	  Research	  Group	  (ARG)	  at	  the	  University	  
of	  Dundee	  in	  Dundee,	  Scotland.	  	  The	  programs	  are	  open	  source	  and	  available	  for	  research	  
purposes.	  	  I	  will	  work	  with	  the	  ARG	  to	  integrate	  the	  applications	  into	  Ametros.	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The RhetFig ontology will classify rhetorical figures in a manner similar to the AIF ontology.  
Schemes, tropes, chroma, and rhetorical strategies will be classified in relation to the 
cognitive affinities they engage.  For example, the scheme antimetabole engages the 
cognitive affinities of repetition and association.  The RhetFig ontology will allow for the 
development of annotation tools (described below) and applications that will allow students 
to analyze their own, as well as that of other student’s use of figuration as an argumentation 
methodology.    
6.2 Corpus Building     
The analytical activities and exercises assigned by the Mentor are based on annotation 
performed by the student.  Ametros will provide an interface that allows the student to 
annotate their work by highlighting a specific sentence, or clause and then clicking the 
appropriate button.  For example, the student may be tasked with annotating the key sentence 
that describes their argument scheme.  
The student is given a finite selection of argument schemes to employ in any given report 
or assignment.  The student may decide to employ the “argument from expert opinion” 
scheme in making their recommendation for a web design company (project one detailed 
above).  The student highlights the text, “the Canadian Association of Web Design 
Companies selected A1 Design as the best e-commerce provider in Canada” and clicks the 
“argument from expert opinion” selection on the interface.  Other aspects such as claim, data, 
and backing statements will also be annotated.  Araucaria allows for the annotation of 
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argument schemes that could serve as the engine for annotation in Ametros interface.   
Textual elements of rhetorical figures such as antimetabole, anaphora, isocolon, and ploche 
will also be annotated for use with the Rhetorical Figure Ontology (RhetFig).  Other tropes 
and chroma such as analogy and gradatio will be annotated.  In addition to a standard list, the 
annotation engine and interface will allow for the addition of whichever argument 
schemes/elements and rhetorical figures the course instructor deems necessary. 
The annotation engine will be designed using a modified version of Araucaria and 
Argumentation Markup Language (AML) developed by the ARG of the University of 
Dundee.  AML is based on XML (Extensible Markup Language) a widely used text markup 
language that provides a number of standard tools for development. Basing AML on XML 
also allows for the use of stylesheets that will allow Ametros to extend the basic markup 
parameters of AML to elements of figuration and figural logic.  AML currently annotates 
text with basic elements of argumentation including premises and propositions (Reed and 
Rowe, 2004).  Ametros will create an interface that simplifies the annotation of elements to a 
highlight and click model.  One of the primary roles of the Teaching Assistant (a full 
description of the role is presented below) is the checking and correcting of the annotation.  
Approximately four texts, written in different technological mediums and formats 
(recommendation report, blog post, instant messenger dialogue, and presentation transcript) 
are annotated during a course cycle.  The TA (as Mentor) is responsible for checking and 
correcting the annotation, or sending it back to the student for revision if the elements 
annotated do not represent an argument scheme or rhetorical figure.  At the end of each term, 
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the course will produce hundreds of annotated arguments.  Ametros will upload the annotated 
arguments to the Araucaria database, as well as a database maintained for use research on 
figuration and figural logic.  As the number of arguments in the corpus increases, the 
annotation engine will deploy a hidden Markov model algorithm that will train the engine to 
anticipate the validity of the selection.  A hidden Markov model algorithm determines the 
probability of linguistic tokens in a temporal sequence based on a corpus database (Baum, 
1972).  In other words, the annotation engine (as Mentor) will suggest corrections or 
alterations to an annotation.  For example if the student clicks the “argument from example” 
selection for what the engine determines is more likely the scheme “argument from expert 
opinion”, a suggestion to change the annotation is presented in a pop-up text box.  If the 
annotation engine is in agreement with the annotation of the scheme, it will ask Walton’s 
critical questions, creating a mini-dialectical argument aimed at helping the student test their 
propositions.  For example, in the “argument from expert opinion” scheme the annotation 
engine will ask, “if there is a possibility of bias on the part of the expert in question”.  The 
annotation engine, as Mentor, will answer will further suggestions on the issue of bias – how 
important it is to check or how to, or even whether to defend the proposition if bias does exist 
and so on.   As the corpus grows, the annotation engine will become adept to the point of 
replacing the TA in annotation checking, as well as asking Walton’s critical questions.  
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Another possible method of computational analysis is rhetorical structure theory (RST).20  
Moens, Mochales Palau, Boiy, and Reed (2007) developed an analytical method based on 
RST for the classification of legal arguments that could serve as a method for computational 
argument analysis in Ametros.  The RST based analysis defined th relations between 
arguments and non-arguments through a series of markers including word couples, text 
statistics such as sentence and word length, punctuation, key words, and parse features such 
as certain conjunctions and adverbial combinations (227).     
The annotation engine will provide immediate feedback to the student in terms of 
argument and figural elements.  The student will be able to use the annotation engine in 
combination with Araucaria to create a visual representation of their argument that will help 
in not only understanding the effectiveness of their case, but also look at how arguments 
evolve in different digital media settings.  The database of arguments will also allow the 
student to take part in dialogic interaction with the arguments of other students on their own 
time.  Students will be able to use a modified Arvina tool to select recommendations different 
from their own to present counter claims and backing.  The result is a chat-based argument 
with the real propositions of other students that are controlled and presented by the artificial 
                                                
 
 
20	  RST	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  rhetoric	  per	  se,	  the	  theory	  attempts	  to	  define	  structure	  and	  
coherence	  in	  a	  text	  by	  analyzing	  relations	  between	  elements	  defined	  as	  nucleus	  and	  
satellite.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  relation	  “antithesis”	  has	  a	  nucleus	  of	  ideas	  favored	  by	  the	  author	  
and	  a	  satellite	  of	  ideas	  disfavored	  by	  the	  author	  (see	  Mann	  &	  Thompson,	  1988).	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intelligence engine of the modified Arvin application.  These chats will have the appearance 
of instant messenger interactions that will also be annotated as a dialogic argument in a 
digital medium.  The annotation engine and the applications it serves add a level of feedback 
not found in online courses. 
6.3 Assessment    
Next to feedback, assessment is the greatest challenge faced in an online environment.  
Assessment falls into two categories; automatically marked multiple-choice, fill-in-the-blank, 
and true-false quizzes, or short and long answer assignments marked by Teaching Assistants.  
Professional communication does not lend itself to the first category.  Assessing using auto-
marked quizzes demands a focus on theory and not practice.  Content modules in courses that 
utilize quizzes invariably rely on process and memorization making the deployment of a 
technogenetic pedagogy all but impossible.  The second category generally suffers from 
inconsistency in grading.  Individual Teaching Assistants will always interpret the most 
detailed rubrics differently.  The second most common complaint that I have read on the 
course evaluations for the professional communications online course offered by the 
University of Waterloo is inconsistent marking of assignments.  Regular Teaching Assistant 
meetings and discussion can alleviate the problem somewhat, but ultimately consistent 
grading will be a problem whenever a large body of students is graded on the same material 
by a large group of Teaching Assistants.  Ametros will attempt to alleviate the consistency 
problem though the various feedback loops available in each project.  The feedback 
applications available through the annotation engine and the interactions with the Mentor 
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(whether TA or AI engine) create a situation where multiple drafts of each project are revised 
numerous times.  Peer analysis in combination with applications such as a modified Arvina 
dialectical argument generator and Araucaria argument-mapping tool will create final 
products that are of higher quality than one-time submission projects.  The engagement of the 
Teaching Assistant in the process of revision also makes marking variance less likely.  The 
most important effect of the feedback loop of revisions, however, is on the attitudes of the 
students; the sheer number of times the student engages either the Teaching Assistant or 
artificial intelligence engine as Mentor, instills a deep understanding of the marking rubric 
involved.  For example, as the student annotates their argument elements of propositions and 
figuration, answers critical questions on their scheme, is given suggestions for improvement, 
and engages the work of other students, she is more apt to be completely aware of the quality 
of her work.  It is my expectation that the grade average for the course will be generally 
higher than a traditional offering with a portfolio (database) of student work in support.   
Assessment in Ametros is related to the workload of the course.  Personal research on 
online courses offered by the University of Waterloo, Conestoga College, and the University 
of Phoenix reveal that the average time spent engaged with the course modules (excluding 
reading) is forty-five minutes per week.  I take the time spent on course modules such as 
content lectures and workshops to be the equivalent of time spent in class in an on-campus 
setting.  The normal weekly in-class time of on-campus course is three hours.  In all courses 
observed, the amount of reading was relatively consistent at about forty-to-sixty pages 
weekly.  The discrepancy in student engagement time is more than likely a result of a 
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concern over attention.  It is unlikely a student would sit through a ninety-minute lecture 
online.  Ametros increases the engagement time of students and course drastically through 
the simulation game model.  The student does not click on a content module and listen to the 
twenty or so minutes of lecture and PowerPoint; she meets with the Mentor character for a 
theoretical introduction, completes a draft of a communication, annotates, analyzes, and 
diagrams the draft, Engages the work of other students, constantly interacts with the Mentor 
through numerous drafts and revisions, and finally submits a final artifact.  The goal is to 
have three hours on online engagement that keeps the student’s attention by keeping 
interaction time to less than twenty minutes per activity and instilling the goal and play 
orientation of a game.   
6.4 Ongoing Research Program 
In addition to developing new pedagogical tools based on technogenetic rhetoric, Ametros 
will provide a corpora of categorized arguments for future research into computer models of 
argumentation and figuration.  The arguments will be categorized according to digital 
medium and provide an opportunity for researchers to analyze arguments by media type.  
The corpora will be available to researchers in natural language processing to develop 
applications in number of different areas
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